What’s Wrong With CSI

I’ve had several requests to make this recent article available despite it still being freely available on the Forbes site (I know there have been some annoying pop-up advertisement windows.) Anyway, check out Roger’s co-authored article for EPISTEME on this topic: Epistemics for Forensics.

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Forensic evidence doesn’t always tell the truth.

Forensic evidence is foolproof, right? It’s how those clever cops on CSI always catch the killer. DNA evidence springs innocent men from prison. Fingerprints nab the bad guys.

If only forensics were that reliable. Instead, to judge by the most comprehensive study on the reliability of forensic evidence to date, the error rate is more than 10% in five categories of analysis, including fiber, paint and body fluids. (Meaning: When the expert says specimen X matches source Y, there’s a 10% probability he’s wrong.) DNA and fingerprints are more reliable but still not foolproof. The 1995 study, in the Journal of Forensic Sciences, looked at proficiency tests labs take to see whether their work is sound.

More recent studies have also shown problems. Though a 2005 study in the Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology suggests a fingerprint false-positive rate a bit below 1%, a widely read 2006 experiment shows an alarming 4% false-positive rate.

Yet the public sees errors as gross anomalies. Like the time the FBI wrongly linked an Oregon attorney named Brandon Mayfield to the 2004 Madrid commuter train bombing that killed 200 people. The FBI had claimed a 100% match between fingerprints found at the scene and Mayfield, who was held for two weeks in federal custody. When the Spanish National Police got the real perpetrator, an Algerian named Ouhnane Daoud, the FBI had to admit its mistake. Mayfield accepted a $2 million settlement from the government.

Another debacle, this time involving DNA testing: Josiah Sutton served four and a half years for rape after the Houston Crime Lab tied him to crime-scene DNA. The lab was later found to be rife with problems, including a leaky roof that let rainwater contaminate evidence. Sutton was proclaimed innocent in 2004 and awarded $118,000 in reparations the next year.

Forensic evidence is also used in white-collar cases. In the Martha Stewart trial, government forensic scientist Larry F. Stewart (no relation to Martha) testified that he had performed incriminating tests on the famous “@60” written next to “ImClone(nasdaq: IMCL – news – people )” on a worksheet used to record Martha Stewart’s securities positions. The notation suggested that she had a long-standing agreement to sell ImClone should the price hit $60, which would have cleared her of insider trading. Larry Stewart said his tests showed the potentially exonerating notation was made with different ink, thereby suggesting that it might have been added later.

When the court learned that someone else performed the tests he claimed to have done himself, Larry Stewart was tried for perjury. The tester had done an incomplete job, failing to compare the “@60” ink to all the other ink on the page. (Larry Stewart was acquitted.)

How can we preserve the usefulness of forensic evidence while protecting the public when it breaks down? The core problem with the forensic system is monopoly. Once evidence goes to one lab, it is rarely examined by any other. That needs to change. Each jurisdiction should include several competing labs. Occasionally the same DNA evidence, for instance, could be sent to three different labs for analysis.

This procedure may seem like a waste. But such checks would save taxpayer money. Extra tests are inexpensive compared to the cost of error, including the cost of incarcerating the wrongfully convicted. A forthcoming study I wrote for the Independent Institute (a government-reform think tank) shows that independent triplicate fingerprint examinations in felony cases would not only eliminate most false convictions that result from fingerprint errors but also would reduce the cost of criminal justice if the false-positive error rate is more than 0.115%, or about one in a thousand.

Other reforms should include making labs independent of law enforcement and a requirement for blind testing. When crime labs are part of the police department, some forensic experts make mistakes out of an unconscious desire to help their “clients,” the police and prosecution. Independence and blind testing prevent that. Creating the right to a forensic expert for the defense would help restore the imbalance in scientific firepower that too often exists between prosecution and defense. Private labs are subject to civil liability claims and administrative fines, giving them financial incentives to get it right.

Roger Koppl is a professor of Economics and Finance at Fairleigh Dickinson University’s Silberman College of Business and a Director of the Institute for Forensic Science Administration.

Social Indentity

As usual, Dan Little has posted some thoughtful reflections on the multifarious tributaries that feed into the complex that is social identity. It brings to mind a recent correspondence I had with someone who was adamant that I call them by their “new” name (legally changed by deed poll), someone who I happened to know under their birth name.

My response to her was that legal identity is but one component of, and the shallowest notion of, the complex that is social identity. She will always be known as XXXXXX in the minds of those who knew her in another context and that this is beyond her control. Such is the dynamics of social reality.

Alzheimer’s

Here’s a restrained and sensitive article from the Scotsman on Claude Wischik‘s work on Alzheimer’s disease. The tone of the article matches the low-key disposition and existential focus of Wischik. Speaking to an Alzheimic patient on a regular basis, I have often used synonyms for the metaphor of “tangles”:

Wischik has spent 24 years studying the neurofibrillary ‘tangles’ that first destroy nerve cells critical for memory and then neurons in other parts of the brain in those suffering from Alzheimer’s.

Testimony

EPISTEME 5:2, featuring Roger Koppl, Robert Kurzban and Lawrence Kobilinsky’s paper that has attracted a great deal of press attention is now available online.

Neuroeconomics

While I too am sceptical about the techno-ebullience associated with MRI scans what is interesting about the self-defeating claim in a cheekily entitled Economist article “Do economists need brains?” is this quote:

neuroscience could not transform economics because what goes on inside the brain is irrelevant to the discipline. What matters are the decisions people take—in the jargon, their “revealed preferences”—not the process by which they reach them.

The Economist is referring to an article by Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer entitled  “The Case for Mindless Economics.” Now whatever my scepticism, it seems the aforementioned quote is perverse. As the journalist rightly says Hayek certainly understood that markets do not rest upon “rational” behavior (Hayek, 1944, p.64; 1988, pp.53-54) but more importantly appreciated the essential place of mind in any explanation of sociality. This can be found across his work and in his neglected work (1952).

References

Hayek, F. A. (1944/1976). The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, F. A. (1952/1976). The Sensory Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, F. A. (1988). The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Swarm intelligence and traffic patterns

Simon Garnier has found and posted a super little swarm vignette on his website. This is as lucid an introduction to swarm intelligence as one is likely to get. Nice one Simon!

Reason with a capital “R”

Anthony Grayling has convened a “symposium” on Reason in the latest issue of the New Scientist. Grayling’s position is very predictable but credit to him and the editors for bringing together a diverse group who for the most part seem to disagree with his conception. Neuroscientist Chris Frith, mathematician Roger Penrose and philosopher Mary Midgley are the highlights (at least for me) – Chomsky gives his usual pat responses. There is a series of short videos to accompany the symposium.

The Contemporary Relevance of The Sensory Order

I’m pleased to discover that there’s a discussion going on at the blog The Austrian Economists relating to a posting by Steve Horwitz. Other luminaries such as Roger Koppl have chimed in. For the past year I’ve been working on a paper on the contemporary relevance of The Sensory Order – hence my keen interest. 

Oakeshott on Religion, Science and Politics

Here are the abstracts for the forthcoming Zygon: A Journal of Religion and Science symposium on Oakeshott.

Elizabeth Corey (Baylor)

RELIGION AND THE MODE OF PRACTICE IN MICHAEL OAKESHOTT

Michael Oakeshott’s religious view of the world stands behind much of his political and philosophical writing. The present essay proceeds first by discussing Oakeshott’s view of religion and the mode of practice in his own terms. I then attempt to illuminate his idea of religion by describing it in less technical language, drawing also upon other thinkers such as Georg Simmel and George Santayana, who share similar views. I then turn to an evaluation of Oakeshott’s view as a whole, considering whether his ideas about religion can stand up to careful scrutiny and whether they have value for present-day reflection on religion.

Timothy Fuller (Colorado College)

OAKESHOTT ON THE CHARACTER OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: NEED THERE BE A CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND RELIGION?

Michael Oakeshott reflected on the character of religious experience in various writings throughout his life. In Experience and its Modes (1933) he analyzed “science” as a distinctive “mode” or account of experience as a whole, identifying those assumptions necessary for science to achieve its coherent account of experience in contrast to other “modes of experience” whose quests for coherence depend on different assumptions. Religious experience he thought was integral to the “practical mode.” The latter experiences the world as interminable tension between “what is” and “what ought to be.” The question, Is there a conflict between science and religion? is actually, in Oakeshott’s approach, the question, Is there a conflict between the scientific mode of experience and the practical mode? Insofar as we tend to treat every question as a practical one, these questions seem to make sense. But Oakeshott’s analysis leads to the view that “scientific experience” and “religious experience” are categorically different accounts of experience abstracted from the whole of experience. They are voices of experience which may speak to each other, but they are not ordered hierarchically. Nor can either absorb the other without insoluble contradictions.

Byron Kaldis (The Hellenic Open University)

OAKESHOTT ON SCIENCE AS A MODE OF EXPERIENCE

This paper offers a critical exposition and reconstruction of Michael Oakeshott’s views on natural science. The principal aim is to enrich Oakeshott’s modal schema either by throwing light on it in terms of its internal consistency or by bringing to bear on it recent developments in philosophy in general or the philosophy of science in particular. The discussion brings forth the special place reserved for philosophy, the crucial tenet of the separateness of these modes seen as Leibnizian monads as well as the special status allowed to science. It considers the possibility of combining one moment of philosophical thinking, namely ethics, with science in the midst of such modal separateness. Section I offers a general introduction of how to approach Oakeshott’s views on science. Section II stresses philosophy and its relation to science, while Section III elaborates on what the modes of experience are meant to be and how science is placed amongst them. Section IV examines Oakeshott’s more particular views on science.

Corey Abel (USAFA)

OAKESHOTIAN MODES AT THE CROSSROADS OF THE EVOLUTION DEBATES

This paper examines Michael Oakeshott’s theory of modes of experience in light of today’s evolution debates, and argues that in much of our current debate science and religion irrelevantly attack each other or, less commonly but still irrelevantly, seek out support from the other. The paper takes this opportunity to analyze Oakeshott’s idea of religion, and finds links between his early “holistic” theory of the state, his individualistic account of religious sensibility, and his theory of political, moral, and religious authority. By doing so, it shows that a modern individualistic theory of the state need not be barrenly secular, while also suggesting that a religious sensibility need not be translated into an overmastering desire to use state power to pursue moral or spiritual ends in politics. Finally, the paper suggests that Oakeshott’s vision of a civil conversation, as both a metaphor for Western civilization and as a quasi-ethical ideal, shows us how we might balance the recognition of diverse modal truths, the pursuit of singular religious or philosophic truth, and a free political order.

Efraim Podoksik (Hebrew University)

Review of Elizabeth Corey’s Michael Oakeshott on Religion, Aesthetics, and Politics