manwithoutqualities

Mind and Behavior: Autumn 2008

May 7, 2009Adams and Aizawa, Andy Clark, Bounds of Cognition, cognition, cognitive science, cognitive systems, david chalmers, distributed cognition, extended mind, journal of mind and behavior, Justin Fisher, mind body, neurophilosophy, neuroscience, philosophy of mind, situated cognition, Supersizing the Mind

The latest issue of The Journal of Mind and Behavior is now available. I especially want to bring your attention to the Critical Notice on Fred Adams’ and Ken Aizawa’s The Bounds of Cognition, a review essay superbly executed by Justin Fisher. Requests for reprints should be sent to:

Professor Justin C. Fisher, Department of Philosophy, Hyer Hall 207, Southern Methodist University, P.O. Box 750142, Dallas, Texas 75275

Email

Intro:

Fred Adams and Kenneth Aizawa have long been the loyal opposition in the debate about extended cognition. Contemporary humans regularly use external devices to process information. Many of us store telephone numbers in our cell phones rather than our brains. Alzheimer’s patients use trusted notebooks to store all kinds of information (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). Expert Scrabble players continually reorganize their letters to more quickly see possible words they might play (Kirsh, 1995). Fans of extended cognition have held that the information processing performed partly within such external devices is enough like traditional cases of cognitive processing that it also deserves to be called “cognitive processing.” Adams and Aizawa have been two key figures to stand against this tide, arguing that we should instead view these as mere cases of external tool use, and that, at least for the time being, we should reserve the term “cognitive processing” for processes that occur inside creatures’ heads. The Bounds of Cognition compiles and updates Adams and Aizawa’s attempts to defend against this tide, and it gives the authors the opportunity to go on the offensive themselves, and give careful arguments for why we should stick to their more conservative construal of “cognitive processing.” This book does very well to give the reader a thorough overview of the state of play in the debate over extended cognition. As a consequence, the present paper is as much a critical commentary on the whole debate as it is a review of the book itself.

Human nature and war

May 7, 2009david livingstone smith, evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, human nature, new england institute, war

Here is NEI Director, David Livingstone Smith’s recent SUNY New Paltz lecture entitled “The Most Dangerous Animal: Human Nature and the Origin of War.” David is one of the leading experts in this field – really worth checking out.

Philanthropy

May 7, 2009Amy Kass, Conversations on Philanthropy, Molière, philanthropy, philosophy

One of my abiding interests is in philanthropy having worked within the non-profit world and as an external consultant to non-profits. There is a growing literature on the idea of philanthropy – philosophical and emprical – that is most fascinating. The best example of this is edited by Lenore Ealy entitled Conversations on Philanthropy: An Interdisciplinary Series of Reflections and Research. Some working papers are also available online. There is much more to the notion of philanthropy than Guidestar! Indeed, in preparation for a symposium on philanthropy that I’ll be attending shortly, I’m reading Molière’s The Miser, a Comedy and selections from Amy Kass (ed.) The Perfect Gift: The Philanthropic Imagination in Poetry and Prose.

New England Institute for Cognitive Science and Evolutionary Studies

May 1, 2009cognitive science, evolution, evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, new england institute, Paul Roscoe, Richard Wrangham, Ruth Garrett Millikan

Check out the New England Institute for Cognitive Science and Evolutionary Studies iTunes U site. Click the launch bar: once it loads click the NEI box and at the bottom right hand side of the first category, click the box that looks like this:

itunesthumb

You will find

Ruth Garrett Millikan’s recent lecture.

Richard Wrangham

Paul Roscoe

A Smorgasbord of “Situated” Projects

April 28, 2009active perception, Adams & Aizawa, Alva Noë, Alzheimer's, Andy Clark, autonomy, Bounds of Cognition, brain, cognition, cognitive science, collective intentionality, consciousness, cyborgs, Daniel Dennett, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, Embedded, embodiment, Enacted, extended mind, functionalism, Julian Kiverstein, mark rowlands, mind body, neurobiology, neurophilosophy, philosophy of mind, philosophy of social science, robert wilson, situated cognition, social cognition, sociocognition, Supersizing the Mind, susan hurley

There is an excellent collection of papers comprising the latest issue of Topoi (Volume 28, Number 1 / March, 2009). I assume that because of the introduction “Mind Embodied, Embedded, Enacted: One Church or Many?” this issue was pulled together by Julian Kiverstein and Andy Clark. They set up the issue by posing the following two questions, questions that I’ve been wrestling with of late given the issue I’m currently pulling together:

[w]hat, if anything, forms the deep theoretical core of the embodied, embedded approach? Equally importantly, we may ask to what extent the various projects pursued under the single umbrella are in fact harmonious?

Robotic silliness

April 27, 2009humor, robotics, robots

Here’s some spring silliness. I like the principle though.

Cognition and dance

April 26, 2009cognition, cognitive science, collaboration, complexity, computational intelligence, David Kirsh, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, stigmergic, stigmergy, Wayne McGregor

dance

How do the dancers visualize his cues? How do they respond to one another in the group dynamic? How do they remember? And how does he?

There’s a fascinating experiment reported in the LA Times (and blog) on distributed cognition being run by David Kirsh in association with maestro choreographer Wayne McGregor. Of course, the reason the experiment caught my eye was the involvement of Kirsh whose work is informing my thoughts and, because independently, I appreciate the McGregor’s genius. As is common, the reporter doesn’t have the strongest of grips on the broader significance of distributed cognition.

dance David Kirsh

Ryle

April 25, 2009Andy Clark, Anthony Chimero, concept of mind, Dennett, Gilbert Ryle, ryle

ryle, v. to give examples. “He ryles on and on without ever daring a conclusion.” Hence, n. An example. “His argument was elucidated by a variety of apt ryles.” “The original ryle has been chisholmed beyond recognition.” (2) A variety of smooth, lucid, thin ice that forms on bogs. The Philosophical Lexicon

Though published several years ago, I want to bring your attention to the freely available special Ryle edition of the Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy. Ryle holds a special place for me in that he remains one of the supreme philosophical stylists, a writer whose marvelous turn of phrase is so entertaining, one can easily forget one is reading a substantive piece of analytical philosophy. Others that have this ability include Dennett (Ryle’s student) and Andy Clark – incidentally, two writers for whom, as Anthony Chimero says, Ryle has never gone out of fashion. Ryle’s talent can be found not only in his well-known The Concept of Mind, but also in his writing on Plato. It’s been a rare treat to examine one not one but two great stylists – Ryle and Oakeshott.

NPG 5092, Gilbert Ryle