Cosmos & Taxis

cosmos

I want to bring your attention to a new journal that has just been launched.

Walking, dawdling and eating beignets in New Orleans

new orleans

Sums it up really:

But the best concert I saw cost nothing, at what has to be the best free venue in New Orleans, Three Muses on Frenchmen Street, in the Seventh Ward, just outside the French Quarter. Why? It’s intimate but not crowded. (While the staff members at the door don’t collect covers, they do count bodies, making sure there is always breathing space.) The performer was Glen David Andrews, a trombonist familiar to most locals, and fans of the HBO series “Treme,” but not to me. Dressed immaculately in a three-button beige suit, he played the crowd with as much finesse as he did his instrument. At one point he said, deadpan, “My name is Wynton Marsalis,” evoking chuckles. I turned to the guy next to me and asked, “Who is this guy?”
“The best performer in New Orleans,” he replied.
“Then why is it free?”
“Because this is New Orleans.”
Actually, by the end of the gig, I had spent a worthwhile $22: $5.50 ($1.50 tip) for an IPA from NOLA Brewing Co. and $15 for Andrews’s CD, “Live at Three Muses.”

Mary “Bunt” Townsend Percy

A Confederacy of Dunces

I was curious to find out whether or not “Bunt” Percy was still alive since it was she that nudged her husband Walker into reading Confederacy. As Cory MacLauchlin tells it:

Walker said to Bunt, “You read it. Tell me what to do with it.” A few days later, Walker asked Bunt what she thought of the novel. She understood that the fate of the book largely lay in her hands. “It’s ready for you,” Bunt replied. “I think you should read it.” He knew that she approved of the book. Holding respect for her judgment, he was obliged to give Toole a chance.

Bunt died recently but her obituary makes no mention of this. Thanks to Cory for setting the record straight and giving this lady her due: it may well be that were it not for her, one of the greatest novels of the twentieth century might not have seen the light of day despite the formidable Thelma Toole being the driving force. As Cory says, it was the females that first recognized Toole’s talent.

Another obituary that has absolutely no connection with Bunt is the news that Barbara Donald has died. I did meet her but can’t recollect the circumstances though I suspect it was at some PNW gig or maybe even at TESC.

Stigmergy in human practice: Coordination in construction work

collective knowledge, complexity, computational intelligence

Some excerpts from Lars’ paper.

When the concept of stigmergy was first introduced in 1959 by the French entomologist Pierre-Paul Grassé (1959), an important step towards understanding the coordination of collective activities in social insects was made. Today, the concept of stigmergy is well established within the field of entomology (Theraulaz and Bonabeau, 1999). Turning from the study of insect behaviour to the study of human practice we find the concept of stigmergy to be less well established. However, criteria for applying the concept of stigmergy to the study of human practice are in fact readily emerging and a series of interesting and illuminating studies of stigmergy in a human context has been published (e.g. Christensen, 2008; Marsh & Onof, 2008; Ricci et al., 2007; Susi & Ziemke, 2001; Tummolini & Castelfrananchi, 2007; Parunak, 2006). This paper aims to contribute to this body of literature. Building on Grassé (1959), we will argue that that a coordinative effect can occur when human individuals act on the physical traces of work accomplished previously by others. That is, we will say that actors may coordinate and integrate their cooperative efforts by acting directly on the physical traces of work previously accomplished by others and that signs left or modifications made by individuals on artifacts may, given an appropriate context of practice, become meaningful to others and in turn inspire new actions on artifacts. This is how stigmergy may unfold in a human context. However, in connection to the study of stigmergy in a human context we need to ask a fundamental question before we “get ahead of ourselves.” The question is this: Does the concept of stigmergy add anything to our ability to account for the coordination of cooperative work in a human context? After all, stigmergy is a concept of coordination (Theraulaz and Bonabeau, 1999) and if we are to apply it to the study of human practice we have to ensure that it is not redundant in this context. That is, we have to make sure that there are no other concepts of coordination already having the analytical role that we are casting for the concept of stigmergy. This work has not been done so far (see related work section), and we shall address this challenge here. We shall proceed in the following manner. First we shall discuss related work. Secondly, we shall establish the nature of the concept of stigmergy in the study of human practice. Third, we shall compare the concept of stigmergy to three well-established concept of coordination in order to satisfy ourselves that stigmergy is not interchangeable with them. Fourth, we shall employ the concept of stigmergy in a study of construction work in order to explore the analytical utility of the concept in a human context. Finally, a conclusion and some perspectives will be offered.

In construction work, as in building design (Christensen, 2007; 2008), interdependent tasks may be partly integrated by virtue of individuals paying heed to the material evidence of work previously accomplished by others while performing their own tasks. Cooperative construction work tasks may be integrated through practices of stigmergy. As a case in point we shall consider the integration of cooperative work tasks pertaining to the construction of interior walls in a large building project. In the interior construction stage of a large building project a considerable number of partition walls are constructed. Partition walls are what divide the building into for instance units of office space. The construction of these walls is a cooperative work process involving a number of different trades such as carpenters, electricians and painters (see figure 2). The first and second frame shows the result of the carpenter’s initial efforts. The third frame, including insert, shows the work of the electrician in progress. Finally, the fourth frame depicts the closed wall ready for painting. The initial parts of a partition wall is constructed by a carpenter in the form of a frame made of light weight steel grinders fitted with plasterboards on the one side. At a later point in time, another actor, namely, an electrician will arrive and pay heed to the work carried out and seek to align the wiring of the electrical circuits with it. That is, the electrician will drill holes in the plasterboard to accommodate the electrical instillations and he or she will pull electrical cables through little holes in the vertical steel grinders of the frame and connect them to the electrical system as a whole. When the electrician is done and has left the scene, the carpenter returns to close the wall i.e. clad the second side of the wall in plasterboards in accordance with the previous work done. That is, the carpenter must take notice of the work previously performed by himself and the electrician as he seeks to put up the second round of plasterboards. Subsequently, the painter shows up to paint what the others have erected. At this point the wall in-the-making will have been worked on to consist of a steel frame, plasterboards on the first side, electrical instillations inside, and plasterboards on the second side. Finding the wall in this state the painter paints the wall with several coats of paint. In this manner the work ensemble including carpenter, electrician and painter all make distinct contributions towards the construction of the wall in accordance with their respective areas of expertise. We could say that the individual actor creates and changes the form of the wall in-the-making, not for the purpose of conveying a message, but simply as part of performing their individually allotted tasks, in turn another actor pays heed to and acts upon the material evidence of the work of others. This is partly how the cooperative work tasks pertaining to the construction of partition walls are integrated through practice of stigmergy. Perhaps to allow for full appreciation of the importance of this mode of coordination in building construction work, it would prudent to recall that no formal construct (e.g. architectural plan) exhaustively stipulates a concrete practice. Plans are underspecified with respect to that which is represented (Suchman, 1987), and architectural plans for the construction of for example partition walls are no exception. The actors have to “fill in the blanks” for themselves, so to speak, and acting on the evidence of work previously accomplished by others may be said to be one way of doing this. Furthermore, please bear in mind that architectural plans for specific building parts such as walls are not assembly manuals like those that come with for example IKEA furniture, rather architectural plans represent mainly how parts of the building it are supposed to look in the final state. Consequently, the assembly of for example partition walls is not covered in architectural plans. In addition, the pace of contemporary construction work is such that as soon as one actor (e. g. carpenter) has completed a task, time does not allow for much standing around and talking to the next actor (e. g. electrician) even though their tasks are interdependent and there are numerous details that need to be integrated. Of course articulation work through talk on the building site or in weekly coordination meetings may contribute to the integration of cooperative construction work tasks, but so may acting on the material evidence of work previously accomplished. The point is that in addition to various kinds of articulation work in meetings and with and without coordinative artifacts such as time schedules, cooperative construction work is coordinated by virtue of actors paying heed to the material evidence of work previously accomplished by others while performing their own tasks. At this juncture we may ask if the physical “evidence” of work may be promoted by the way in which the work is performed making it more straightforward for others to act on in practice of stigmergy? With reference to our case above, we may say that an electrician could for example install the electrical wiring and let a cable hang conspicuously visible in order to make the carpenter pay heed to it and afford it the required space as the wall is closed with the second layer of plasterboards (if the cables are completely hidden to the carpenters view he or she may accidentally put a nail through it with the nail gun as the second layer of plasterboards are mounted on the frame of the wall). This raises an interesting point: coordination through the material field of work may also be a matter of being mindful of the work that is to be performed by others looking forward in time, rather than only a matter of paying heed to work previously accomplished by others. At this point we may remind ourselves “the economy of logic […] dictates that no more logic is mobilized than is required by the needs of practice” (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 145). Following Bourdieu, we may say that the individual actors will engage in no more physical and cognitive effort than is practically necessary. That is, unless an actor has practical reasons for considering the situation from the perspective of others such as for example subsequent actors that may follow in practices of stigmergy, he or she will retain his or her own perspective and just carry out the work without though for the perspectives of others. Note that it is of course an empirical matter, something that differs from case to case, exactly how this plays out in practice. It is important to note that stigmergy, as a coordinative practice, is in not dependant on such forward looking mindfulness although it may be part of the larger set of practices. In sum, in construction work, cooperative work tasks are (partly) integrated through practices of stigmergy.

The concept of stigmergy was not originally developed in order to describe human practice, rather it was developed within the field of entomology i. e. the study of social insects. This study has raised and addressed a question central to any attempt to introduce the concept of stigmergy to the study of human practice: Does the concept of stigmergy add anything to our ability to account for the coordination of human cooperative work or is it simply interchangeable to already existing concepts? We have argued that it does add a new analytical perspective. Initially we suggested that in the context of human practice it is fruitful to understand stigmergy as a “heed” concept. That is, stigmergy refers to the phenomenon that distributed cooperative work tasks may be partly integrated by virtue of individuals paying heed to the material evidence of work previously accomplished by others while performing their own tasks. Based on this understanding of the concept of stigmergy in the context of human practice we explicitly compared and delimited the concept in relation to well-established concept describing human coordinative practices. We found that it differs from these concepts. We found that the concept of stigmergy is not interchangeable to well-established concepts of coordination such as articulation work, awareness and feedthrough. Finally, we explored the potential of the concept of stigmergy in an empirical study of coordinative practice in construction work in order to further investigate the utility of the notion of stigmergy as an analytical tool in the context of human practice. In regard to perspectives for further research, we may note that the three concepts of stigmergy, articulation work and awareness could amount to a trinity in the analytical toolbox for the description and analysis of the coordination of cooperative work – each concept pertaining to a unique yet interconnected mode of coordination of cooperative work.

A Confederacy of Dunces – quotes and extracts – 5

A Confederacy of Dunces

Leaving New Orleans also frightened me considerably. Outside of the city limits the heart of darkness, the true wasteland begins (p.10).

Beyond Complexity: Can the Sensory Order Defend the Liberal Self?

hayek

Here are a couple of extracts from Chor-yung’s paper:

Friedrich Hayek’s social philosophy is one of the most systematic and sophisticated among the contributions made by 20th-century liberal thinkers. His defense of the free market and individual freedom and his critique of collectivism of various kinds are mainly based on his epistemological theses, which in turn are derived from his social philosophy. Hayek once famously said, ‘‘the differences between socialists and nonsocialists ultimately rest on purely intellectual issues capable of a scientific resolution and not on different judgments of value,’’ and he believes that the doctrines advocated by the socialists ‘‘can be shown to be based on factually false assumptions,’’ and the whole family of socialist thought can be ‘‘proved erroneous’’ (1973, p. 6). One important area contributing to the development of Hayek’s epistemological theses is his works on theoretical psychology, and his book The Sensory Order: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology (1952a) plays a crucial role in this since it helped Hayek spell out the logical character of his social philosophy (1952a, p. v). It can be said that The Sensory Order enables Hayek to develop a conception of mind (which is essentially a classificatory and rule constituting complex order of a mental kind) that, on its own, enhances our understanding of cognitive psychology, and, when linked with Hayek’s social and political thought, helps strengthen Hayek’s epistemological defense of the free market and limited government. Although The Sensory Order did not attract the kind of  scholarly attention it deserves for decades after its first publication in 1952, the path-breaking quality of the book and the integral part it plays in Hayek’s social philosophy are now widely recognized (see, e.g., Butos & Koppl, 2006; Caldwell, 2004; Feser, 2006; Gaus, 2006; Horwitz, 2000; Marsh, 2010; Rizzello, 1999; Smith, 1997; Weimer, 1982). Admittedly, The Sensory Order is a difficult book since it deals with questions of the most fundamental kind (such as the nature of mind and the limits of explanation). When one tries to relate The Sensory Order to Hayek’s broader defense of liberalism, the task becomes doubly difficult, and different interpretations of Hayek’s position in The Sensory Order may lead to diametrically opposite assessment of his contribution. Scholars who are unsympathetic to Hayek’s social philosophy tend to characterize his explanation of the mental order in The Sensory Order as ‘‘materialistic and naturalistic’’ and wonder how his brand of materialism with its implied physicalist notion of human agency can sit well with the defense of individual liberty. Contrariwise, defenders of Hayek like to stress his idea that the inherent nature of the mind as a classification apparatus sets limits to its capacity for self-explanation. They argue that social interaction in any developed society must involve so great a degree of complexity that no single mind or central planning unit can fully take into account all the respective preferences of, or the dispersed information possessed by, individual actors, making synoptic planning untenable. This chapter is an attempt to offer an interpretation of The Sensory Order in line with Hayek’s supporters. But it would like to go a step further by arguing that a liberal conception of human agency, in which the individual is characterized as distinct, free, evolutionary, creative yet culturally embedded, can be derived from Hayek’s theoretical psychology. In what follows, I outline my interpretation of The Sensory Order and defend Hayek against some major criticisms, including the criticism that his psychological works express or imply a physicalist conception of the mind. Furthermore, I identify some problems with Hayek’s conception of the self: in particular its ‘‘instrumental’’ tendency and corresponding lack of appreciation of the unique value of individual style and imagination.

All in all, it seems fair to say that there is a danger in Hayek’s liberalism to accord only an instrumental value to individual liberty. This is so because his idea of true individualism is derived from his social theory, and given the fact that there are inherent limitations in human rationality, the individual is valuable and his freedom should be protected precisely because it is only under such conditions that we can find out which individual gift, preference, and skill will eventually prevail through the process of free competition for the benefit of whole group. Perhaps, A. E. Galeotti is correct to say that to Hayek, liberty in the end is only ‘‘a procedural, methodological value’’ and ‘‘being a procedure, one appreciates it [i.e. liberty] on the ground of its positive results’’ (1991, pp. 284–285). If freedom is to be justified primarily on the grounds of beneficial results, does that mean that the autonomous and self-determining self has little value in itself or in other aspects that are important to humanity? The uniqueness of the human individual is valuable, according to Stuart Hampshire, because among living things as we know them, only the human individual displays the salient capacity ‘‘to develop idiosyncrasies of style and imagination, and to form specific conceptions of the good.’’ In addition, Hampshire points out that individual style and imagination, like works of art or the emotion attached to sexual love, is mostly unrepeatable, as ‘‘the leaps and swerves of a person’s imagination do not follow any standardized routes’’ and defy the prediction of rational and general rules and is therefore irreplaceable (1989, p. 118, 126). ‘‘If this individual essence is destroyed when the individual is destroyed,’’ says Hampshire, ‘‘the world is to that degree impoverished’’ (Hayek, 1952a, p. 117). One does not have to agree with Hampshire’s idea of individuality and the values he attaches to it here to see that something important is missing in Hayek’s liberal self. While this chapter shows that a distinct and creative self may be reconstructed from Hayek’s complex and impressive account of the mind, nowhere in Hayek’s voluminous works can we find any in-depth discussion of the value of individuality. If the self is unique and irreplaceable, its value as an individual not only should go beyond the requirements to struggle for better group survival, important though better survival for the human race is, the individual’s unique style, imagination, and personality should also feature large in any defense of liberalism. Although Hayek’s defense of liberalism is unique and theoretically sophisticated, his epistemological theses by and large have overlooked the need to explain those essential virtues that make the self uniquely valuable. Thinkers who are sympathetic to Hayek’s theory should have a lot of food for thought in moving forward the defense of liberalism beyond his contributions, which nevertheless are among the most thought-provoking in the 20th century.

John Kennedy Toole

A Confederacy of Dunces

Speaking of autoscopic doubles (Toole-Ignatius Reilly) I’m working on a review of Cory MacLauchlin’s Butterfly in the Typewriter: The Tragic Life of John Kennedy Toole and the Remarkable Story of A Confederacy of Dunces. Cory reminds us that today marks the death of Toole. It is often said “how can one assess the greatness of the author on one work?” Well, one work is all it takes. As I’ve repeatedly said, Toole is right up there with Rolfe, Kafka, Musil and Mishima. It reminds me of the tired and dumb cliché that George Best never fulfilled his potential.