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Persons and the Extended-Mind Thesis

An extract from Lynne Rudder Baker’s paper: Cognitive scientists have become increasingly enamored of the idea of extended minds. The extended-mind thesis (EM) is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain or even within the boundaries of the skin. EM is the modal claim that it is possible that the…

A conceptual and empirical framework for the social distribution of cognition: The case of memory

The power team of  Barnier, Sutton, Harris, and Wilson. Paradigms in which human cognition is conceptualised as “embedded”, “distributed”, or “extended” have arisen in different areas of the cognitive sciences in the past 20 years. These paradigms share the idea that human cognitive processing is sometimes, perhaps even typically, hybrid in character: it spans not only…

Consciousness and the social mind

Here is the intro to Phil’s piece. Emotion is a hot topic, getting hotter all the time. The reasons for this enthusiasm are various, but the growth of neuroscientific interest in the area surely ranks high among them. The same goes for another hot topic: social cognition. Within the last two decades, two subfields of…

Functionalism and mental boundaries

I’ve decided to dust off some of the papers from a themed issue that I co-edited five years ago since I happen to be very much in “extended mind” mode just now. First up is Larry Shapiro – below is his into; here is his abstract. 1. Introduction Where are minds? For most people the…