I ordered two bottles of Kwak for my chum and I at De Hems, a hybrid pub/bar with a superior range of brews. The barman cavalierly plonked the opened bottles on the bar. This sort of service does not befit a bar that supposedly knows how to do things properly: as with all Belgian beers there is a specific receptacle for each beer. I insisted on having the highly distinctive Kwak glass and holder. In consultation with the manager I was provided with the correct kit subject to my giving up one of my shoes as a deposit for a dreadful Birkenstock that was kept behind the bar just in case they served a non-ignoramus. Head’s turned in puzzlement in this busy bar as this transaction was effected.
Birthday Boy: BB King @ 87
EPISTEME: 9.1
Check out the freely available symposium on Pragmatic Encroachment. Also there is a critical notice of Sandy Goldberg’s Relying on Others (sadly not free) that:
focuses on the book’s central claim, the extendedness hypothesis, according to which the processes relevant for assessing the reliability of a hearer’s testimonial belief include the cognitive processes involved in the production of the testimony.
Of Men and Manners
Here is a review of Tony Quinton‘s last (and posthumous) work edited by Anthony Kenny (who else would be up to the task?)
CFP: Philosophical Approaches to Social Neuroscience
Special Issue of Cognitive Systems Research
Edited by Leslie Marsh (Medical School, University of British Columbia) and Philip Robbins (Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri)
A Confluence of Interest
It’s been twenty-five years or so since Gazzaniga’s (1985) empirically motivated work that understood the brain as a kind of hermeneutic device or “interpreter” that evolved in response to social forces. This work could be considered a landmark in the nascent field of social neuroscience (SN). From a philosophical perspective it’s also been some twenty-five years since Churchland (1986) broke ranks with the a priorism characteristic of the prevailing philosophy of mind by taking heed of developments within neuroscience.
Social neuroscience, by definition, is an acknowledgement that the nervous system cannot be considered in isolation from the social environments in which humans have evolved. By the same token, the non-Cartesian wing of cognitive science is also a de facto acknowledgement that ubiquitous sociality must be factored into philosophy of mind. This said, there is still a very limited literature dealing with this clear confluence of interest. Of course, social neuroscience is not totally unknown to philosophy – possibly the most famous instance being the work of Gallese et al (1996), given philosophical currency via Gallese and Goldman (1998). But given the diversity of research projects that drive social neuroscience and “situated” philosophy of mind, the possible topics of philosophical investigation go well beyond mirror neurons.
The motivation behind this special issue is to harvest some of the results from SN with a view to:
(a) empirically enriching philosophy of mind, and
(b) philosophically informing social neuroscience.
To this end, we seek philosophical assessments of work being done in and around SN – including (but not limited to) work on mindreading, moral cognition, judgment and decision making, law and testimony, and social epistemology. The list of topics includes empathy, altruism, social pain, attribution, the self, stereotyping (race, gender, etc.), and collective intentionality.
Some overlapping questions for consideration:
1) Methodologically speaking, how social is (or can) neuroscience really be if all that is measured is brain activity in non-social contexts, i.e. fMRI scanners? (Keysers & McKay, 2011). Put another way, does social cognition draw upon a distinct set of processes dissociable from non-social processes? (Jenkins & Mitchell, 2011)
2) What count as foundational results in SN? (Ochsner, 2004)
3) What sort of metaphysical and epistemological commitments does research in SN presuppose? To what extent is SN opposed to reductionism in the philosophy of science? (Decety & Cacioppo, 2010)
4) What drives the “techno-ebullience” surrounding neuroimaging in general, and neuroimaging in SN particular, and how might it be problematic for the field? (Vul et al, 2009; Decety & Cacioppo, 2010).
Timeline
Official start: December 1, 2012
Final drafts due: February 1, 2014
Refereeing: February/March 2014
Final versions due: August 1, 2014
In the first instance we are looking for proposals of not more than 500 words. The aim is to have a broad spread of interest comprising the issue. Final papers should be between 7,500 and 9,000 words. Contributors are encouraged to scan the contents of two major journals that have social neuroscience as a dedicated interest: Neuroimaging (Elsevier) and Social Neuroscience (Taylor and Francis) as well as journals that have SN as a major interest, namely Neuropsychologica ( Elseveier), Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (MIT), Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (APA) and Brain Research (Elsevier).
Please send your proposals to both Philip and Leslie:
References
Churchland, P. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Decety, J. & Cacioppo, J. T. (2010). Problems and Prospects in Social Neuroscience. Japanese Journal of Physiological Psychology and Psychophysiology 28(1): 5-16.
Decety, J. & Keenan, J. P. (2006). Social Neuroscience: A new journal. Social Neuroscience, 1.1, 1-4.
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L. and Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Action recognition in the premotor cortex. Brain 119: 593-609.
Gallese, V. & Goldman, A. (1998) Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12:493-501.
Gazzaniga, M. S. (1985). The Social Brain: Discovering the Network of the Mind. New York: Basic Books.
Jenkins, A.C. & Mitchell, J.P. (2001) How has Cognitive Neuroscience Contributed to Social Psychological Theory? In: Todorov et al.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Doubleday
Keysers, C. & McKay (2011). How to Make Social Neuroscience Social. Psychological Inquiry: An International Journal for the Advancement of Psychological Theory 22:3, 210-216.
McEwen, B. S. & Akil, H. (2011). Introduction to Social Neuroscience: Gene, Environment, Brain, Body. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1231, vii-ix.
Ochsner, K. N. (2004). Current directions in social cognitive neuroscience. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 14: 254-258.
Ogawa, S, Lee, T. M, Nayak, A. S. & Glynn, P. (1990). Oxygenation-sensitive contrast in magnetic resonance image of rodent brain at high magnetic fields. Magnetic Resonance Medicine 14: 68-78.
Todorov, A., Fiske, S.T., & Prentice, D.A. (2011). Social Neuroscience: Toward Understanding the Underpinnings of the Social Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vul, E., et al. (2009). Voodoo correlations in social neuroscience. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4(3): 299-307.
The Fate of Rationalism in Oakeshott’s Thought
Here is Ken Minogue’s intro paragraph to his essay in the Companion to Michael Oakeshott (I recently had dinner with Ken and am pleased to report that he is doing quite well).
Michael Oakeshott is perhaps best known as the foe of a political vice called “rationalism,” and it is a vice because, in believing that all knowledge is technical, it fails to recognize the crucial role of what Oakeshott calls “practical knowledge.” The famous distinction between technical and practical knowledge, however, obscures the sheer complexity of Oakeshott’s understanding of political activity. We can, indeed, find a simple theme running through much of Oakeshott’s criticism at this period: namely, that the contingencies of the human world cannot be reduced to a simple, abstract (and manageable) plot. Rationalism does this, and Oakeshott detects it also in Whig history as analyzed by Herbert Butterfield: “What is, in fact, a resultant, or even a byproduct, of conflicting purposes and interests is made to appear as the consummation of a single homogeneous stream of activity triumphing over opposition and obstruction” (WIH 221). But this general theme becomes recessive as he developed his political philosophy in the years after the famous Inaugural. He seeks a more complex understanding of these things.
Clash of the Titans: When the Market and Science Collide
Here is the abstract and the introduction from the volume Experts and Epistemic Monopolies where our paper can be found.
Abstract
Purpose/problem statement – Two highly successful complex adaptive systems are the Market and Science, each with an inherent tendency toward epistemic imperialism. Of late, science, notably medical science, seems to have become functionally subservient to market imperatives. We offer a twofold Hayekian analysis: a justification of the multiplicity view of spontaneous orders and a critique of the libertarian justification of market prioricity.
Methodology/approach – This chapter brings to light Hayekian continuities between diverse literatures – philosophical, epistemological, cognitive, and scientific.
Findings – The very precondition of knowledge is the exploitation of the epistemic virtues accorded by society’s manifold of spontaneous forces, a manifold that gives context and definition to intimate, regulate, and inform action. The free-flow of information is the lifeblood of civil (liberal) society. The commoditization of medical knowledge promotes a dysfunctional free-flow of information that compromises notions of expertise and ultimately has implications for the greater good.
Research limitations/implications – While we accept that there are irresolvable tensions between these epistemic magisteria we are troubled by the overt tampering with the spontaneous order mechanism of medical science. The lessons of Hayek are not being assimilated by many who would go by the adjective Hayekian.
Originality/value of chapter – On offer is a Hayekian restatement (contra the libertarian view typically attributed to Hayek) cautioning that no one spontaneous order should dominate over another, neither should they be made conversable. Indeed, we argue that the healthy functioning of a market presupposes institutions that should not answer to market imperatives.
Introduction
It’s a common error to mistake the nature of liberalism. Of course ‘‘liberalism’’ is a term with many meanings, some unrelated and not all compatible. A common refrain from both self-avowed Hayekians and critics alike attributes to Hayek the view that the market is the root of social order. In this chapter we dispute this assertion. Hayek made it clear in no uncertain terms that the market exists as part of a manifold of spontaneous orders that constitute the fabric of civil (liberal) society. Hayek’s defence of common law against legislation, morality, and tradition against so-called ‘‘social justice,’’ and the market against the egalitarian impulse affirms the multiplicity view. What Hayek was recommending was the interdependence of independent equals. This provides the philosophical backdrop to the discussion. As grist to the Hayekian mill we draw upon an eclectic body of literature and examples. The discussion unfolds as follows: the second section examines Hayek’s supposed economism and libertarianism; the third section looks at the characteristics of science as a spontaneous order; the fourth section recasts the notion of a spontaneous order as an extended cognitive system afforded by technological developments. The fifth section examines some of the distortive market influences upon medical science and the sixth section discusses the philosophical motivations behind the open access movement. The penultimate section looks at a specific case study – The Knowledge Hub for Pathology (hereafter TKHP) – that instantiates the virtues of a spontaneous order discussed in the preceding four sections. We conclude with a few brief remarks.
Old Pulteney 21
On a recent visit back to Old Blighty I had the opportunity to more than sample some Old Pulteney 21. I had never heard of the distillery since my interests have tended to focus on Islay, Speyside and Highland single malts. It was merely one bottle, an unopened office gift amongst several, to a friend who very rarely imbibed and had only a vague inkling as to what good Scotch was – there were the obligatory over-marketed, over-packaged and over-priced blends of Chivas and Johnny Walker Blue Label office/Christmas gifts. With even the most pedestrian of single malts far more interesting than Chivas and JW, one has to wonder why people think that Chivas and JW are class acts – well not really, they are just ignorant and fall for the over-the-top coffin-like packaging, the sort of aesthetic that was characteristic of “Posh and Becks” wedding. Anyway back to Old Pulteney. I did enjoy it immensley despite it not being really to my default taste – i.e. the smokey Islays. I have since discovered that Old Pulteney 21 had recently won World Whisky of the Year. I wouldn’t read too much into this but I do think that the Old Pulteney distillery is thoroughly underrated and though hardly a favourite of mine, is producing very interesting and quite different tastes. (Of this trip’s single malt “sampling” the old favourites Laphroaig, Dalwhinnie, Talisker and Ardbeg never let me down). As with all single malts the characteristics are determined by location (the most northerly on the British mainland). Furthermore, for Old Pulteney:
The wash still, in particular, is a source of fascination to visitors due to the absence of a ‘swan neck’. Legend has it that when the still was delivered it was too tall for the still house and the manager simply decided to cut the top off!
Tasting the blues
Following on from Floyd here is the much more reserved Rick Stein who goes on a sojourn through the Mississippi Delta. It was Floyd who gave Rick his television break and I notice that Dave Prichard who Floyd “directed” (Prichard was ostensibly the director), directs Stein here.
Ever since the early 1960s, Rick Stein has been in love with the blues and years later he is fascinated by the dishes ingrained in its lyrics – fried chicken and turnip greens, catfish and black-eyed peas, and the rest. In this film, Rick pays homage to the musicians who created this music and to the great dishes of the Mississippi Delta that go hand in hand with the blues.
Robo Law
How the law should deal with technologies that blur man and machine
Philosophers at the Humboldt University of Berlin, meanwhile, are exploring the various ways in which robotic technologies challenge the notion of what it means to be human. To what extent is it defined by having a body of a particular shape, or by cultural factors?
