Nicholas Rescher

episteme, Nicholas Rescher, philosophy

One can’t help but marvel at eclectic breadth and the prolific output of Nicholas Rescher. Now in his 83rd year, there are no signs of this phenomenon slowing down. I first met Nick at the Bradley Society conference held at Harris Manchester College, Oxford in about 1998. Unlike so many other stars of a younger generation, Nick is still doing the hard work of thinking – he is not endlessly repackaging his “greatest hits” and even “minor hits” under ever new thematic permutations and churning out stuff that he could do in his sleep. Last but by no means least, Nick is an absolute gentleman – he so kindly agreed to participate in an early issue of EPISTEME to help get things rolling for this new journal. And he continues to send me works of his that he thinks might be salient to my interests. Thank you Nick Rescher – long may you continue writing.

Robert Musil

bence nanay, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, l'homme sans qualite, man without qualities, robert musil

I’m very much looking forward to this Monist collection on Robert Musil edited by Bence Nanay. It’s about time Musil got the mainstream philosophical recognition he so deserves. Bravo Bence! Needless to say that with my moniker I’m a great fan of Musil. Here is an extract from Musil’s Man Without Qualities. And if ever you are in Klagenfurt (about a three and a half hour drive southwest of Vienna) check out the Musil Museum.

Smith on Searle and De Soto

capital, collective intentionality, Hernando de Soto, institutional facts, language, philosophy of social science, political obligation, political philosophy, property rights, rule following, Searle, social constructivism, social facts, social identity, social ontology, social reality, speech acts

A fascinating talk by (ontology kingpin) Barry Smith entitled “John Searle and Hernando de Soto: The Mystery of Capital and the Construction of Social Reality.“

Spreading the Joy? Why the Machinery of Consciousness is (Probably) Still in the Head

active externalism, Andy Clark, cognition, david chalmers, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science

Check out this recent(ish) paper by Andy Clark in Mind Vol. 118 . 472 . October 2009

Is consciousness all in the head, or might the minimal physical substrate for some forms of conscious experience include the goings on in the (rest of the) body and the world? Such a view might be dubbed (by analogy with Clark and Chalmers’s (1998) claims concerning ‘the extended mind’) ‘the extended conscious mind’. In this article, I review a variety of arguments for the extended conscious mind, and find them flawed. Arguments for extended cognition, I conclude, do not generalize to arguments for an extended conscious mind.

Nurturing the Mind: Extended Functionalism, Complementarity and the Deep Blue Sea

Andy Clark, Chalmers, Embedded, embodied cognition, embodiment, enactivism, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, functionalism, Julian Kiverstein, Mirko Farina

Here’s the penultimate draft of the aforementioned paper by Julian Kiverstein and Mirko Farina:

Abstract: Like many other studies, this paper focuses on the ways in which the functional isomorphism between neural and extra-neural features can provide the means to meet the criteria for cognitive extension. However, unlike these other studies, this paper acknowledges the stalemate into which the debate over Extended and Embedded has fallen. While surveying the literature directed at the functionalist version of Extended Mind, we investigate the feasibility of the complementarity approach. By exploring the offshoots of recent studies encompassing developmental niche construction, neural development and nurtured cognitive structures, we attempt to validate this complementarity alternative and in bringing it back to fore thereby escape the apparent impasse.

An experimental study of blind proficiency tests in forensic science

applied ethics, epistemic systems, epistemics, Everard James Cowan, Forbes, forensic science, forensics, injustice, Institute for Forensic Science Administration, justice, Roger Koppl, social epistemology

Check out the very important work being done by Roger Koppl and his associate Jim Cowan of the Institute for Forensic Science Administration (for an accessible overview of Roger and Jim’s work see Roger’s Forbes interview from a few years back). To get a sense just how vital their work is consider the stats cited in their paper:

There are over one million felony convictions per year. Risinger (2007) has established that the “minimum factual wrongful conviction rate” for capital rape-murders from 1982 through 1989 is at least 3.3% (pp. 768 & 778). The study of Saks and Koehler (2005) suggests that about two thirds of false convictions arise in part from forensic science testing errors or false or misleading forensic science testimony. Multiplying these numbers gives you a number greater than 20,000.

Overextended Cognition

Adams & Aizawa, Andy Clark, dan weiskopf, extended mind, externalism, Lawrence Shapiro, philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, robert rupert, robert wilson, Shannon Spaulding

Here’s a new paper by Shannon Spaulding. The abstract:

Extended cognition is the view that some cognitive processes extend beyond the brain. One prominent strategy of arguing against extended cognition is to offer necessary conditions on cognition and argue that the proposed extended processes fail to satisfy these conditions (Adams and Aizawa, 2008; Rupert, 2010; Weiskopf, 2008).  I argue that this strategy is misguided and fails to refute extended cognition. I suggest a better way to evaluate the case for extended cognition that should be acceptable to all parties, captures the intuitiveness of previous objections, and avoids the problems with the strategy of offering necessary conditions on cognition. I conclude that extended cognition theorists have failed to establish the truth of extended cognition.