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Ryle & Oakeshott on the “Knowing-How/Knowing-That” Distinction

Some two and a half years ago I previewed this paper. For several reasons, not least because of my faffing about and constantly reworking it in light of new reading, not to mention wrestling with some Quine and Frege, it only now has gone to press. Here are the first and last sections. Section II…

Being Heidegger

Simon Critchley has the first of an eight-part series of blog postings on Heidegger’s Being and Time. Will he discuss the influence Heidegger has had on non-Cartesian cognitive science? We will see. Unlikely as it sounds, Gilbert Ryle’s critical notice (Mind XXXVIII 1929, 355-370) warmly welcomed Sein und Zeit despite the inherent difficulties of the work…

Extended hype?

Galen Strawson, while thinking there is much to be said for non-Cartesianism, doesn’t think that the radical turn taken by the extended mind hypothesis, is fruitful nor indeed really all that new. Stay tuned for an excellent review by Chris Onof of Strawson’s Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does physicalism entail panpsychism? in The Journal…