Browse by:

Shaun Gallagher: Enactively extended intentionality

Shaun Gallagher talk: I argue that the extended mind hypothesis requires an enactive, neo-pragmatic concept of intentionality if it is to develop proper responses to a variety of objections. This enactive concept of intentionality is based on the phenomenological concept of a bodily (or motor or operative) intentionality outlined by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. I explore…

AI as applied philosophy

Here’s a snappy piece by Alva Noë on man vs. machine. Is the ant smart? Or stupid? Maybe neither. Or, most intriguingly of all, maybe it is both? Is there an experimentum crucis that we might perform to settle a question like this once and for all? No. Intelligence isn’t like that. It isn’t something that…

Guidance, Selection, and Representation/Affordances and Intentionality

Here is a two-fer from The Journal of Mind and Behavior: 1. Guidance, Selection, and Representation: Response to Anderson and Rosenberg Tom Roberts 2. Affordances and Intentionality: Reply to Roberts Michael L. Anderson and Anthony Chemero Abstracts Roberts: Anderson and Rosenberg’s (2008) guidance theory of representation offers an analysis of mental content that strongly emphasises the influence…

Hayek: Cognitive scientist Avant la Lettre

My published article is now available from here. Check out the full table of contents for this volume.

The Phenomenal Qualities Project

I want to bring your attention to The Phenomenal Qualities Project. With a Whose Who of theorists involved, it promises to offer a wonderful forum for ecumenical discussion: Objectives: There are four main objectives. To investigate a set of fundamental questions concerning phenomenal qualities – such as the colours, sounds and so on, of which we…

Hayek: cognitive scientist avant la lettre

Here is the uncorrected proof of my essay – do not cite.