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Functionalism and mental boundaries

I’ve decided to dust off some of the papers from a themed issue that I co-edited five years ago since I happen to be very much in “extended mind” mode just now. First up is Larry Shapiro – below is his into; here is his abstract. 1. Introduction Where are minds? For most people the…

Shaun Gallagher: Enactively extended intentionality

Shaun Gallagher talk: I argue that the extended mind hypothesis requires an enactive, neo-pragmatic concept of intentionality if it is to develop proper responses to a variety of objections. This enactive concept of intentionality is based on the phenomenological concept of a bodily (or motor or operative) intentionality outlined by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. I explore…

Trailing Hayek in Mind

Here is the table of contents for my forthcoming (in press) edited volume focusing on The Sensory Order – this is the first salvo of shameless promotion. CONTENTS “SOCIALIZING” THE MIND AND “COGNITIVIZING” SOCIALITY Leslie Marsh “MARGINAL MEN”: WEIMER ON HAYEK Walter Weimer PART I: NEUROSCIENCE HAYEK IN TODAY’S COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE Joaquín Fuster THE NON-CARTESIAN…

Enaction: An Interview with Ezequiel Di Paolo

Here is an interview posted on the eclectic APPS bog. Ezequiel is one of the main current players in enactivist theory and has a recently published (edited) book out that I’ve been reading. Enactivism is a position I’m quite sympathetic to though I’m sceptical of “new paradigm” talk.

Nurturing the Mind: Extended Functionalism, Complementarity and the Deep Blue Sea

Here’s the penultimate draft of the aforementioned paper by Julian Kiverstein and Mirko Farina: Abstract: Like many other studies, this paper focuses on the ways in which the functional isomorphism between neural and extra-neural features can provide the means to meet the criteria for cognitive extension. However, unlike these other studies, this paper acknowledges the…

The Mind as Neural Software?

Here is a superb paper by Gualtiero Piccinini that brings much needed clarity to a longstanding issue. A penultimate ms can be found here. As a consequence, when the behavior of ordinary computers is explained by program execution, the program is not just a description. The program is also a (stable state of a) physical component of…

Rupert review of Clark

Here’s a great pairing – Rob Rupert, one of the three most formidable critics of the extended mind thesis (the other two of course being Adams & Aizawa) – reviewing the most formidable promoter of EM. See the latest issue of The Journal of Mind and Behavior. (Also see another of Rob’s reviews of Clark…