‘Super Fly’ Remake in the Works

Oh dear, yet another potentially lazy, flat and ham-fisted Hollywood retread is apparently in the works. I’m not saying it couldn’t be a decent effort (the brilliant music is, of course, in place assuming it will be reused) — but in the prevailing climate of hysteria emanating from the various politically “correct” priesthoods and their associated zombie armies, it could well be made overly bland and, still then, many fuckwit SJWs will no doubt take umbrage. Though Super Fly was a somewhat wooden film it was emblematic of a gritty and grim urban landscape, heightened by Curtis’ counterposing a deceptively beautiful soundtrack. (The sequel Super Fly T.N.T. was really crap: this time round the music was by Osibisa, who did good some stuff in the day, but not in this case). I don’t know Alex Tse’s work but an intelligent remake must surely pose the question as to why the problems haven’t been ameliorated in 46 years. (The independent-minded of you already know the answer!). The names Samuel L. Jackson and Quentin Tarantino spring to mind when one thinks of a reboot.

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Competition, Economic Planning, and the Knowledge Problem

The collected works of Israel Kirzner — coming soon. Here, by the way, is Pete Boettke on “Why Israel Kirzner Deserves a Nobel Prize“.

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Jerry Fodor

Obit (of sorts) in LRB but well worth reading his IEP entry. Update: here is the NYT obit.

I hate relativism. I hate relativism more than I hate anything else, excepting, maybe, fiberglass powerboats… surely, surely, no one but a relativist would drive a fiberglass powerboat.

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On the Sly: In Search of the Family Stone

A decent documentary on Sly is long overdue: next year marks the 50th anniversary of the release of Dance to the Music, a landmark album for acid funk/soul. This documentary sounds promising but the distribution seems to be the standard damn snag: Michael should give mediAm a go (nothing to lose). Anyway, great to see that other genius and close “party” friend of Sly’s, Bobby Womack, captured on film as well. (Still no word on the Hendrix documentary).

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Walker Percy and the Politics of Deranged Times

Still on Percy, check out Brian Smith’s neat little article. Do also check out Brian’s recent book as well which I hope to review shortly.

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Walker Percy Wednesday 161

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We are aware that the effect is achieved by applying the notions of water and scars to lightning, the most unwaterlike or unscarlike thing imaginable. But are these metaphors merely pleasing or shocking or do they discover?—discover an aspect of the thing which had gone unformulated before?

Clouds are called variously bars, rafters, prisms, mealy, scarves, curds, rocky, a river (of dull white cloud), rags, veils, tatters, bosses. The sea is

paved with wind . . . bushes of foam

Chips of foam blew off and gadded about without weight in the air.

Straps of glassy spray.

In these metaphors both the likeness and unlikeness are striking and easily discernible. One has the impression, moreover, that their discovering power has something to do with their unlikeness, the considerable space between tenor and vehicle. Hard things like rocks, bosses, chips, glass, are notably unlike clouds and water; yet one reads

Chips of foam blew off and gadded about

with a sure sense of validation.

If we deviate in either direction, toward a more univocal or accustomed likeness or toward a more mysterious unlikeness, we feel at once the effect of what Richards calls the tension of the bow, both the slackening and tightening of it. When one reads fleecy cloud$ or woolly clouds, the effect is slack indeed. Vehicle and tenor are totally interarticulated: clouds are ordinarily conceived as being fleecy; fleecy is what clouds are (just as checkered is what a career is). You have told me nothing. Fleecy cloud, leg of a table, are tautologies, a regurgitation of something long since digested. But

A straight river of dull white cloud

is lively. One feels both knowledgeable and pleased. But

A white shire of cloud

is both more interesting and more obscure. The string of the bow is definitely tightened. The mind is off on its favorite project, a casting about for analogies and connections. Trusting in the good faith of the Namer, I begin to wonder if he means thus and so-this particular sort of cloud. The only “shire” I know is a geographical area and what I more or less visualize is a towering cumulus of an irregular shire-shape .

Two levels of analogy-making can be distinguished here. There is the level of metaphor proper, the saying about one thing that it is something else: one casts about to see how a cloud can be a shire, and in hitting on an analogy, one validates an inscape of cloud. But there is the more primitive level of naming, of applying a sound to a thing, and of the certification of some sounds as being analogous to the thing without being like it (as in the mysterious analogy between plu and flowing, sta and standing). Thus shire may be applicable to a certain kind of cloud purely as a sound and without a symbolized meaning of its own. For as it happens, concrete nouns beginning with sh often refer to objects belonging to a class of segmented or sectioned or roughly oblong flattened objects, a “geographical” class: shape, sheath, shard, sheet, shelf, shield, shire, shoal, shovel, shroud, etc. One speculates that the vocable sh-is susceptible of this particular spatial configuration. (I easily imagine that the sound sh has a flatness or parallelness about it. ) This relation is very close to the psychological phenomenon of synesthesia, the transsensory analogy in which certain sounds, for example, are characteristically related to certain sounds-blue to color blue (could blue ever be called yellow?).

To summarize: The examples given of an accidental blundering into authentic poetic experience both in folk mistakes and in mistaken readings of poetry are explored for what light they may shed on the function of metaphor in man’s fundamental symbolic orientation in the world. This “wrongness” of metaphor is seen to be not a vagary of poets but a special case of that mysterious “error” which is the very condition of our knowing anything at all. This “error,” the act of symbolization, is itself the instrument of knowing and is an error only if we do not appreciate its intentional character. If we do not take note of it, or if we try to exorcise it as a primitive residue, we shall find ourselves on the horns of the same dilemma which has plagued philosophers since the eighteenth century. The semanticists, on the one horn, imply that we know as the angels know, directly and without mediation (although saying in the next breath that we have no true knowledge of reality); all that remains is to name what we know and this we do by a semantic “rule”; but they do not and cannot say how we know. The behaviorists, on the other, imply that we do not know at all but only respond and that even art is a mode of sign-response; but they do not say how they know this. But we do know, not as the angels know and not as dogs know but as men, who must know one thing through the mirror of another.

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Brain connectivity reflects human aesthetic responses to music

Freely available paper in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience.

Humans routinely experience pleasure in response to higher order stimuli that confer no clear evolutionary advantage. Aesthetic responses through pursuit of and engagement with the arts activates the same reward network in the brain that responds to the basic, sensory pleasures associated with food, sex and drugs via dopaminergic pathways.

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Walker Percy and the Politics of the Wayfarer

One of the contributors to the forthcoming Walker Percy, Philosopher (Palgrave) volume  (“Percy on the Allure of Violence and Destruction”) has himself a new book out on Percy entitled Walker Percy and the Politics of the Wayfarer.

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The Sensory Order

The reissue of TSO edited by Viktor Vanberg (originally Chicago University Press) is about to, for some reason, also be published by Routledge. Here is an excerpt from Viktor’s excellent introduction:

Among F. A. Hayek’s numerous publications, The Sensory Order (hereafter TSO) is undoubtedly the most unusual. After all, from someone known as an economist and social philosopher, one would hardly expect a treatise on the “Foundations of Theoretical Psychology.” And, indeed, to Hayek’s disappointment, for the first decades after its appearance, TSO received hardly any attention, neither from psychologists nor from social scientists. Psychologists did not suspect Hayek, the social theorist, to have anything important to contribute to their discipline, and Hayek’s colleagues in the social sciences did not expect his thoughts on “theoretical psychology” to be of relevance to their concerns.

True, several early reviewers took notice, and Hayek received a number of personal reactions from friends and colleagues. A sympathetic response to the unpublished typescript came from Ludwig von Bertalanffy. Erwin Schrödinger expressed his general agreement but voiced some reservations. John C. Eccles pointed to the complementarity of Hayek’s thoughts and his own neurophysiological theory but expressed his skepticism “in respect to the main thesis” of the book. In a long, encouraging letter, John Z. Young noted the affinity of Hayek’s thoughts to Donald O. Hebb’s neurophysiological theory, and in a short letter, Hebb acknowledged the agreement in the “general direction” of their respective approaches. Yet all this fell far short of what Hayek had hoped for, and as he expressly stated, most disappointing for him was the reserved response of the two persons whose opinion he cared particularly about: Karl Popper and Konrad Lorenz.

A turning point in the reception of TSO— reflected with some delay in the citation counts— came in the 1980s, and it was Walter B. Weimer, a psychologist at Pennsylvania State University, who played some role in this. Weimer, who had come across Hayek’s book and recognized its relevance for the ongoing debate in cognitive psychology, wrote a letter to Hayek in the fall of 1976 saying: “Nearly a quarter of a century ago you published TSO.. Erwin Schrödinger expressed his general agreement but voiced some reservations. John C. Eccles pointed to the complementarity of Hayek’s thoughts and his own neurophysiological theory but expressed his skepticism “in respect to psychologists are quite slow, especially in recognizing anything of significance, but a few of us have taken notice of your work and the opinion is beginning to form that you have written a prolegomenon which is necessary for any future cognitive psychology.” The specific purpose of Weimer’s letter was to invite Hayek to a conference on “cognition and the symbolic process.” As he phrased it, “if there were any way in which we could persuade you to attend, and/or present some of your ideas, it would delight us and help spread the interest in your ‘other’ research.” The proceedings of the conference, which was held in May 1977 at Pennsylvania State University, including a panel on TSO, were finally published in 1982, with Weimer’s “Introduction to the Theoretical Psychology of TSO”  and Hayek’s contribution, “The Sensory Order after 25 Years.” Most significant for the increase in the attention TSO gained was the recognition Hayek’s contribution to theoretical psychology received from two prominent neuroscientists, Gerald Edelman and Joaquin M. Fuster. Fuster, a professor for Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences at UCLA, had, already in the spring of 1976, written a letter to Hayek in which he stated:

For almost twenty years I have been engaged in research on the central nervous system at the University of California. . . . It is becoming obvious that the principles of classical sensory physiology (neurons specializing in external feature detection, etc.) are no longer applicable to the neuronal transactions that take place at cortical level. Instead, it appears that the theoretical principles enunciated by you in “TSO” are remarkably useful for understanding the neural and behavioral phenomena that we are observing. The concept of sensory “classification,” as you utilize it in your theoretical discourse, is the most appropriate that I have encountered for interpreting a variety of experimental data related to visual representation in the inferotemporal cortex. In fact, I have adopted your theoretical approach as part of the rationale for a new series of investigations of cortical neuron discharge which I am now undertaking.

In his 1995 book, Memory in the Cerebral Cortex, Fuster publicly praised Hayek’s pioneering contribution to cognitive neuroscience:

The first proponent of cortical memory networks on a major scale was neither a neuroscientist nor a computer scientist but, curiously, a Viennese economist: Friedrich von Hayek (1899–1992). . . . Although devoid of mathematical elaboration, Hayek’s model clearly contains most of the elements of those later models of associative memory . . . that, with their algorithms, have not come any closer than it does to solving those problems in a neutrally plausible manner. It is truly amazing that, with much less neuroscientific knowledge available, Hayek’s model comes closer, in some respects, to being neurophysiologically verifiable than those models developed 50 to 60 years after his.

In similar terms Gerald M. Edelman, recipient of the 1972 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, expressed his admiration for “Friedrich von Hayek, an economist who, as a young man, thought quite a bit about how the brain works”. Having read TSO he remarked in 1982 about its author: “What impressed me most is his understanding that the key to the problem of perception is to comprehend the nature of classification. . . . I think the essence of his analysis still remains with us; the problem of perception, at the level of its necessary conditions, is a problem of classification.”

It seems that the recognition Hayek’s psychological thoughts found in cognitive neuroscience was needed to alert economists to the fact that TSO may also deserve to be taken seriously by scholars whose primary interest is in Hayek’s economics and social philosophy. Even if it is still, as Caldwell diagnosed in 1997, “particularly among economists, Hayek’s least appreciated book” (1856), economists have begun to take notice of TSO— including Nobel Laureates Douglass North and Vernon Smith— and the literature devoted to the subject is growing. Essentially two issues figure prominently in this literature. This is, on the one hand, the question of how Hayek’s contribution is to be assessed in light of the context of modern neuroscience and, on the other hand, the issue whether, and if so to what extent, Hayek’s thoughts on the “Foundations of Theoretical Psychology” must be regarded as an integral and foundational part of his oeuvre, a part that is important for a deeper understanding of his economic and social philosophy. As the present edition of TSO is part of Hayek’s Collected Works, it seems appropriate to concentrate in this introduction on the second issue. My aim is to show that TSO has, indeed, its systematic and highly significant place in the development of the socioeconomic paradigm that Hayek elaborated over the six decades of his active literary production. Before I turn to this task (in sections 4ff.), I shall first take a look at the genesis of TSO (section 1), its central problem (section 2), and its theoretical core (section 3).

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