Until about 2006 I read pretty much everything I could on the knowing-how/knowing-that distinction. Here is one paper that I’ve only recently come across by David Wiggins in Mind. I was very lucky to have Wiggins as a tutor, a most honorable man and an exacting philosopher. AristotleDavid WigginsEpistemologyGilbert Ryleknowing-that knowing-howMichael Oakeshott
The very excellent Stephen Turner on tacit knowledge in the latest issue of Tradition & Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical. EpistemologyGilbert RyleHubert DreyfusJason StanleyJohn McDowellJohn Searleknowing-that knowing-howMichael PolanyinormativismPittsburgh Schoolsocial epistemologyStephen TurnerTacit knowledge
Jason Stanley and John Krakauer in the NYT We argue that skilled human activity generally requires the acquisition and manipulation of knowledge, as well as implicit processes that do not depend on propositional knowledge (for example, increased dexterity). It is hard, and perhaps not possible, to forge a theoretically significant distinction between working with one’s hands…
Glowing review of Bengson and Moffett’s edited book: edited works are very difficult to assess and often suffer from being uneven in quality. But as the reviewer says: “The wealth of its perspectives and accounts is not merely a blessing but also a nightmare for the reviewer.” So, nice one Marc! EpistemologyPhilosophy of mindsocial epistemology
This from Intelligent Life.
Jason Stanley one of the leading writers on this topic has this piece in the NYT. Here is a copy of Jason’s paper that reignited interest in the topic and has since generated quite a large body of literature. (The featured photo here is of course by Steve Pyke). Jason Stanleysteve pyke
Shapin’s London Review of Books review of Michael Polanyi and His Generation: Origins of the Social Construction of Science by Mary Jo Nye. (Both Hayek and Oakeshott are mentioned by Shapin). Michael Polanyi lives on in the footnotes. If you want to invoke the idea of ‘tacit knowledge’, Polanyi is your reference of choice. You’ll probably…