Jack Greenleaf

Jack Greenleaf has died. Greenleaf provided the first full length study of Oakeshott. We did speak in 2001 since I’d hoped he’d come to the inaugural conference of the Michael Oakeshott Association at the LSE. The sense that I got was that he felt somewhat resentful for primarily being known for his work on Oakeshott. It was a fine book and is still worthy to be read. Here are two obituaries:

The Telegraph

The Guardian 

Cognitive Closure

If the human brain were so simple that we could understand it, we would be so simple that we couldn’t.                                                                                                                                       

                                                                                                                                                    (Pugh, c. 1938)

 

I was going to write something about this article that recently appeared in the New Scientist until I discovered that Brain Hacks had already done so. Hayek would have been appalled by what he’d term a logical contradiction – the mind explaining itself. Hayek is acutely aware that self-referentiality leads to dead-ends: the instrument of explanation simultaneously being the object of explanation cannot get us anywhere. Hayek takes the view that a unified theory of consciousness is forever beyond our grasp. See also Colin McGinn on cognitive closure.

EPISTEME: Dartmouth Conference Reminder

With just under two weeks to go, I thought I’d remind you of the upcoming EPISTEME conference on Evidence and Law.

Hayek: Cognitive Scientist Avant La Lettre

Here is a PowerPoint slide-show intended to accompany my recent talk at Sussex.

PowerPoint

 

 

The Memetics of Bullshit

Jonah Lehrer has a nice article on the memetics of social cognition. So much of what passes for “knowledge” and is transmitted and generated through the media, seems to have this character. This is what I have termed media “glove puppetry” – glossy people with an ideological, sentimental or showbiz hand up their arse.

Whose Hayek?

In a recent article in Dessent entitled “Who’s Afraid of Friedrich Hayek? The Obvious Truths and Mystical Fallacies of a Hero of the Right” Jesse Larner expresses his surprise that he finds Hayek to be “nowhere near as extreme as his ideological descendants” and “not the cynic I had braced for.” It is reassuring to know that Larner has come to this assessment. Hayek is a social epistemologist, a philosopher of social science, and a philosophical psychologist – taken thus, one will be hard pressed to view Hayek as doctrinal or ideological.   

It is odd that the New Right’s Hayek seems to be so skewed/misappropriated. The problem is that Hayek is layered with multiple coats of intellectual varnish – more often than not, highly whimsical. Ideological categories employed in popular discourse are taken as Procrustean – not appreciating that there is a great deal of fluidity within and between ideological positions. Larner’s take on Hayek as a romantic or an eccentric mystic has no resonance at all. On what grounds does this claim rest upon? Perhaps because social knowledge condenses in tradition and practice – to ignore this repository is not only impossible, but it is to be irrational. Indeed, Larner’s Hayek would have no resonance to self-ascribed conservatives (at least in the US) who are in fact rationalistic and foundational – an anathema to the high liberality expressed though a high Tory lens or a Berlinian/Razian liberalism. 

Larner writes: “Hayek doesn’t seem to grasp that individual beings can exists both as individuals and as members of a society”. On the contrary, if one has any familiarity with Hayek’s philosophical psychology and his social theory, this polarity is deflated. For Hayek, both the individual and the ambient social soup are ontologically and epistemologically reciprocal and correlative. Hayek is certainly not the paradigmatic (and caricatural) laissez-faire theorist. Oakeshott famously took Hayek to task by pointing out that a doctrinal laissez-faire attitude is also a species of rationalism. This is uncritically taken as a knock-down argument by Oakeshott commentators. Hayek explicitly and repeatedly distanced himself radical libertarianism as early as 1944 in The Road to Serfdom – the primary focus of Larner’s article. The laissez-faire Hayek would undermine the Hayek of tradition – it would be corrosive!

 

Testimony conference: abstracts/program

Abstracts and program details for the upcoming Dartmouth conference are now available – see here.

Mind in Life

A short review of Evan Thompson’s recent Mind in Life from Metapsychology online. I have commissioned a close-grained review essay for the Journal of Mind and Behavior – stay tuned.

The Individual in the Fragile Sciences: Sociality

I received a message from Rob Wilson one of the most talented and broad-ranging philosopher-scientists around. He was updating me on what he’s been up to of late. He brought two things to my attention.

1. Rob has begun drafting the third instalment to his trilogy which he’s entitled Blood is Thicker than Water, nicht wahr? Terra Socialis: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences: Sociality. The first book Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences: Cognition has achieved classic status within the extended mind literature, a work which I reviewed very favourably:

No philosopher of social science can afford to ignore this book: this well informed, detailed and up-to-date discussion is virtually a self-contained course in the philosophy of social science and is more finessed and textured than other recent attempts to take account of the confluence between social science and cognitive science.

Hot on the heels of “Boundaries” was Genes and the Agents of Life: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences: Biology. Rob would welcome comments on the draft of Blood is Thicker than Water– the chapters can be downloaded from Rob’s website (left-hand window). It’s great that Rob is so open about his work – he welcomes any comments submitted before August 1st. I for one look forward to reading the draft soon.

2. Rob has also brought my attention to the What Sorts of People blog, attached to the What Sorts of People Should There Be? network. Both sites should be of interest to anyone that has social ontology as a central interest – philosophers of social science, sociologists, anthropologists, followers of public policy and several other disciplines – extended mind theorists and identity theorists will also find much to appreciate. Social epistemologists might also find the What Sorts of People Should There Be? site of relevance.