Turing: “He invented the idea of software, essentially”
This in The Washington Post. Alan TuringArtificial intelligenceconsciousnessFreeman Dysonphilosophical psychologyPhilosophy of mindTuring machineTuring test
This in The Washington Post. Alan TuringArtificial intelligenceconsciousnessFreeman Dysonphilosophical psychologyPhilosophy of mindTuring machineTuring test
The intro to Jack Weinstein’s chapter. In the midst of one of the most famous passages in The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith writes “nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog” (WN I.ii.2). In and of itself, this is probably not a noteworthy…
New York Times Brainbrain scienceCognitive neuroscienceconsciousnesshumeNeurobiologyNeurophilosophyneuroscienceOliver Sacksphilosophical psychologyPhilosophy of mindProsopagnosia
Very positive reviews: The Guardian The Telegraph The Independent New Scientist AIArtificial intelligenceCognitive scienceconsciousnessex machinaPhilosophy of mindqualia
According to Robert Grant, Oakeshott only ever communicated with two “official” philosophers, one of which was Ryle: Oakeshott warmly introduced Ryle, who delivered the annual August Comte Memorial Lecture at the LSE. John. D. Mabbott who read the proofs for On Human Conduct had, years earlier, been the first to recognize Oakeshott’s KH/KT connection with Ryle in his…
Here is a review of István Aranyosi’s recent book, a contribution to the latest issue of JMB, Vol. 35 No. 3 Summer 2014. CognitionCognitive scienceEmbodied cognitionExtended MindExternalismIstván Aranyosijournal of mind and behaviorMichael Madaryphilosophical psychologyPhilosophy of mindsituated cognition
Review CognitionDaniel Dennettdarwinmemeticsnaturalismphilosophical psychologyPhilosophy of mindReligionReligion & Spiritualityreligion and science
The intro to Brian Glenney’s chapter: The aim of this chapter is to propose an account of sensory perception from the known writings of Adam Smith, chiefly his juvenile work, “On the External Senses.” This account asserts that when we perceive an object we simulate its painful or pleasurable effects on our body—we imaginatively place…
New Scientist The Economist The Telegraph The Independent . . . and the original Chalmers paper. brain scienceCognitionCognitive neuroscienceCognitive scienceconsciousnessDavid ChalmersneurosciencePatricia Churchlandphilosophical literaturephilosophical psychologyPhilosophy of mindqualiathe hard problemthomas nagel
William Ramsey in Synthese CognitionCognitive neuroscienceCognitive scienceconsciousnessDavid Marrdistributed cognitionExtended MindFolk psychologyphilosophical psychologyPhilosophy of mindrepresentationalismsituated cognition