Belief in Naturalism: An Epistemologist’s Philosophy of Mind

epistemology, helsinki metaphysical club, naturalism, philosophy of mind

Here’s a paper from Susan Haack to be delivered at the Helsinki Metaphysical Club.

In philosophy, George Santayana famously observed, “partisanship is treason.”  I agree. Like good-faith inquirers in any field, philosophers have an obligation to seek true and illuminating answers to the questions that concern them; and it would obviously be a serious breach of this obligation simply to adopt a party line on some question, and then defend it against all objections. So my title, “Belief in Naturalism,” should most emphatically not be taken as suggesting that I adopt naturalism as an article of faith. When I have taken a naturalistic stance (as I have in metaphysics, in philosophy of science, and in epistemology), I have done so, not because it is naturalistic, but because, on reflection, it seemed to be right—the best, the most reasonable, stance to take. What my title signals is, rather, that my purpose here is to shed some light on what belief is, on why the concept of belief is needed in epistemology—and how all this relates to debates over epistemological naturalism.

To this end, I will first clarify the many varieties of naturalism (section 1); next distinguish the various forms of epistemological naturalism specifically (section 2); then offer my theory of belief (section 3); and, by way of conclusion, apply this theory to resolve some contested questions (section 4).

Mystery and Evidence

Dennett, epistemology, evidence, knowing how knowing that, philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, religion, richard dawkins, russell, stephen jay gould, wittgenstein

Philosopher of mind, Tim Crane, on religion and evidence in The New York Times.

For what it’s worth I have repeatedly said that epistemologically speaking, the concept of God does not achieve enough clarity and distinctness to be discussable. When we cite the divine attributes—omniscience, omnipotence, and so on—I do not think we have the least purchase on these ideas, which generate antinomies almost immediately.

Principia Mathematica

artificial intelligence, cognitive science, Herbert Simon, hunter heyck, Principia Mathematica, russell, whitehead

On hearing that Simon’s “thinking machine” computer program Logic Theorist not only validated Russell and Whitehead’s axioms and theorems (but even proved one more elegantly), Russell replied: “I am delighted to know that Principia Mathematica can now be done by machinery. I [only] wish Whitehead and I had known of this possibility before we both wasted ten years doing it by hand.”

Cited in Herbert A. Simon: The Bounds of Reason in Modern America by Hunter Crowther-Heyck

Cognitive ability and the extended cognition thesis

cognition, cognitive science, duncan prichard, epistemic luck, epistemic virtue, epistemology, extended mind, externalism, philosophy of mind, social epistemology

Here’s a just published paper by Duncan Pritchard in Synthese. It’s reassuring to see epistemologists picking up on the extended mind thesis – the other notable epistemologist pursuing this line is Sandy Goldberg. This is the way things are going – I for one am working on a project that will be a major push in this direction. As I’ve recently said, ” it is clear that the notion of extended mind has made inroads into other domains . . epistemologists who view mind and epistemology as two sides to the same coin and are engaged in the project to “cognitivize epistemology” and “socialize the mind” (Goldberg, 2007; Marsh & Onof, 2008b; Prichard, in press).”

Duncan’s Abstract

This paper explores the ramifications of the extended cognition thesis in the philosophy of mind for contemporary epistemology. In particular, it argues that all theories of knowledge need to accommodate the ability intuition that knowledge involves cognitive ability, but that once this requirement is understood correctly there is no reason why one could not have a conception of cognitive ability that was consistent with the extended cognition thesis. There is thus, surprisingly, a straightforward way of developing our current thinking about knowledge such that it incorporates the extended cognition thesis.

New Studies in Social Epistemology

alvin goldman, Christian List, Franz Dietrich, jennifer lackey, melissa koenig, michael strevens, miranda fricker, social cognition, social epistemology

Here is a collection from OUP with a section devoted to SE (how times have changed) with some top-notch names anchored of course by Alvin Goldman.

Special Theme: Social Epistemology Guest Editor: Alvin Goldman

8: Alvin Goldman: Systems-Oriented Social Epistemology

9: Franz Dietrich & Christian List: The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory

10: Miranda Fricker: Can There Be Institutional Virtues?

11: Melissa Koenig: Selective Trust in Testimony: Children’s Evaluation of the Message, the Speaker and the Speech Act

12: Jennifer Lackey: What Should We Do When We Disagree?

13: Michael Strevens: Reconsidering Authority: Scientific Expertise, Bounded Rationality, and Epistemic Backtracking

Grayling on neurophilosophy

anthony grayling, cognition, cognitive science, consciousness, mri, neuron, neurophilosophy, Neurophysics, neuroscience

Here’s a brief view of neurophilosophy from Anthony Grayling in The Philosopher’s Magazine.

Call for Papers – Stigmergy

artificial intelligence, collaborative filtering, collective intentionality, complexity, computational intelligence, computational psychology, computer simulations, Eric Bonabeau, google, Margery Doyle, particle swarm optimization, Pierre-Paul Grasse, stigmergic, stigmergic cognition, stigmergy, swarm, swarm behavior, swarm intelligence

Stigmergy – the phenomenon of indirect communication mediated by modifications of the environment – was first conceptualized by zoologist Pierre-Paul Grasse in his ground-breaking work on termite colonies (Grasse 1959). It wasn’t until 1999 that Grasse’s work was brought to a wider audience by Eric Bonabeau et al (1999) in a special issue of Artificial Life. Since then interest in stigmergic systems has blossomed with researchers recognizing the application of Grasse’s insights to stock markets, economies, traffic patterns, supply logistics, computer networks, resource allocation, urban sprawl, and cultural memes. New forms of stigmergy have been exponentially expanded through the affordances of digital technology: Google’s recommendation algorithm, Amazon’s filtering algorithm, wiki, open source software, weblogs, and a whole range of “social media” are now deemed as essentially stigmergic.

Though the concept of stigmergy has typically been associated with ant- or swarm-like “agents” with minimal cognitive ability or with creatures of a somewhat higher cognitive capacity such as fish (schooling patterns) or birds (flocking patterns) or sheep (herding behavior), stigmergy offers a powerful tool to be deployed in the human domain. The editors of this special issue are thus looking for contributions that have human-human (social, organizational, and socio-technical) stigmergy as the main focus.

Proposals are invited from social scientists, social epistemologists, cognitive scientists, economists, group decision theorists, collective intentionality theorists, computational sociologists, network theorists, multi-agent modelers, and indeed researchers from any discipline that has social complexity and coordination as a core topic.

Papers that are theoretical, experimental, or computational in orientation are welcome. Please send proposals of no more than 300 words to lesliemarsh [at] gmail [dot] com with “Stigmergy/Cognitive Systems Research” in the subject line. The deadline for proposals is Nov 1, 2010.

All papers will be subject to double blind review by a least two referees and accepted papers will be published in a special issue of Cognitive Systems Research

Special Issue Editors

Margery Doyle
Senior Cognitive Research Scientist Air Force Research Lab
711 Human Performance Wing
L-3 Communications Link Simulation & Training

Leslie Marsh
Assistant Director
New England Institute of Cognitive Science and Evolutionary Behavior

References

Grasse, P. P. (1959). La reconstruction du nid et les coordinations interindividuelles chez Bellicositermes natalensis et Cubitermes sp. La theorie de la stigmergie: Essai d’interpretation du comportement des termites constructeurs. Insectes Sociaux, 6(1), 41–83.

Bonabeau, E. (Ed.) (1999). Stigmergy. Artificial Life, Vol. 5, No. 2: 95-202

Swarm intelligence

ants, artificial intelligence, collective intentionality, complexity, computational intelligence, computational psychology, cybernetics, Marco Dorigo, optimization, particle swarm optimization, spontaneous order, stigmergic, stigmergic cognition, stigmergy, swarm, swarm behavior, swarm intelligenceWrite a comment

Here’s an article from The Economist on the practical application of swarm intelligence to human optimization problems.

“Artificial Intelligence”

artificial intelligence, cognitive science, Herbert Simon, neurophilosophy, neuroscience, philosophy of mind

I shall disclaim responsibility for this particular choice of terms. The phrase “artificial intelligence,” which led me to it, was coined, I think, right on the Charles River, at MIT. Our own research group at Rand and Carnegie Mellon University have prefered phrases like “complex information processing” and “simulation of cognitive processes.” But then we run into new terminological difficulties, for the dictionary also says that “to simulate” means “to assume or have the mere appearance or form of, without the reality; to imitate; counterfeit; pretend.” At any rate, “artificial intelligence” seems to be here to stay, and it may prove easier to cleanse the phrase than to dispense with it. In time it will become sufficiently idiomatic that it will no longer be the target of cheap rhetoric.

Herbert Simon 1996