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Walker Percy Wednesday 183

SYMBOL AND CONSCIOUSNESS The selective and intentional character of consciousness has been stressed by empiricists and phenomenologists alike. The conscious act is always intentional: One is never simply conscious, but conscious of this or that. Consciousness is, in fact, defined by the phenomenologist as noematic intentionality in general. But quite as essential to the act…

Dan Zahavi on Husserl’s legacy

Richard Marshall chats with Dan in 3:AM Magazine. Very briefly put, I think phenomenologists reject various forms of reductionism, objectivism, and scientism. They insist on foregrounding the experiential perspective, and are more interested in descriptive adequacy than in explanatory mechanisms. Central to their efforts is an attempt to characterize and understand the pre-scientific lifeworld, which…

Mind and Behavior: Vol. 34 No. 2

The latest issue of JMB is now available. Two articles have caught my attention: “Deep Naturalism: Patterns in Art and Mind” by Liz Stillwaggon Swan and “Problematizing Tye’s Intentionalism: The Content of Bodily Sensations, Emotions, and Moods” by Juan J. Colomina ArtCognitionCognitive neuroscienceCognitive scienceconsciousnessEmbodied cognitive scienceintentionalityjournal of mind and behaviorJuan ColominaLiz Stillwaggon Swanmichael tyenaturalismphilosophical psychologyPhilosophy of mindqualia

Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content

Check out this recently released book by Dan Hutto and Erik Myin. The book will be reviewed by the very excellent Tom Froese for The Journal of Mind & Behavior. Stay tuned. Speaking of enactivism see this special issue of Constructivist Foundations dedicated to Neurophenomenology. Constructivist Foundations must rate as one of the best open access journals I have…

The Emergence of the Mind: Hayek’s Account of Mental Phenomena as a Product of Spontaneous Physical and Social Orders

Extracts from Gloria’s chapter: Friedrich Hayek’s social theory is well known for his articulation of the paradigm of spontaneous orders that challenges the traditional distinction between what is natural and what is artificial. The problem that Hayek saw is that language and other social objects do not fall under either heading completely. Language is, for…