Embodied economics

We know that extended mind discussion is entering unlikley quarters. The same it seems is happening with embodiment. Check out this recent paper “Embodied economics: how bodily information shapes the social coordination dynamics of decision-making” by Olivier Oullier and Frederic Basso.

To date, experiments in economics are restricted to situations in which individuals are not influenced by the physical presence of other people. In such contexts, interactions remain at an abstract level, agents guessing what another person is thinking or is about to decide based on money exchange. Physical presence and bodily signals are therefore left out of the picture. However, in real life, social interactions (involving economic decisions or not) are not solely determined by a person’s inference about someone else’s state-of-mind. In this essay, we argue for embodied economics: an approach to neuroeconomics that takes into account how information provided by the entire body and its coordination dynamics influences the way we make economic decisions. Considering the role of embodiment in economics—movements, posture, sensitivity to mimicry and every kind of information the body conveys—makes sense. This is what we claim in this essay which, to some extent, constitutes a plea to consider bodily interactions between agents in social (neuro)economics.

Rupert Reviews Rowlands/Interview with Shapiro

These two items via Ken Aizawa’s blog.

1. Rob Rupert reviews Mark Rowlands’ latest

2. Ginger Campbell interviews Larry Shapiro (check out the companion episodes Ginger mentions)

Moral Worth and Inclinations in Kantian Ethics

Check out my chum and occasional collaborator Chris Onof’s paper Moral Worth and Inclinations in Kantian Ethics just published at Kant Studies Online. There are few philosophers around today that write with such exacting precision, such intimacy with their topic and with such philosophical breadth that Chris Onof does.

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature – 30 years on

I chanced upon this freely available review of Rorty’s notorious PMN (30th anniversary edition). It reminded me that I’d read PMN long before reading Oakeshott and that coming across Rorty’s invocation of Oakeshott’s conversational metaphor had no resonance for me. Even though I’m not in sympathy with Rorty and Oakeshott’s relativism I’m amazed at the kerfuffle it engenders.

Merleau-Ponty

My visit to Merleau-Ponty’s grave coincided with the 50th anniversary of his death. It was Andy Clark who first brought Merleau-Ponty to my attention (Phenomenology of Perception) in his seminal book Being There, the latter, for me at least, one of those books that presented a seismic shift to my thinking. My interest in M-P is in his phenomenology, not his Marxism which I had no knowledge of. (The guy in the Jim Morrison T-shirt was a Père Lachaise guide that tracked down M-P’s grave without whom I wouldn’t have found it.)

Experience and Its Modes

I chanced upon this  online version of arguably my favourite philosophical book. The opening paragraph should be something every student should read and have posted above ones desk: 

An interest in philosophy is often first aroused by an irrelevant impulse to see the world and ourselves better than we find them. We seek in philosophy what wiser men would look for in a gospel, some guidance as to le prix des chooses … And it is some time, perhaps, before we discern that philosophy … has certainly never offered its true followers anything which might be mistaken for a gospel.  Of course, some so-called philosophers afford pretext enough for this particular misunderstanding. Nearly always a philosopher hides a secret ambition, foreign to philosophy, and often it is that of the preacher. But we must not follow the philosopher on these holiday excursions.

David Rumelhart (1942-2011)

Stanford University News

New York Times

I Programmer

Rumelhart was enormously important in the 1980s in reviving this neural network approach to language and cognition

Steven Pinker

Derek Parfit: On What Matters

Derek Parfit’s latest book On What Matters is about to hit the shelves. I guess this must qualify as a major philosophical event if like me you were taken by the astounding philosophical imagination of Reasons and Persons. Below is a shot of Parfit at his dashing peak taken in Oxford by the late Susan Hurley.

 

Broken Window Fallacy

The topic of economics is not within my usual ambit (I do retain a tangential epistemological interest) but it’s certainly timely and Steve Horwitz always brings an astringency of good sense (however unfashionable that might be) to the knee-jerk economic issues of the day. Because of my passionate interest in New Orleans Steve’s thesis has a great deal of resonance:

New Orleans has had a relatively low unemployment rate since 2005, but I don’t think you can convince anyone there that another Katrina is the path to prosperity.

The perversity of the broken window fallacy finds its analog in a so-called “Keneysian” approach to war. The idea is this. War must surely be the generator of technological innovation while simultaneously attenuating unemployment. Blistering barnacles as Captain Haddock would say.

Doing things with music

Two items of note (at least for me) from the excellent Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences: great to see this journal flourishing. I recall a correspondence with an eminent emeritus professor of philosophy at McGill around 2000 who nearly had a coronary when I told him of my interest in phenomenology (he’s still with us and quite productive). The bile that came through his letter (hard copy) was palpable. Anyway, the professor in question is no longer “where it’s at” so here’s a fascinating paper by Joel Krueger – “Doing things with music” (abstract below). Also a review of Larry Shapiro’s Embodied Cognition, a book I’m (still) very much looking forward to reading – first paragraph of the review below as well. Both writers are very versatile in their interests and I’ve been honoured to have had them as contributors to previous projects (very generous with their time) I’ve pulled together (Larry Shapiro; Joel Krueger).

Doing things with music

This paper is an exploration of how we do things with music—that is, the way that we use music as an “esthetic technology” to enact micro-practices of emotion regulation, communicative expression, identity construction, and interpersonal coordination that drive core aspects of our emotional and social existence. The main thesis is: from birth, music is directly perceived as an affordance-laden structure. Music, I argue, affords a sonic world, an exploratory space or “nested acoustic environment” that further affords possibilities for, among other things, (1) emotion regulation and (2) social coordination. When we do things with music, we  are engaged in the work of creating and cultivating the self, as well as creating and cultivating a shared world that we inhabit with others. I develop this thesis by first introducing the notion of a “musical affordance”. Next, I look at how “emotional affordances” in music are exploited to construct and regulate emotions. I summon empirical research on neonate music therapy to argue that this is something we emerge from the womb knowing how to do. I then look at “social affordances” in music, arguing that joint attention to social affordances in music alters how music is both perceived and appropriated by joint attenders within social listening contexts. In support, I describe the experience of listening to and engaging with music in a live concert setting. Thinking of music as an affordance-laden structure thus reaffirms the crucial role that music plays in constructing and regulating emotional and social experiences in everyday life.

Embodied Cognition

Lawrence Shapiro’s Embodied Cognition is one of the first detailed book length attempts to introduce and develop the central themes of embodied cognition, an important trend in cognitive science.1 Embodied cognition is increasingly influential, but it would be a mistake to characterize it as a rigidly defined and unified theory. It emerged from a variety of fields (e.g., the phenomenological movement in philosophy, ecological, and developmental psychology, robotics, ethology, and dynamical systems theory) and therefore still suffers from internal disagreements over fundamental issues, such as its subject matter, its methodological commitments, the exact nature and definition of “embodiment,” and the extent to which embodiment matters in explaining cognition. Thus, the explanatory capacity and successes of the embodied cognition program depend upon further clarification of these issues. Providing this clarification, it seems, is the primary motivation behind Shapiro’s book.