Mind and Behavior 32:3

cognitive science, journal of mind and behavior, language, Luca Berta, phenomenology, philosophy of mind, qualia

The latest issue of The Journal of Mind and Behavior is now available. Though there is much to commend in this issue, one paper caught my eye: “Qualia from the Point of View of Language” by Luca Berta.

What is the difference between the discriminations made by a home appliance able to distinguish salt from sugar, and my sensations of salty and sweet? It is never taken into consideration that, in contrast to the appliance, I can have offline sensations, i.e., phenomenal experiences in the absence of direct environmental stimuli, mainly evoked by words occurring into thought, conversation, reading, etc. If we put this detachment stimuli/sensations in relation with the correlative detachment signs/referents inaugurated by the cognitive revolution of symbolic language (the fact that we use signs in the absence of their referents), we might rethink the role played by language in our phenomenal experience as a whole. Qualia can be defined as forms of relationship between organisms and environment, given that human environment is extended to the linguistic dimension, and that the latter has ignited a coevolutionary process with human cognition. The very same properties we attribute to qualia, even when conceiving of them as pre-linguistic phenomenal traits, rely on the cognitive resources that language has made available. The substantialist notion of qualia, I argue, is formed by an online sensation on which the focus shifts from the perceived object to the sensory quality by virtue of linguistic modes of thinking, which are systematically neglected.

Complexity and Extended Phenomenological-Cognitive Systems

Anthony Chemero, brain science, cognition, cognitive science, complexity, consciousness, dynamical systems, embodied cognition, embodiment, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, Michael Silberstein, neurophilosophy, neuroscience, phenomenology, philosophy of mind, qualia, situated cognition

A freely available piece from Topics in Cognitive Science. With the keywords complexity; dynamical systems; extended cognition; consciousness – who could resist. In fact the whole issue is freely available from this relatively new title published under the auspices of the Cognitive Science Society.

The complex systems approach to cognitive science invites a new understanding of extended cognitive systems. According to this understanding, extended cognitive systems are heterogenous, composed of brain, body, and niche, non-linearly coupled to one another. This view of cognitive systems, as non-linearly coupled brain–body–niche systems, promises conceptual and methodological advances. In this article we focus on two of these. First, the fundamental interdependence among brain, body, and niche makes it possible to explain extended cognition without invoking representations or computation. Second, cognition and conscious experience can be understood as a single phenomenon, eliminating fruitless philosophical discussion of qualia and the so-called hard problem of consciousness. What we call “extended phenomenological-cognitive systems” are relational and dynamical entities, with interactions among heterogeneous parts at multiple spatial and temporal scales.

The above article was cited by Guy Van Orden and Damian Stephen in their (also freely available) “Is Cognitive Science Usefully Cast as Complexity Science?“

Readers of TopiCS are invited to join a debate about the utility of ideas and methods of complexity science. The topics of debate include empirical instances of qualitative change in cognitive activity and whether this empirical work demonstrates sufficiently the empirical flags of complexity. In addition, new phenomena discovered by complexity scientists, and motivated by complexity theory, call into question some basic assumptions of conventional cognitive science such as stable equilibria and homogeneous variance. The articles and commentaries that appear in this issue also illustrate a new debate style format for topiCS.

Consciousness Online 4

bernard baars, chris frith, cognition, consciousness, Consciousness Online, neurophilosophy, neuroscience, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, richard brown

Check out the recently completed online conference. Bravo to Richard Brown for this great initiative. Also check out the forthcoming issue of Consciousness and Cognition that  features papers from CO2.

Hayek’s Speculative Psychology, The Neuroscience of value Estimation, and the Basis of Normative Individualism

cognitive science, Daniel Dennett, don ross, hayek, individualism, Jerry Fodor, neurophilosophy, philosophy of mind, philosophy of social science, the sensory order

Here’s the opening paragraph of Don Ross’ paper from Hayek in Mind: Hayek’s Philosophical Psychology.

Philosophers of mind who re-visit Friedrich Hayek’s The Sensory Order almost sixty years after its publication should feel humbled, perhaps sheepish, on behalf of their discipline. The book is essentially an exercise in abstract speculative mental architecture construction, the kind of project that has dominated the philosophy of mind since it began to reflect the rise of cognitive science in classic texts such as Dennett’s Content and Consciousness (1969) and Fodor’s Language of Thought (1975). Remarkably, Hayek’s effort is less in need of revision today, despite the mountain of intervening empirical work and technical refinement, then any of these works in its most obvious comparison class that were written by philosophers.

Lockean Social Epistemology

C.A.J. Coady, Frederick F. Schmitt, locke, philosophy of education, social epistemology, testimony

As mentioned in this paper, Locke and social epistemology is an improbable relation but  . . .

Locke’s reputation as a sceptic regarding testimony, and the resultant mockery by epistemologists with social inclinations, is well known. C.A.J. Coady paints Locke as an extreme example of epistemological individualism; Frederick F. Schmitt argues that Locke regards testimony neither as a source of knowledge nor as a means to justify belief, whilst Michael Welbourne, in The Community of Knowledge (1981), depicts Lockean epistemology as fundamentally opposed to a social conception of knowledge; that he „could not even conceive of the possibility of a community of knowledge‟ (Welbourne: 1981, 303). This interpretation of Locke is flawed. Whilst Locke does not grant the honorific „knowledge to anything short of certainty, he nonetheless held what we would call „testimonial knowledge‟ in appropriate esteem. This can be shown by his careful distinction between testimony and mere received opinion. Furthermore, this distinction is dependent upon a knowledge community which enables hearers of testimony to access alternative accounts.

Chalmers’ Singularity

artificial intelligence, cognitive enhancement, cognitive science, consciousness, Daniel Dennett, david chalmers, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, philosophy of mind, singularity

Check out the latest issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, a themed issue built around Dave Chalmers’ 2010 JCS paper  “The Singularity“.

What happens when machines become more intelligent than humans? One view is that this event will be followed by an explosion to ever-greater levels of intelligence, as each generation of machines creates more intelligent machines in turn. This intelligence explosion is now often known as the ‘singularity’.

By way of a taster here is an excerpt from Dan Dennett’s contribution in his usual inimitably bold style entitled “The Mystery of David Chalmers.”

‘The Singularity’ is a remarkable text, in ways that many readers may not appreciate. It is written in an admirably forthright and clear style, and is beautifully organized, gradually introducing its readers to the issues, sorting them carefully, dealing with them all fairly and with impressive scholarship, and presenting the whole as an exercise of sweet reasonableness, which in fact it is. But it is also a mystery story of sorts, a cunningly devised intellectual trap, a baffling puzzle that yields its solution — if that is what it is (and that is part of the mystery) — only at the very end. It is like a ‘well made play’ in which every word by every character counts, retrospectively, for something. Agatha Christie never concocted a tighter funnel of implications and suggestions. Bravo, Dave.

Clouding Conservatism

conservatism, corey abel, elizabeth corey, George Feaver, liberalism, political philosophy

Yet more Oakeshottiana. Here is a brief review by Elizabeth Corey of The Meanings of Michael Oakeshott’s Conservatism (table of contents). Corey summarizes why Oakeshott’s supposed conservatism equally frustrates self-avowed conservatives and liberal critics: in the second excerpt she neatly captures the appeal of Oakeshott for someone such as myself. (See also another recent posting).

In a certain sense, then, to call Oakeshott’s thought “conservative” is to court danger; for it implies that some sort of common understanding of conservatism might apply rather straightforwardly  to Oakeshott. It does not.

The heart of Oakeshott’s conservatism thus lay in both recognition and acceptance of the world’s imperfections. He hoped that we might see and appreciate the goods worthy of enjoyment, and that in addition we might know how to enjoy them. This was difficult, in his view, because it required that we put off or ignore our anxiety and aspirations for the future and engage fully in our present lives.

Neuroscience and philosophy must work together

barry smith, cognitive science, consciousness, neurophilosophy, neuroscience, philosophy of mind, the "easy" problems, the "hard" problem

Part of the Guardian’s Hard Problem series.