History, Providence, and Skeptical Politics

Here’s my chum Ken McIntyre’s new book. Here’s a review as well. Ken did a lovely essay for Paul and my Oakeshott “Companion“, an essay entitled “Philosophy and Its Moods: Oakeshott on the Practice of Philosophy.”

Hugh Lloyd-Jones

I came across Hugh Lloyd-Jones’ work when I went through my Hellenistic phase – well it’s still with me. Though this posting doesn’t coincide with any anniversary I have had occassion through my recent reading to have Hugh on my mind – we corresponded briefly years back when I set up the MOA. Anyway, as you will see he was a formidable intellect and quite the character. Here is the late Tony Quinton’s memorial contribution – for more memorial contributions see:

I am honoured and delighted to have been given this opportunity to say a few words about my dear old friend. I am inclined to imagine that I have always known him but in fact we must have first met in Oxford in the late forties after we were demobilised. We have been close for the subsequent sixty years in which he has been a continuing source of stimulation and mischievous entertainment. We both came from the same rather dingy social background: the officer class of the declining British Empire of the inter-war years. We got better educations by securing scholarships, to the schools, appropriate in their different ways to our different characters to which we went, and then to Christ Church. Hugh was, of course, above all a classical scholar. I am, perhaps, with the possible exception of Ralph, the least qualified of those who are speaking this afternoon to speak about his achievements in that field. The Gaisford prize was not, I think, one of the numerous classical awards he won at Oxford. But he was fond of Dean Gaisford’s observation that the study of classical literature elevates above the common herd and leads not infrequently to positions of dignity and emolument. It led him to a position of dignity, the Regius chair which he held for the best part of thirty years, if not to anything very conspicuous in the way of emolument. But he did not rely on his classical learning to elevate him above the common herd. I never met anyone more richly endowed than he with the two principal requirements for a distinguished academic career: knowledge and intellectual penetration. In the classics both of these are needed on a fairly large scale for distinction. Historians can get by on the basis of a richly stored memory; philosophers on intelligence alone (G.E. Moore, for example, knew hardly anything at all but had an astonishingly clear head). Hugh’s knowledge of classical literature was at once amazingly deep and vastly comprehensive. But this was not merely luggage. He brought to his work ferocious critical powers. His knowledge and intelligence, however, were by no means confined to the domain of classic literature. He had a very wide knowledge of many other societies than those of Greece and Rome and was expert in their languages as well. At this point I shall bring out my second academic chestnut: the memorable reply of Rector Barber of Exeter College to someone who asked whether the writings of the Roman poet Manilius on which he was laboriously engaged were really worth the effect, whether Manilius was any good as a poet. ‘To be quite frank with you’, Barber replied, ‘I don’t go in much for the gush side of criticism.’ Hugh was by no means confined to the cognitive appreciation of classical literature and of the other languages with which he was familiar; he had an exact literary sensitivity. But Hugh’s mind did not excel merely on the upper and cognitive level. As all who knew him will recall, he was equipped with outsize will and emotion. The former drove him to prodigies of hard work; the latter to constant displays of powerful 5 feeling, both favourable and unfavourable of literature, of those who studied it and anything else that caught his attention. If he was interested in something he was passionately interested in it, either intensely enthusiastic or intensely hostile. On his emotional speedometer there was nothing in between full speed ahead and full speed reverse. He was incapable of being lukewarm about anything that took his interest but was either wholly committed or wholly indifferent. As for the range of his knowledge there was one matter on which he might have been thought to have known too much: namely cricket. He knew more about cricket than it is decent for anyone to know unless they are a test selector or a senior member of the editorial staff of Wisden’s Almanack. Conversation with him was an invigorating experience. Wild denunciations of disapproval of persons were relieved by occasional panegyrics about favourably regarded individuals. His gossip was essentially operatic in nature, full of thunder and lightning, even if sometimes not of the most exact historical accuracy. At this point I must remove from the fire my third and last academic chestnut: Bernard Williams’ fine answer to the question what does Western philosophy owe to the Greeks: Western philosophy. To the parallel, but broader question: what does Western civilization owe to the Greeks, Hugh would unhesitatingly have replied ‘Western civilization’. Not for him any Arnoldian equivalence of status as between Hebrew and Hellene. This inevitably carried with it a rather distinctly less than enthusiastic attitude toward Christianity. This was a somewhat paradoxical position for the holder of a chair in Christ Church, the most ostentatiously Christian college in Oxford. What marked him out rather sharply, from great Oxford unbelievers of the century preceding his own – Hobbes, Gibbon and Bentham whose attitude towards their place of education was deeply critical – is that he was devoted to Oxford. In this respect he was rather more like Newman, with whom he did not, in general, share many opinions and attitudes. From an early age, thirteen say, at which one first begins to think about such things for oneself, I like Hugh have been unable to accept the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. All those dead people we remember who used to love or be fond of us: why do they not get in touch with us? But, if at some social event I was to come across an attractive young woman in a tight-fitting dress who proceeded to address me with a series of flagrantly incorrect opinions, delivered with the utmost passion and who, in the course of the proceedings tapped herself on the chest with her fist and went on to gnaw the knuckle of her index finger I should be inclined to reconsider my position and wonder if I had not come upon a reincarnation of Hugh, although a strikingly frivolous one.

Here are some of the major obituaries:

The Independent

The Guardian

The Telegraph

Non cogito, ergo sum

This from Intelligent Life.

What Does It Mean to Be Human?

My chum David Livingstone Smith has this piece in Psychology Today.

Interpreting Figurative Meaning

I’m looking for a suitably qualified reviewer for this new book, the review to appear in The Journal of Mind and Behavior.

Getting to the Hayekian Network

Here is Troy Camplin’s intro to his paper for Hayek in Mind.

In many ways this paper is necessarily an introduction. I want to introduce away to understand F. A. Hayek’s ideas on both spontaneous orders and the brain by understanding network structures. More, I want to distinguish between networks that emerge top-down in organizations and cellular regulatory networks and those that emerge bottom-up in self-organizing systems and spontaneous orders, whose relations to each other follow similar patterns. Socialists argue, contrary to Adam Smith’s thesis that the economy selforganizes from the bottom-up (1776), that the economy should be consciously designed and given goals. Hayek modernized Smith with spontaneous order theory. At the same time, self-organization theory emerged in physics and chemistry, complex adaptive systems (CAS) theory emerged in biology, and network theory emerged in several disciplines; these are all in the same conceptual family as spontaneous order theory. Hayek was part of the 20th century revolution of bottom-up self-organization theorizing that sees the universe emerging on its own through natural processes. If everything in the universe is self-organized, where do we get this idea, resurrected by socialists, that conscious design is the norm? Humans, like most animals, evolved to immediately, instinctively recognize the signs of others of their species. With wolves, lions, and other strongly territorial species, scent signs mark territory to warn off others. But humans are more visual, so we leave visual evidence of order. As a consequence, we associate the presence of order with an orderer or designer, and the development of creationist theories to explain nature, soul theories to explain the mind, and governments to order society. Darwinism and self-organization theories replaced creationist theories (for most people); top-down soul theories, including Descartes’ homunculus theory, evolved into CAS theories of the brain’s network structures, out of which the mind emerges; top-down social theories (where the hierarchical structure of the Catholic church was reproduced in other Western social structures, for example) gave way to Adam Smith’s bottom-up self-organizing ‘‘invisible-hand’’ theory. While life and mind have continued to evolve toward theories of self-organization, our social theories took a u-turn when socialism emerged as a respectable theory of economic ordering. The designer fallacy, increasingly abandoned in theories of life and mind, was readopted in our social theories.

Abelard and Heloise

I never knew that a film had been made of these most famous love birds so here it. I can’t vouch for the quality since I haven’t seen it. See if you can access Melvyn Bragg’s podcast with among others Anthony Grayling.

The Trouble with Scientism: Why history and the humanities are also a form of knowledge.

Philip Kitcher, prominent philosopher of science in The New Republic:

The problem with scientism—which is of course not the same thing as science—is owed to a number of sources, and they deserve critical scrutiny. The enthusiasm for natural scientific imperialism rests on five observations. First, there is the sense that the humanities and social sciences are doomed to deliver a seemingly directionless sequence of theories and explanations, with no promise of additive progress. Second, there is the contrasting record of extraordinary success in some areas of natural science. Third, there is the explicit articulation of technique and method in the natural sciences, which fosters the conviction that natural scientists are able to acquire and combine evidence in particularly rigorous ways. Fourth, there is the perception that humanists and social scientists are only able to reason cogently when they confine themselves to conclusions of limited generality: insofar as they aim at significant—general—conclusions, their methods and their evidence are unrigorous. Finally, there is the commonplace perception that the humanities and social sciences have been dominated, for long periods of their histories, by spectacularly false theories, grand doctrines that enjoy enormous popularity until fashion changes, as their glaring shortcomings are disclosed.

Human social behavior arises, in a complex social context, from the psychological dispositions of individuals. Those psychological dispositions are themselves shaped not only by underlying genotypes, but also by the social and cultural environments in which people develop. Cultural transmission occurs in many animal species, but never to the extent or to the degree to which it is found in Homo sapiens. Human culture, moreover, is not obviously reducible to a complex system of processes in which single individuals affect others. Rigorous mathematical studies of gene-cultural coevolution reveal that when natural selection combines with cultural transmission, the outcomes reached may differ from those that would have been produced by natural selection acting alone, and that the cultural processes involved can be sustained under natural selection. Whether this happens in a wide variety of areas of human culture and domains or is relatively rare is something nobody can yet determine. But culture appears to be at some level autonomous and in some sense irreducible, and this is what scientism cannot grasp.

The Poetic Character of Human Activity: Collected Essays on the Thought of Michael Oakeshott

Coming soon – Chor-yung did a lovely piece for Hayek in Mind.

The Amygdala Made Me Do It

James Atlas reviews the latest spate of books on biological determinism.