Browse by:

The Enactive Approach

Evan Thompson and Ezequiel Di Paolo have co-authored this entry for Larry Shapiro’s upcoming The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition. The one and only Sylvie Guillem Cognitive scienceEmbodied cognitive scienceenactivismEvan ThompsonEzequiel Di PaoloLawrence ShapiroSylvie Guillem

Oakeshott and Hayek: Situating the Mind

Below are some excerpts from my paper – the excerpts chosen with a view to addressing the criticisms leveled by John Kekes. 1) Kekes writes: The third deficient essay is by Leslie Marsh, one of the editors of this volume. He compares Oakeshott and Hayek from the point of view of cognitive science. I find…

Dreamless Sleep, Embodied Cognition, and Consciousness: The Relevance of a Classical Indian Debate to Cognitive Science

A terrific talk (see abstract below) by Evan Thompson as a curtain raiser to his forthcoming book from Columbia University Press entitled Waking, Dreaming, Being: New Light on the Self and Consciousness from Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy. In the meantime check out the expansive review of his Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of…

Mind and Matter

Here’s a review from the NYT by the ever caustic Colin McGinn (one of my favourite philosophers of mind, however unfashionable some might think he is). H/T to Paul Raymont for the link and for tracking the toing and froing. Here is the equally polemical Raymond Tallis with a joint review of Deacon and Gazzaniga. CognitionCognitive neuroscienceCognitive…

Shaun Gallagher: Enactively extended intentionality

Shaun Gallagher talk: I argue that the extended mind hypothesis requires an enactive, neo-pragmatic concept of intentionality if it is to develop proper responses to a variety of objections. This enactive concept of intentionality is based on the phenomenological concept of a bodily (or motor or operative) intentionality outlined by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. I explore…