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Walker Percy Wednesday 183

SYMBOL AND CONSCIOUSNESS The selective and intentional character of consciousness has been stressed by empiricists and phenomenologists alike. The conscious act is always intentional: One is never simply conscious, but conscious of this or that. Consciousness is, in fact, defined by the phenomenologist as noematic intentionality in general. But quite as essential to the act…

Walker Percy Wednesday 182

THERE ARE two interesting things about current approaches to consciousness as a subject of inquiry. One is that the two major approaches, the explanatory-psychological and the phenomenological, go their separate ways, contributing nothing to each other. They do not tend to converge upon or supplement each other as do, say, atomic theory and electromagnetic theory.…

Dan Zahavi on Husserl’s legacy

Richard Marshall chats with Dan in 3:AM Magazine. Very briefly put, I think phenomenologists reject various forms of reductionism, objectivism, and scientism. They insist on foregrounding the experiential perspective, and are more interested in descriptive adequacy than in explanatory mechanisms. Central to their efforts is an attempt to characterize and understand the pre-scientific lifeworld, which…

Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl

This is a highly unusual collection worth checking out, co-edited by the very excellent Dagfinn Føllesdal – for the first time here is a work that seriously brings Adam Smith into the orbit of cogsci: Contents Preface Introduction Contributors Can we have objective knowledge of the world? Can we understand what is morally right or wrong?…

Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception

New translation reviewed by Eran Dorfman Sixty-seven years after its publication in French and fifty years after its first translation into English, the long-awaited new translation of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception has finally come out. This classical work famously grounds experience in the body, showing how the latter conditions perception and action in various domains such as…

Shaun Gallagher: Enactively extended intentionality

Shaun Gallagher talk: I argue that the extended mind hypothesis requires an enactive, neo-pragmatic concept of intentionality if it is to develop proper responses to a variety of objections. This enactive concept of intentionality is based on the phenomenological concept of a bodily (or motor or operative) intentionality outlined by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. I explore…