Oakeshott, Libertarianism and Judaism

Here’s a nice rendering by Mary Campbell of a photo of Oakeshott given to me by his son Simon (the photo was taken at Caius circa 1933). Speaking of Oakeshott, the following must rate as the most bizarre invocation of Oakeshott I’ve come across (Jewish Political Studies Review 19:1-2, Spring 2007).

Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990) was a leading British social and political theorist, often credited as a father of libertarian thought.

Even on the most generous of interpretations “father of libertarian thought” is so off-beam. We know Oakeshott took issue with libertarianism in no uncertain terms. Who conceives of Oakeshott in these terms? I’d like to know. And again:

As to openings, Oakeshott, unlike many other philosophical defenders of the free society, has a generous appreciation for the category of tradition. Although his political thought is often associated-no doubt simplistically-with libertarianism, he afforded traditional ways of life considerable scope in the conduct of a humane society.

A traditionalist (assuming Oakeshott to be one) cannot accept the spontaneous unforseen consequences of an absolutely free-market. It would be corrosive of tradition!! This is not to say that the free-market doesn’t have an important role to play  for Oakeshott – or that tradition itself is not a spontaneous phenomenon – but to so brazenly claim that Oakeshott is associated with libertarianism is absurd. I know of no theorist who makes that claim.

Although somewhat overshadowed in life by his more famous contemporaries Isaiah Berlin, Friedrich Hayek, and Karl Popper, Oakeshott, not least on account of his profound and astonishingly elegant prose, bids fair to displace them in death.

That’s quite an optimistic claim – at best Oakeshott might take his place next to these titans – but displace them? This is hagiography.

Last,

Oakeshott’s thought, however, has hardly been taken up by Jewish philosophers. Although political theorists who are Jews, such as Josiah Lee Auspitz or Efraim Podoksik of the Hebrew University, have worked on Oakeshott, there have been no diligent attempts to mine Oakeshott for the purposes of Jewish thought. Nor have Jewish thinkers engaged him in philosophical conversation. This is regrettable, for Oakeshott offers a number of promising openings and provocations for contemporary Jewish thought.

Though a significant chunk of those who have written on Oakeshott are Jewish, this fact has no salience at all. Can only “Jewish” scholars plausibly claim expertise in Jewish philosophy? Ridiculous.

Jonathan Dancy on Craig Ferguson

How unusual is this? A mainstream analytical philosopher on a talk show. Dancy seems more at ease than I remember him in Reading but is still somewhat flummoxed by the inherent flippancy generated for entertainment context. A tough gig I suppose. His early work concerned epistemology but is now best known for his ethical particularism.

Guidance, Selection, and Representation/Affordances and Intentionality

Here is a two-fer from The Journal of Mind and Behavior:

1. Guidance, Selection, and Representation: Response to Anderson and Rosenberg

Tom Roberts

2. Affordances and Intentionality: Reply to Roberts

Michael L. Anderson and Anthony Chemero

Abstracts

Roberts:

Anderson and Rosenberg’s (2008) guidance theory of representation offers an analysis of mental content that strongly emphasises the influence that intentional states have upon the production and modulation of bodily behavior. On this view, a mental state gains both its status as a representation, and its content, in virtue of occupying a particular role in the guidance of action. I present three related challenges for the guidance theory, before defending an alternative model that is grounded not in action-guidance, but in action-selection. Firstly, I argue that the guidance theory fails to explain an important category of perceptual misrepresentation. Secondly, I propose that the content ascriptions predicted by the theory are not sufficiently determinate. Thirdly, I propose that the contents implicated by the guidance view do not match those that are naturally ascribed in the explanation of intentionally-directed behavior. The modified account that I develop responds to these concerns, and suggests that representational states depict affordance properties: the opportunities and obstacles that the subject’s environment offers for the pursuit of goals and plans.

Anderson and Anthony Chemero:

In this essay we respond to some criticisms of the guidance theory of representation offered by Tom Roberts. We argue that although Roberts’ criticisms miss their mark, he raises the important issue of the relationship between affordances and the action oriented representations proposed by the guidance theory. Affordances play a prominent role in the anti-representationalist accounts offered by theorists of embodied cognition and ecological psychology, and the guidance theory is motivated in part by a desire to respond to the critiques of representationalism offered in such accounts, without giving up entirely on the idea that representations are an important part of the cognitive economy of many animals. Thus, explorations of whether and how such accounts can in fact be related and reconciled potentially offer to shed some light on this ongoing controversy. Although the current essay hardly settles the larger debate, it does suggest that there may be more possibility for agreement than is often supposed.

P.S. Stay tuned for a critical notice of Tony Chemero’s Radical Embodied Cognitive Science to be reviewed in JMB by Rick Dale.


Rupert review of Clark

Here’s a great pairing – Rob Rupert, one of the three most formidable critics of the extended mind thesis (the other two of course being Adams & Aizawa) – reviewing the most formidable promoter of EM. See the latest issue of The Journal of Mind and Behavior. (Also see another of Rob’s reviews of Clark here.)

Abstract:

For well over two decades, Andy Clark has been gleaning theoretical lessons from the leading edge of cognitive science, applying a combination of empirical savvy and philosophical instinct that few can match. Clark’s most recent book, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension, brilliantly expands his oeuvre. It offers a well-informed and focused survey of research in the burgeoning field of situated cognition, a field that emphasizes the contribution of environmental and non-neural bodily structures to the production of intelligent behavior. The situated research program, fledgling though it may be in some respects, has reached an age at which its philosophical stock can reasonably be taken; and Clark is just the person to take it.

Anthony Flew

I heard through my chum David Livingtone Smith who heard through Leiter that Anthony Flew had died a few days ago. I recall Flew to be a most generous fellow. We corresponded by snail mail to his residence in Reading (I still have the letters). I was of the mind to invite him to the inaugural Oakeshott conference at the LSE thinking he’d be a fine chairman for the philosophy of education panel. When I spoke with him he said that he’d be delighted so long as I paid for his train and cab fare, which of course I was happy to do. In our discussions we never spoke about philosophy of religion (it seems that his turning from atheism to theism is unfortunately what he is being remembered for). As I indicated in a previous posting we talked about Ryle, Gellner, Language and Logic, and the “No True Scotsman” fallacy.

Times obituary

Telegraph

Guardian

LA Times

The Philosopher’s Magazine (reminiscences)

The Network-Extended Mind

Here are two articles brought to my attention by my collaborator, a senior member of HSI engineering at Lockheed Martin. Extended mind is making its way into what one may think is an unlikely area. It’s not. Andy Clark’s cyborg is very much part of HCI – an example being a pilot’s helmet display. The emphasis in these articles, however, is on network theory.

The Network Extended Mind

Paul R. Smart, Paula C. Engelbrecht, Dave Braines, Mike Strub and Cheryl Giammanco

Abstract:

Whereas the traditional view in cognitive science has been to view mind and cognition as something that is the result of essentially inner, neural processes, the extended cognition perspective claims that at least some human mental states and processes stem from complex webs of causal influence involving extra-neural resources, most notably the resources of our social and technological environments. In this chapter, we explore the possibility that contemporary and near-future network systems are poised to extend and perhaps transform our human cognitive potential. We also examine the extent to which the information and network sciences are relevant to our understanding of various forms of cognitive extension, particularly with respect to the formation, maintenance and functioning of extended cognitive systems in network-enabled environments. Our claim is that the information and network sciences are relevant on two counts: firstly, they support an understanding of the mechanisms underpinning socially- and technologically-mediated forms of cognitive extension; secondly, they serve to guide and inform engineering efforts that strive to enhance and expand our cognitive capabilities. We discuss the relevance and applicability of these conclusions to current and future research exploring the contribution of network technologies to military coalition operations.

The Extended Mind and Network-Enabled Cognition

Paul R. Smart, Paula C. Engelbrecht, Dave Braines, James A. Hendler and Nigel Shadbolt

Abstract:

In thinking about the transformative potential of network technologies with respect to human cognition, it is common to see network resources as playing a largely assistive or augmentative role. In this paper we propose a somewhat more radical vision. We suggest that the informational and technological elements of a network system can, at times, constitute part of the material supervenience base for a human agent’s mental states and processes. This thesis (called the thesis of network-enabled cognition) draws its inspiration from the notion of the extended mind that has been propounded in the philosophical and cognitive science literature. Our basic claim is that network systems can do more than just augment cognition; they can also constitute part of the physical machinery that makes mind and cognition mechanistically possible. In evaluating this hypothesis, we identify a number of issues that seem to undermine the extent to which contemporary network systems, most notably the World Wide Web, can legitimately feature as part of an environmentally-extended cognitive system. Specific problems include the reliability and resilience of network-enabled devices, the accessibility of online information content, and the extent to which network-derived information is treated in the same way as information retrieved from biological memory. We argue that these apparent shortfalls do not necessarily merit the wholesale rejection of the network-enabled cognition thesis; rather, they point to the limits of the current state-of-the-art and identify the targets of many ongoing research initiatives in the network and information sciences. In addition to highlighting the importance of current research and technology development efforts, the thesis of network-enabled cognition also suggests a number of areas for future research. These include the formation and maintenance of online trust relationships, the subjective assessment of information credibility and the long-term impact of network access on human psychological and cognitive functioning. The nascent discipline of web science is, we suggest, suitably placed to begin an exploration of these issues.

What is this thing called social epistemology?

Check out two recent MSS by Alvin Goldman that addresses this question.

1. Why Social Epistemology Is Real Epistemology (to appear in D. Pritchard, A. Haddock, and A. Millar, eds., Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press). Goldman, the doyen of analytical social epistemology takes on the late Bill Alston.

2. Systems-Oriented Social Epistemology (to appear in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, eds., Oxford Studies in Epistemology). “Systems oriented SE is a flexible form of epistemological consequentialism that evaluates social epistemic systems in terms of their impact on epistemic outcomes.” Good grief – Hayek even gets a mention.

Social epistemology meets network theory

Here’s a paper written by Carlo Martini.

From The Sensory Order to the Moral Order

Check out Troy Camplin‘s just published article in NOMOI: Revista Digital sobre Epistemología, Teoría del Conocimiento y Ciencias Cognitivas No. 1 – Año 2010. (Scroll down to p. 3).

Visualizing the internet: Akamai’s network traffic

Check out Akamai‘s data visualizations for the internet traffic it handles. Though pretty cool seeing this in their Cambridge control room when I visited, I was told it was more for show than anything else. Check out their online vizualizations page. Also, do check out their EdgePlatform blurb, a superb example of distributed computing.