Stefan Zweig

H/T to Paul Raymont’s wonderfully eclectic Philosophy, lit, etc. for bringing my attention to this review in the Literary Review. I paste in the text just in case it becomes available by subscription only. Another, though unrelated article on Zweig, can be found in Intelligent Life: 

Stefan Zweig is a writer readers either love or barely know. As fresh work is published, Julie Kavanagh pinpoints his appeal …

By contrast here is a rather snippy assessment of Zweig in The Guardian. For what its worth I still think that Schachnovelle stands as one of the greatest psychological novels written and Die Welt von Gestern one of the most subtle of autobiographies. I realise that this is somewhat disturbing but here is a shot of Zweig and his wife after their double suicide.

 

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Three Lives: A Biography of Stefan Zweig
By Oliver Matuschek
(Translated by Allan Blunden)
(Pushkin Press 215pp £20)
Friderike & Stefan

Among the treasures in the British Library, one of the most unexpected is a collection of autographed manuscript scores that includes Mozart’s thematic catalogue of his own works. Donated in 1986, these formed part of the incredible hoard accumulated by Stefan Zweig throughout his life.

The collecting habit began early. By the age of fifteen, Zweig, the indulged second son of a wealthy family of Viennese industrialists, had decided to become a writer. Praised by Hermann Hesse for his first collection of stories, Zweig decided to broaden his literary connections by inviting the celebrated writers of the day to correspond with him. His success rate increased after he took the kindly advice of one great author and began enclosing return postage; several agreed, not only to sign letters, but to sell their manuscripts to an enterprising youth who, by the age of twenty, was leading the life of a sixty-year-old, nestled among a gathering of framed photos, poems and autographs that included – his greatest jewel – a handwritten Goethe poem.

Protected from that familiar iron rod to a young writer’s back – a lack of money – Zweig chose to broaden the cosy horizons of home life and the Viennese coffee-shops with travel. Aged twenty-five, and already equipped with a reputation as one of Vienna’s most interesting authors, he visited London and acquired, during long hours in the great circular reading room of the old British Library, a passion for William Blake. Advised by the writer and future politician Walter Rathenau, he visited India and America, where he astonished the porter at his New York hotel by eagerly requesting to be led to the New Jersey grave of Walt Whitman.

Oliver Matuschek’s authoritative and magnificently researched biography does full justice to the combination of intelligence, industry and adept networking that helped Zweig in his rise to become a figure of international reputation, with a vast popular following. At the same time, he slyly portrays a faintly comical figure, possessed by a gnawing and unslakable desire to be on handshaking terms with the great of past and present. Few men, as Matuschek observes, would have been so thrilled as Zweig to find that he lived in the same building as the daughter of Goethe’s doctor; few, returning home from America on the same boat as the dying Mahler, would have attempted – as Zweig did – to scramble over the wall of suitcases that provided the great composer with a small area of privacy. (Mahler, although weak, turned his head away from view; later, as Zweig tried to ingratiate himself with Alma’s small daughter, Mahler faintly asked for him to be sent away.)

Asked to comment on his brother’s long-deferred marriage to the stoical and admirably loyal Friderike, Alfred Zweig commented that it had never worked. This was harsh. True, Stefan Zweig had no sympathy with his two unliterary step-daughters; true, Friderike was rapidly taught that the most she could hope for in a promiscuous man’s life was the role of ‘top bunny’. (‘I don’t begrudge him others,’ Friderike gallantly announced, before adding, less sweetly: ‘nor others him.’) Invited to disclose, late in life, whether the marriage had been happy, Friderike declined to answer. Asked why they had no children together, she answered, with customary opacity: ‘He was no Don Juan.’ You can say that again. On his wedding night, Zweig left town, but not before instructing Friderike to sort out and file his drawers of old love-letters.

Obsessive, depressive and secretive in his private life, Zweig hid behind the persona of a cherished performer. Throughout the economically volatile 1920s, his works never lost their popularity. Revered for the biographical triads in which he specialised (but which did not find an English readership), Zweig moved from platform to platform, reading from his work to audiences who never failed to buy. Occasionally, one of his chosen subjects registered a protest (Freud was infuriated to be teamed with Mesmer and Mrs Baker Eddy); but Zweig’s ascent never faltered. ‘Onwards and upwards,’ he noted in his fiftieth year. Significantly, he added a hope that the progress would not endure for long.

In 1932, despite the steady rise of Hitler and occasional published allusions to ‘the Jew Zweig’, the prolific author’s life of Marie Antoinette sold 50,000 copies. In 1934 an order for the withdrawal of no fewer than fifteen Zweig titles from sale was hastily rescinded, for fear of public displeasure. Nevertheless, following a random search of his home for weapons and incriminating materials, Zweig went into exile. Richard Strauss, courageously insisting that the name of his new librettist should appear on posters and programmes in 1935, was delighted by the rapturous reception at Dresden of his latest opera. Three nights later, performance of Die schweigsame Frau was banned. The composer was compelled to find himself, at speed, an Aryan substitute for Zweig.

England was Zweig’s first refuge and one of Matuschek’s many gems is an early BBC interview, proof that English was one language in which the multilingual author was ill at ease. Beware of Pity, his surprisingly late first full-length novel, won Zweig, at last, an English audience, while Friderike’s helpful discovery, at the refugee centre in Woburn Place, of a diligent German typist named Lotte led to divorce and a second, happier marriage. (Friderike, ever loyal, remained a faithful correspondent and facilitator.)

Married in 1939, the newly weds settled at Rosemount, a terraced home in Bath, where they lived among Zweig’s most treasured amulets: Beethoven’s desk, a Mozart song, and – a new acquisition – the score of An die Musik. A lecture in Paris (arranged by the indefatigable Friderike) about his lost Vienna led Zweig to begin work on his wonderful, if somewhat imaginative, autobiography: The World of Yesterday.

Zweig had fallen in love with the glittering beauty of Rio de Janeiro on his first visit in 1936. In 1941, following a nervous breakdown while in New York, the decision was taken that he and Lotte would settle in Brazil. Before departure, a little ominously, he made a gift to a visiting friend of the typewriter on which he had just completed his life story.

The final decision, taken in February 1942, was possibly triggered by news of the fall of Singapore to Japan. More certainly, as Matuschek strongly indicates, Zweig was ready to complete a long-held plan to end his life. Opening the door of the couple’s bedroom at the hillside villa in secluded Petrópolis, the housemaid found Zweig and Lotte dead and fully clothed. The cause of death – a joint suicide by poison – was not questioned. In a last letter to Friderike, Zweig told her that the lack of books and solitude had become oppressive, but that he was now peaceful. ‘Cheer up,’ he concluded, ‘knowing me quiet and happy.’

Oliver Matuschek has ranged widely to provide this thoughtful, balanced and sometimes pleasingly ironic account of a writer whose name was once among the most celebrated in the world. I wish that he had found space to discuss the quality of the work, as well as the life; but his intention, to provide a detailed personal portrait of Zweig and his family, has been admirably and fully achieved.

Mind and Behavior 32:3

The latest issue of The Journal of Mind and Behavior is now available. Though there is much to commend in this issue, one paper caught my eye: “Qualia from the Point of View of Language” by Luca Berta.

What is the difference between the discriminations made by a home appliance able to distinguish salt from sugar, and my sensations of salty and sweet? It is never taken into consideration that, in contrast to the appliance, I can have offline sensations, i.e., phenomenal experiences in the absence of direct environmental stimuli, mainly evoked by words occurring into thought, conversation, reading, etc. If we put this detachment stimuli/sensations in relation with the correlative detachment signs/referents inaugurated by the cognitive revolution of symbolic language (the fact that we use signs in the absence of their referents), we might rethink the role played by language in our phenomenal experience as a whole. Qualia can be defined as forms of relationship between organisms and environment, given that human environment is extended to the linguistic dimension, and that the latter has ignited a coevolutionary process with human cognition. The very same properties we attribute to qualia, even when conceiving of them as pre-linguistic phenomenal traits, rely on the cognitive resources that language has made available. The substantialist notion of qualia, I argue, is formed by an online sensation on which the focus shifts from the perceived object to the sensory quality by virtue of linguistic modes of thinking, which are systematically neglected.

Complexity and Extended Phenomenological-Cognitive Systems

A freely available piece from Topics in Cognitive Science. With the keywords complexity; dynamical systems; extended cognition; consciousness – who could resist. In fact the whole issue is freely available from this relatively new title published under the auspices of the Cognitive Science Society.

The complex systems approach to cognitive science invites a new understanding of extended cognitive systems. According to this understanding, extended cognitive systems are heterogenous, composed of brain, body, and niche, non-linearly coupled to one another. This view of cognitive systems, as non-linearly coupled brain–body–niche systems, promises conceptual and methodological advances. In this article we focus on two of these. First, the fundamental interdependence among brain, body, and niche makes it possible to explain extended cognition without invoking representations or computation. Second, cognition and conscious experience can be understood as a single phenomenon, eliminating fruitless philosophical discussion of qualia and the so-called hard problem of consciousness. What we call “extended phenomenological-cognitive systems” are relational and dynamical entities, with interactions among heterogeneous parts at multiple spatial and temporal scales.

The above article was cited by Guy Van Orden and Damian Stephen in their (also freely available) “Is Cognitive Science Usefully Cast as Complexity Science?

Readers of TopiCS are invited to join a debate about the utility of ideas and methods of complexity science. The topics of debate include empirical instances of qualitative change in cognitive activity and whether this empirical work demonstrates sufficiently the empirical flags of complexity. In addition, new phenomena discovered by complexity scientists, and motivated by complexity theory, call into question some basic assumptions of conventional cognitive science such as stable equilibria and homogeneous variance. The articles and commentaries that appear in this issue also illustrate a new debate style format for topiCS.

Consciousness Online 4

Check out the recently completed online conference. Bravo to Richard Brown for this great initiative. Also check out the forthcoming issue of Consciousness and Cognition that  features papers from CO2.

Hayek’s Speculative Psychology, The Neuroscience of value Estimation, and the Basis of Normative Individualism

Here’s the opening paragraph of Don Ross’ paper from Hayek in Mind: Hayek’s Philosophical Psychology.

Philosophers of mind who re-visit Friedrich Hayek’s The Sensory Order almost sixty years after its publication should feel humbled, perhaps sheepish, on behalf of their discipline. The book is essentially an exercise in abstract speculative mental architecture construction, the kind of project that has dominated the philosophy of mind since it began to reflect the rise of cognitive science in classic texts such as Dennett’s Content and Consciousness (1969) and Fodor’s Language of Thought (1975). Remarkably, Hayek’s effort is less in need of revision today, despite the mountain of intervening empirical work and technical refinement, then any of these works in its most obvious comparison class that were written by philosophers.

Lockean Social Epistemology

As mentioned in this paper, Locke and social epistemology is an improbable relation but  . . .

Locke’s reputation as a sceptic regarding testimony, and the resultant mockery by epistemologists with social inclinations, is well known. C.A.J. Coady paints Locke as an extreme example of epistemological individualism; Frederick F. Schmitt argues that Locke regards testimony neither as a source of knowledge nor as a means to justify belief, whilst Michael Welbourne, in The Community of Knowledge (1981), depicts Lockean epistemology as fundamentally opposed to a social conception of knowledge; that he „could not even conceive of the possibility of a community of knowledge‟ (Welbourne: 1981, 303). This interpretation of Locke is flawed. Whilst Locke does not grant the honorific „knowledge to anything short of certainty, he nonetheless held what we would call „testimonial knowledge‟ in appropriate esteem. This can be shown by his careful distinction between testimony and mere received opinion. Furthermore, this distinction is dependent upon a knowledge community which enables hearers of testimony to access alternative accounts.

Chalmers’ Singularity

Check out the latest issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, a themed issue built around Dave Chalmers’ 2010 JCS paper  “The Singularity“.

What happens when machines become more intelligent than humans? One view is that this event will be followed by an explosion to ever-greater levels of intelligence, as each generation of machines creates more intelligent machines in turn. This intelligence explosion is now often known as the ‘singularity’.

By way of a taster here is an excerpt from Dan Dennett’s contribution in his usual inimitably bold style entitled “The Mystery of David Chalmers.”

‘The Singularity’ is a remarkable text, in ways that many readers may not appreciate. It is written in an admirably forthright and clear style, and is beautifully organized, gradually introducing its readers to the issues, sorting them carefully, dealing with them all fairly and with impressive scholarship, and presenting the whole as an exercise of sweet reasonableness, which in fact it is. But it is also a mystery story of sorts, a cunningly devised intellectual trap, a baffling puzzle that yields its solution — if that is what it is (and that is part of the mystery) — only at the very end. It is like a ‘well made play’ in which every word by every character counts, retrospectively, for something. Agatha Christie never concocted a tighter funnel of implications and suggestions. Bravo, Dave.

Clouding Conservatism

Yet more Oakeshottiana. Here is a brief review by Elizabeth Corey of The Meanings of Michael Oakeshott’s Conservatism (table of contents). Corey summarizes why Oakeshott’s supposed conservatism equally frustrates self-avowed conservatives and liberal critics: in the second excerpt she neatly captures the appeal of Oakeshott for someone such as myself. (See also another recent posting).

In a certain sense, then, to call Oakeshott’s thought “conservative” is to court danger; for it implies that some sort of common understanding of conservatism might apply rather straightforwardly  to Oakeshott. It does not.

The heart of Oakeshott’s conservatism thus lay in both recognition and acceptance of the world’s imperfections. He hoped that we might see and appreciate the goods worthy of enjoyment, and that in addition we might know how to enjoy them. This was difficult, in his view, because it required that we put off or ignore our anxiety and aspirations for the future and engage fully in our present lives.

Neuroscience and philosophy must work together

Part of the Guardian’s Hard Problem series.