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The Self in the Age of Cognitive Science

The most excellent Rob Rupert has made his latest paper freely available. Abstract Philosophers of mind commonly draw a distinction between the personal level – the distinctive realm of conscious experience and reasoned deliberation – and the subpersonal level, the domain of mindless mechanism and brute cause and effect. Moreover, they tend to view cognitive…

Rupert interview on extended mind

The VERY excellent Rob Rupert on naturalistic theories of mental content and no surprise – extended mind. Also with Jonno Sutton and Richard Menary sandwiched in between Rob. H/T to Ken Aizawa for the alert. Here is a link to my collection of  “Rupertiana“. Alan SaundersBrainCognitionCognitive neuroscienceCognitive sciencecomplexityDavid ChalmersEmbodied cognitionExtended MindPhilosophy of mindPhilosophy of scienceRobert RupertShaun…

Review of Menary’s (ed.) The Extended Mind

Richard Menary’s long time coming The Extended Mind is reviewed here by  Joseph Ulatowski. CognitionCognitive neuroscienceCognitive scienceEmbodied cognitionExtended MindneurosciencePhilosophy of mindqualia

Rob Rupert Papers

Check out two forthcoming papers from Rob Rupert, one of the sharpest minds around: 1. Against Group Cognitive States (forthcoming in S. Chant and G. Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality. No listing on OUP’s website yet). English users are not fazed by such sentences as “Microsoft intends to develop a new operating system” and…

Empirical Arguments for Group Minds: A Critical Appraisal

Look out for Rob Rupert’s forthcoming survey for Philosophy Compass. (Thanks to Rob for the heads up). Abstract This entry addresses the question of group minds, by focusing specifically on empirical arguments for group cognition and group cognitive states. Two kinds of positive argument are presented and critically evaluated: the argument from individually unintended effects and the…