Here’s a batch review by the very excellent Rob Rupert of three books that have been out for a while. Anthony ChemeroCognitionCognitive neuroscienceCognitive scienceconsciousnessEmbodied cognitionenactivismExtended MindExternalismEzequiel Di Paolojohn stewartMark Rowlandsolivier gapennePhilosophy of mindRob Rupertsituated cognition
Evan Thompson and Ezequiel Di Paolo have co-authored this entry for Larry Shapiro’s upcoming The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition. The one and only Sylvie Guillem Cognitive scienceEmbodied cognitive scienceenactivismEvan ThompsonEzequiel Di PaoloLawrence ShapiroSylvie Guillem
Here is a video piece commemorating a decade since Varela’s passing with some lovely footage of him speaking. Though it’s titled as part 1, I can’t find the subsequent parts and I can’t find anything on the associated website. BrainCognitionCognitive neuroscienceCognitive sciencecomplexityconsciousnessEmbodied cognitionEpistemologyExtended MindFrancisco Varelaneurosciencephilosophical psychologyPhilosophy of mindqualiasocial epistemologyVarela
A recent book in the EM genre. CognitionCognitive neuroscienceCognitive scienceExtended MindMoral psychologyMoral responsibilitymoralityphilosophical psychologyPhilosophy of mindPsychologySocial Sciences
Alva Noë on where to look Alva NoëAstonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the SoulBrainCognitionCognitive neuroscienceCognitive scienceconsciousnessDescartesEmbodied cognitionExtended MindFrancis CrickneurosciencePhilosophy of mindRené Descartes
Shaun Gallagher talk: I argue that the extended mind hypothesis requires an enactive, neo-pragmatic concept of intentionality if it is to develop proper responses to a variety of objections. This enactive concept of intentionality is based on the phenomenological concept of a bodily (or motor or operative) intentionality outlined by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. I explore…
Four articles (and more) of interest to theorists interested in enaction: 1. Tom Froese’s new article in Adaptive Behavior: Critics of the paradigm of enaction have long argued that enactive principles will be unable to account for the traditional domain of orthodox cognitive science, namely “higher-level” cognition and specifically human cognition. Moreover, even many of the…
Check out two forthcoming papers from Rob Rupert, one of the sharpest minds around: 1. Against Group Cognitive States (forthcoming in S. Chant and G. Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality. No listing on OUP’s website yet). English users are not fazed by such sentences as “Microsoft intends to develop a new operating system” and…
Here is a recent paper freely available. And in the video below is my favourite (the greatest) dancer – she talks about her craft. Here are some previous dance-related/cognition postings. CognitionCognitive scienceEmbodied cognitionPhilosophy of mind
Here is an uncorrected proof (do not cite) of my introduction to Hayek in Mind: Hayek’s Philosophical Psychology. Further details will be made available just as soon as the publisher has updated the webpage for this book (according to Amazon the book will be made available on December 13th). A dedicated website to the volume can…
manwithoutqualities 