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. . . but our brain can’t understand the picture

Hayek already wrote in The Sensory Order (1952) that “An apparatus of classification cannot explain anything more complex than itself” and that “The whole idea of the mind explaining itself is a logical contradiction’’. Hayek takes this incompleteness — the constitutional inability of mind to explain itself — to be a generalized case of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem. See…

Innate: How the Wiring of Our Brains Shapes Who We Are

Published today — this should get some regressive knickers in a twist. In the past century, the tradition of Freudian psychology popularized the idea that our psychological dispositions could be traced to formative childhood experiences. In many areas of modern academic sociology and psychology this belief is still widespread, though it has been extended to…

From cybernetics to brain theory, and more: A memoir

My chum, Péter Érdi, editor of Cognitive Systems Research, has alerted me to the open access memoir (63 pages) by neuroscience grandee Michael Arbib. Giving me the opportunity to talk to these visitors was one of the ways in which McCulloch contributed more to my graduate education than any other professor at MIT. When I thanked him, he…

Philosophical Approaches to Social Neuroscience

Forthcoming in Cognitive Systems Research Looking Beyond the Brain: Social Neuroscience meets Narrative Practice Daniel D. Hutto and Michael D. Kirchhoff Beyond sensorimotor segregation: On mirror neurons and social affordance space tracking Maria Brincker Reuse and body-formatted representations in simulation theory Shaun Gallagher Would a Neuroscience of Violence Aid in Understanding Legal Culpability? Valerie Gray Hardcastle Will…