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Thought Insertion as a Self-Disturbance: An Integration of Predictive Coding and Phenomenological Approaches

My correspondent, the very excellent Aaron Mishara, has just alerted me to his latest freely available coauthored paper in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience. For those familiar with Andy Clark’s “Whatever next? predictive brains, situated agents and the future of cognitive science” and Shaun Gallagher’s “Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: a neurophenomenological critique”  — this article should be…

The phenomenology of depression

Through attempting a comprehensive portrait of existence through time, Heidegger displays a bigger cosmic backdrop against which the shreds of individual despair can be read. My brain had begun to endure its familiar siege: panic and dislocation, and a sense that my thought processes were being engulfed by a toxic and unnameable tide that obliterated…

Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body

Two papers of note from the special issue “The Body Represented/Embodied Representation” of Review of Philosophy and Psychology and one from the current issue: A Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognitive Science – Alvin Goldman Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body – Adrian John Tetteh Alsmith and Frédérique de Vignemont In Defense of Phenomenological Approaches to Social Cognition:…

Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception

New translation reviewed by Eran Dorfman Sixty-seven years after its publication in French and fifty years after its first translation into English, the long-awaited new translation of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception has finally come out. This classical work famously grounds experience in the body, showing how the latter conditions perception and action in various domains such as…

Shaun Gallagher: Enactively extended intentionality

Shaun Gallagher talk: I argue that the extended mind hypothesis requires an enactive, neo-pragmatic concept of intentionality if it is to develop proper responses to a variety of objections. This enactive concept of intentionality is based on the phenomenological concept of a bodily (or motor or operative) intentionality outlined by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. I explore…