Extended cognition and the priority of cognitive systems

extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, robert rupert

Rob’s contribution to the Extended Mind special issue of CSR:

This essay begins by addressing the role of the so-called Parity Principle in arguments for extended cognition. It is concluded that the Parity Principle does not, by itself, demarcate cognition and that another mark of the cognitive must be sought. The second section of the paper advances two arguments against the extended view of cognition, one of which – the conservatism-or-simplicity argument – appeals to principles of theory selection, and the other of which – the argument from demarcation – draws on a systems-based theory of cognition. The final section contests the claim, made by Andy Clark, that empirical work done by Wayne Gray and colleagues supports the extended view.

Welcome to the machine

artificial intelligence, ethics, moral philosophy, robotics, robots

Lead article from the latest Economist.

What to Believe Now: Applying Epistemology to Contemporary Issues

conspiracy theories, David Coady, episteme, epistemology, evidence, expertise, pete mandik, social epistemology, testimony, Wikipedia

Yet another strong Wiley title. David Coady also did a fine job of guest editing EPISTEME for a themed issue on Conspiracy Theories (aside from Harry Frankfurt’s little book where else would a title in mainstream academia have the word “shit” so prominent – see Pete Mandik’s paper).

Philosophy is “dead” editorial

philosophy, philosophy and literature, philosophy of biology, philosophy of economics, philosophy of education, philosophy of history, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, philosophy of social science

From The Guardian – here as well.

Agent-Based Computational Sociology

cognitive modeling, cognitive science, cognitive systems, collective intentionality, collective knowledge, complex adaptive systems, complexity, computation, computational intelligence, computational psychology, computer science, computer simulations, Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa, network theory, networks, social connectionism, social epistemology, social networking, social ontology, stigmergy, systems, ted lewis

Check out this new book I’ve just come across – Wiley’s lists, across disciplines, is certainly looking very strong these days. Also check out two colleagues’ excellent Wiley offerings – Ted Lewis’ Network Science and of course Ken Aizawa’s and Fred Adams’ The Bounds of Cognition.

Morals and markets

adam smith, empathy, ethics, freedom, hayek, liberalism, libertarianism, liberty, moral philosophy, moral psychology, philosophy of economics, philosophy of social science, political philosophy, spontaneous orders

Sandel plugging his latest. The journalist’s quote below has much resonance to me.

Even to a toddler’s mind, the logic of the transaction was evidently clear – if he had to be bribed, then the potty couldn’t be a good idea – and within a week he had grown so suspicious and upset that we had to abandon the whole enterprise.

Like-Minded: Externalism and Moral Psychology

Andrew Sneddon, Embedded, enaction, enactivism, ethics, extended mind, externalism, hume, kant, moral philosophy, moral psychology

A recent book in the EM genre.

“MARGINAL MEN”: WEIMER ON HAYEK

distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, epistemology, evolutionary epistemology, social epistemology, the sensory order, walter weimer

Here is Walt Weimer’s brief but valued contribution to Hayek in Mind. Wiemer did so much to bring Hayek’s philosophical psychology to the wider world – and for that we are deeply indebted to him. It’s still really worth checking out Weimer’s work.

Occasionally I am asked how I came to the work of Friedrich Hayek and why I promoted it (to a mainly psychological audience) through conferences and writings in the 1970’s and 1980’s during the period when I was able to indulge my hobby of studying interesting questions as an “almost” or part-time academic (Weimer, 1974; 1982). Usually it is assumed that I was a psychologist who came across The Sensory Order (Hayek, 1952) and saw its relevance to the “cognitive revolution” then in progress. While partly true, I was never primarily a psychologist – I have always been a student of interesting problems and I do not recognize the sanctity of academic or bureaucratic boundaries. The only problem that consumes me is the nature of knowledge and its acquisition and use. My autobiography would be titled “What Little I Know” in contrast to a physicist of the ‘80’s famous for “What Little I Remember.” I am, in short, primarily an evolutionary epistemologist, as the field has been pioneered by Don Campbell. Hayek had studied the same issues and had similarly been an outsider, a “marginal man,” who was primarily an evolutionary epistemologist usually mistaken for either an economist or political philosopher.

The coupling-constitution fallacy revisited

Ken Aizawa

Ken Aizawa’s contribution to the Extended Mind special issue of CSR:

The hypothesis of extended cognition maintains that cognitive processes sometimes span the brain, body, and world. One of the most prominent types of arguments for this hypothesis begins with observations of the role of certain sorts of bodily and environmental influences on cognitive processes, then concludes that these bodily and environmental influences are themselves cognitive processes. This paper will argue that, while it is widely appreciated that the simplest versions of these “coupling arguments” are fallacious, the advocates of extended cognition still seem to underestimate how prevalent even the simplest forms are in the literature, why they are so pervasive, and how these fallacious arguments might be avoided by greater attention to a plausible theory of what distinguishes cognitive processes from non-cognitive processes.

Extended cognition and epistemology

Andy Clark, duncan prichard, Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa, richard menary, Ronald Giere, sandy goldberg, Stephen Hetherington

H/T to Ken Aizawa for bringing this bumper EM issue to my attention. For a while now I’ve been banging on about the idea that these two literatures, EM and epistemology, have much to say to each other. In this regard I have mentioned in my writings two of the contributors to this issue, Sandy Goldberg and Duncan Pritchard, bona fide epistemologists who make the connection. Of course, I’m indebted to Andy Clark (one of the editors) for bringing the concept of stigmergy to my attention years back, stigmergy giving me the conceptual apparatus to make the same connections but in a somewhat different way. Here is the opening paragraph of the issue’s intro and the full lineup.

Introduction: Extended cognition and epistemology

Andy Clark, Duncan Pritchard and Krist Vaesen

According to the thesis of extended cognition, cognitive processes do not need to be fully located inside the skin of the cognizing agent. Humans routinely engage their wider artifactual environment to extend the capacities of their naked brain. They often rely extensively on external aids (notebooks, watches, and smartphones) and the latter may (under certain conditions) become a proper part of the cognizing mind. The thesis of extended cognition has been influential in the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, linguistics, informatics, and ethics, but, surprisingly, not in contemporary epistemology. The discipline concerned with one of the most remarkable products of human cognition – viz., knowledge – has largely ignored the suggestion that its main object of study might be produced by cognitive processes outside the human skin. The purpose of this volume is therefore to examine the ramifications of extended cognition for epistemology – which, as it turns out, are quite profound.

 The lineup:

Distinguishing virtue epistemology and extended cognition – Kenneth Aizawa

Extended cognition meets epistemology – Fred Adams

Extending the credit theory of knowledge – Adam Green

You do the maths: rules, extension, and cognitive responsibility – Tom Roberts

Cognitive practices and cognitive character – Richard Menary

Distributed cognitive agency in virtue epistemology – Michael David Kirchhoff & Will Newsome

Epistemic extendedness, testimony, and the epistemology of instrument-based belief – Sanford C. Goldberg

Scientific cognition: human centered but not human bound – Ronald N. Giere

The extended knower – Stephen Hetherington

The epistemic/pragmatic dichotomy – Paul Loader

Mentalism is not epistemic ur-internalism- Evan Butts