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Daniel Dennett’s Science of the Soul

Long write-up in The New Yorker Dennett does not believe that we are “mere things.” He thinks that we have souls, but he is certain that those souls can be explained by science. Andy ClarkCognitive scienceDaniel DennettDavid ChalmersdualismGilbert RyleMaterialismneural correlatesNeurophilosophyneurosciencePhilosophy of mindquineReligion

Thought Insertion as a Self-Disturbance: An Integration of Predictive Coding and Phenomenological Approaches

My correspondent, the very excellent Aaron Mishara, has just alerted me to his latest freely available coauthored paper in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience. For those familiar with Andy Clark’s “Whatever next? predictive brains, situated agents and the future of cognitive science” and Shaun Gallagher’s “Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: a neurophenomenological critique”  — this article should be…

Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind

Publisher’s blurb: “How is it that thoroughly physical material beings such as ourselves can think, dream, feel, create and understand ideas, theories and concepts? How does mere matter give rise to all these non-material mental states, including consciousness itself? An answer to this central question of our existence is emerging at the busy intersection of…

Alternative Models of the Mind

The Spindel Supplement to The Southern Journal of Philosophy edited by Shaun Gallagher with top-notch lineup. Andy Clarkdaniel huttodistributed cognitionExtended MindExternalismMark RowlandsMichael Wheelerphilosophical psychologyPhilosophy of mindShaun Gallaghersituated cognition