With the cessation of operations for the journal Studies in Emergent Order C+T have agreed to host and make available SIEO’s full back catalogue of papers comprising a Who’s Who of Austrians and their sympathizers.

Propriety and Prosperity: New Studies on the Philosophy of Adam Smith

Now that the ms has been shipped off to the publisher here is the finalized lineup:

Foreword — Vernon Smith

Adam Smith as a Scottish Philosopher — Gordon Graham

Friendship in Commercial Society Revisited: Adam Smith on Commercial Friendship — Spyridon Tegos

Adam Smith and French Political Economy: Parallels and Differences — Laurent Dobuzinskis

Adam Smith: 18th Century Polymath — Roger Frantz

 One Adam Smith — David Brat

Indulgent Sympathy and the Impartial Spectator — Joshua Rust

 Adam Smith on Sensory Perception: A Sympathetic Account — Brian Glenney

Adam Smith on Sympathy: From Self-Interest to Empathy — Gloria Zúñiga y Postigo

What My Dog Can Do: On the Effect of The Wealth of Nations I.ii.2 — Jack Weinstein

Metaphor Made Manifest: Taking Seriously Smith’s “Invisible Hand” — Eugene Heath

The ‘Invisible Hand’ Phenomenon in Philosophy and Economics — Gavin Kennedy

Instincts and the Invisible Order: The Possibility of Progress — Jonathan B. Wight

The Spontaneous Order and the Family — Lauren K. Hall

Smith, Justice and the Scope of the Political — Craig Smith



Review of Franco-Marsh Companion

Review essay of A Companion to Michael Oakeshott


by Suvi Soininen

Redescriptions: yearbook of political thought, conceptual history and feminist theory. 2012/2013, vol. 16, pp. 172-187 (in downloadable pdf)


Stigmergic epistemology, stigmergic cognition

Here is the intro and conclusion to Chris and my paper:

To know is to cognize, to cognize is to be a culturally bounded, rationality-bounded and environmentally located agent. Knowledge and cognition are thus dual aspects of human sociality. If social epistemology has the formation, acquisition, mediation, transmission and dissemination of knowledge in complex communities of knowers as its subject matter, then its third party character is essentially stigmergic. In its most generic formulation, stigmergy is the phenomenon of indirect communication mediated by modifications of the environment. Extending this notion one might conceive of stigmergy as the extra-cranial analog of artificial neural networks or the extended mind. With its emphasis on coordination, it acts as the binding agent for the epistemic and the cognitive. Coordination is, as David Kirsh (2006, p. 250) puts it, “the glue of distributed cognition”. This paper, therefore, recommends a stigmergic framework for social epistemology to account for the supposed tension between individual action, wants and beliefs and the social corpora: paradoxes associated with complexity and unintended consequences. A corollary to stigmergic epistemology is stigmergic cognition, again running on the idea that modifiable environmental considerations need to be factored into cognitive abilities. In this sense, we take the extended mind thesis to be essentially stigmergic in character.

This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we set out the formal specifications of stigmergy. In Section 3, we illustrate the essentially stigmergic characteristics of social epistemology. In Section 4, we examine extended mind externalism as the preeminent species of stigmergic cognition. In Section 5 we illustrate how the particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm for the optimization of a function could be understood as a useful tool for different processes of social cognition, ranging from the learning of publicly available knowledge by an individual knower, to the evolution of scientific knowledge. In Section 6, we offer some concluding remarks.


A great deal of ground has been covered in the course of which we have made a case for two central claims:

1. Social epistemology has the formation, acquisition, mediation, transmission and dissemination of knowledge in complex communities of knowers as its subject matter. Such knowledge is, for the most part, third party and as such it is knowledge that is conditioned and modified. Understood thus, social epistemology is essentially stigmergic.

2. One might conceive of social connectionism as the extra-cranial analog of an artificial neural network providing epistemic structure. The extended mind thesis (at least the Clarkean variant) runs on the idea that modifiable environmental considerations need to be factored into cognitive abilities. This notion of cognition is thus essentially stigmergic.

With 1 and 2 in mind, two disclaimers are in order. First, a stigmergical socio-cognitive view of knowledge and mind should not be construed as (a) the claim that mental states are somewhere other than in the head or, (b) the corollary, that as individualists, we do not think that what is outside the head has nothing to do with what ends up in the head. A stigmergic approach, necessarily dual aspect, does not require one to dispense with one or the other. There is no methodological profit whatsoever to throwing out the Cartesian baby along with the bath water. Second, a socio-cognitive view of mind and knowledge be not be mistaken as a thesis for strong social constructivism, the idea all facts are socially constructed (a denial that reality in some way impinges upon mind) – again, it would be inconsistent with the environmental emphasis entailed by stigmergy.

For Clark, “[M]uch of what goes on in the complex world of humans, may thus, somewhat surprisingly, be understood in terms of so-called stigmergic algorithms.” (Clark, 1996, p. 279). Traditional cases of stigmergic systems include stock markets, economies, traffic patterns, supply logistics and resource allocation (Hadeli, Valckenaers, Kollingbaum, & Van Brussel, 2004), urban sprawl, and cultural memes. New forms of stigmergy have been exponentially expanded through the affordances of digital technology: we’ve expounded upon Google’s RP and Amazon’s CF but of course include wiki, open source software, weblogs, and a whole range of “social media” that comprise the World Wide Web. These particular examples serve to make the wider stigmergical point that the Janus-like aspect of knowledge and cognition must be set against a background fabric of cultural possibility: individuals draw their self-understanding from what is conceptually to hand in historically specific societies or civilizations, a preexisting complex web of linguistic, technological, social, political and institutional constraints.

It is no surprise then that it has been claimed that stigmergic systems are so ubiquitous a feature of human sociality, it would be more difficult to find institutions that are not stigmergic ( Parunak, 2005 and Tummolini and Castelfrananchi, 2007). If stigmergy were merely coextensive with “the use of external structures to control, prompt, and coordinate individual actions” (Clark, 1997, p. 186), then the concept would amount to a claim about situated cognition in all its dimensionality Solomon, 2006b. While stigmergy includes these aspects, it distinctively emphasizes the cybernetic loop of agent → environment → agent → enviro nment through an ongoing and mutual process of modification and conditioning, appearing to dissolve the supposed tension between the self-serving individual and the social corpora at large through indirect interaction. Though this process of behavior modification has long since been identified by both PSE and SSE theorists, only recently has there begun a concerted effort ( Turner, 2001 and Turner, 2003) to, as Ron Sun puts it (Sun, 2006) “cognitivize” human sociality. Social theory and cognitive science must now recognize the virtues of a “cognitivized” approach to all things social.


Economics, cognitive science and social cognition

Here is the intro to Don’s paper:

This essay concerns the role of economics in the interdisciplinary study of social cognition. Increasingly many economists believe that economics has such a role. Most who hold this opinion do so because they think that, to some extent, important parts of microeconomics should collapse into psychology. They think this in part because they are convinced that most human motivation has turned out to be irreducibly social, whereas traditional microeconomics depended for maintenance of its distance from psychology on modeling people as if their social relations were incidental rather than constitutive. Bruni (2005) is a representative instance of the newer view.

The perspective I will defend here agrees that economics can and should contribute to the understanding of social cognition. Economics is an important part of a complementary suite of cognitive and behavioral sciences that accomplish more together than they could do in isolation. However, I do not believe that any part of economics should be collapsed into psychology, and I reject the widespread opinion that economics for much of its history ‘went wrong’ by ignoring the social dimension of value.

I will aim to do three things in the paper. First, I will describe the origins of the widespread misperception. As will be seen, both the cognitive revolution of the 1960s and the later interanimation of cognitive science and social theory are important parts of this story (see also Angner & Loewenstein, forthcoming). Then I will explain why I think the perception is confused. Finally I will indicate why all of this matters: economics can make its distinctive and important contribution to our understanding of social cognition (and social behavior) only if it is recognized to have a different role from that of psychology. Economics is not equivalent to the psychology of valuation, though there is (of course) such a psychology, which is partly social, and economics helpfully informs it. It would reduce confusion, I believe, if much of what is now called ‘behavioral economics’ were referred to as ‘psychology of valuation’ instead.The confusions I aim to dispel are historical in origin. Thus much of the essay will be about what economists call ‘history of thought’. Let me therefore note that my motives are not the historian’s. That is, I am not concerned per se with the way in which historical thinkers represented their own intentions and views to themselves. I am instead concerned with how we should critically regard previous episodes of reasoning in light of what we think we have learned that participants in these past episodes did not know. To illustrate with a simple example: the question ‘Why did Copernicus set the scientific revolution in motion?’ is not a question for the intellectual biographer, because Copernicus never imagined he was doing any such thing; but it is a perfectly good question for the historian of science who knows how events turned out and what led to what.


Herbert Simon

Since I missed marking the birth of Simon on the 15th, here’s a belated posting of an obituary by his student Edward A. Feigenbaum. (I’m pleased to report that my co-edited project with Roger Frantz commemorating the centenary of HS’s birth is coming together very nicely. HS’s daughter has been incredibly responsive towards the project).

Herbert A . Simon, winner of the 1978 Nobel Prize in Economics, died on 9 February at the age of 84. He was Richard King Mellon Professor of Computer Science and Psychology at Carnegie Mellon University. In an era when universities assiduously preserve the names of their new buildings for generous donors, the new Computer Science Building at Carnegie Mellon University is instead named for Simon and another renowned computer scientist, Allen Newell.

The hallmark of Simon’s remarkable career is the extent of his cross-disciplinary contributions: from economic theory to psychology to behavioral science to computer science. Before his Nobel Prize, Simon had already won the A. M. Turing Award, the top accolade for computer science, prompting computer scientists to refer to him as “our Nobel Prize winner.” But psychologists also awarded him their top honor, the Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award, and they too claimed him as their own.

As his graduate student, in awe of his enormous knowledge and the range of his contributions, I once asked him to explain his mastery of so many fields. His unforget-table answer was, “I am a monomaniac. What I am a monomaniac about is decision-making.” Studies and models of decision-making are the themes that unify most of Simon’s contributions.

He challenged the assumptions of mid- 20th century economic theory, the so-called Rational Economic Man model. This model assumed the omniscience of human decision-making: that humans recognize all of their possible choices and the consequences of selecting each. Simon, the empiricist, observed that Rational Economic Man does not exist. The cognitive ability of people to recognize alternatives and calculate optima is in fact quite limited. He argued that economics could not be built upon a foundation of assumptions concerning human behavior that were patently false.

As a substitute, he introduced assumptions of bounded rationality and the concept of “Satisficing” Man, who cannot maximize – or minimize because the computational demands of doing so are beyond his capability. Satisficing man makes choices that are satisfactory-good enough, rather than the best. In the early 1950s, Simon introduced his theory with two classic papers in which he argued that objects (real or symbolic) in the environment of the decision-maker influence choice as much as the intrinsic information-processing capabilities of the decision-maker. In his book The Sciences of theArtificial (1), with his usual expository skill, he made this idea easy to grasp. His metaphor was the ant on the beach: The ant makes her way from a starting point to a food source along an intricate path. But the path appears to be complex only because of the patterns of the intervening grains of sand, not because of any complex information-processing by the ant.

Collaborating with James March, Simon applied the search model of problem-solving to the study of how organizations make decisions and how they innovate. Their book, Organizations (2), is the foundation of modern organization theory. March, Richard Cyert, and others extended Simon’s theory to microeconomic phenomena in the influential book, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (3).

Simon, the theorist, sought to give these abstractions a concrete expression from which precise predictions of human problem-solving behavior could be made. Simon tried using mathematics but found its lan-guage was not rich enough to express the complexity of the problem-solving processes he was attempting to model. With Allen Newell in 1955, he discovered the right economics language: the language of the digital computer. Newell, Simon, and J. C. Shaw of RAND invented a powerful programming language for describing complex symbol processing. They used their new language to model problem-solving processes such as proving theorems in logic. This marked the start of the field of artificial intelligence and Si-mon considered this contribution to be his finest. Many computer simulation programs of human cognition followed. Newell and Simon’s 1972 book, Human Problem Solving (4), is perhaps .- the most important book on the scientific study of human thinking in the 20th century.

For the last 25 years of his life, Simon continued to experiment and build computer models of cognition. He designed models of human expertise, scientific discov-ery (he modeled how certain historically great discoveries of science were actually made), and human memory. He worked for decades on models of the processes through which symbols are learned, recognized, retrieved, and forgotten.

If one were to read a single book that would encompass the essential Simon, I would suggest the slim volume The Sciences of the Artificial (1), written for a broad scientific audience. In an elegant and lucid way, Simon explains the principles of modeling complex systems, particularly the human in formation-processing system that we call the mind. There is no better epilogue for Herbert Simon than that imparted by one of his Carnegie Mellon University colleagues: As Herb Simon struggled to recover from complications of surgery a few days before his death, this author of nearly a thousand papers and 27 books finished a manuscript he was writing and gave instructions to his daughter about its publication.


1. H.A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial  [The Karl Taylor Compton Lectures] (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,1969).

2. J. G. March, H. A. Simon, Organizations (Wiley, New York, 1958).

3. R.M. Cyert, J. G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1963).

4. A. Newell, H. A. Simon, Human Problem Solving (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N J, 1972).

From: SCIENCE VOL 291 16 MARCH 2001


The social-cognitive dynamics of metaphor performance

Here is the into to Raymond and Lynne’s paper:

Any extended analysis of everyday talk reveals the presence of stretches of language that convey metaphorical meaning. Consider, as one example, the following remarkable conversation between Jo Berry, whose father, Sir Anthony Berry, was killed by a bomb in 1984, and Patrick Magee, who planted the bomb on behalf on the Irish Republican Army during their conflict with the British government. Jo Berry had asked to meet Pat Magee in order to understand more about why the bombing happened, and they first met in 1999, after Pat Magee was released from prison under a peace agreement. Extract 1 comes from the first of the conversations and shows Jo explaining why she wanted to meet Pat. She refers to moment of the bombing in line 91 and to meeting Pat in lines 103 and 104.

Extract 1
90 Jo …I knew,
91 …(2.0) backin the moment,
92 wh- what I wanted to do,
93 … was bring as much –
94 …(2.0) something –
95 … as much positive out of it as I could.
96 … you know,
97 Pat [hmh]
98 Jo …(1.0) [and] I –
99 and I saw very clearly.
100 …(1.0) that the –
101 …the end of that journey,
102 would be,
103 …sitting down and,
104 …talking to the people who did it.
105 Pat … hmh
106 Jo … that just camein a moment,
107 and then went away,
108 and then –
109 … there’s been a longlong .. 16 years of [getting to this point].
110 Pat [hmh hmh]

There are several instances of metaphorically used words and phrases in this excerpt, which we have underlined. For instance, “back in” in line 91 conveys the idea of Jo’s remembering the bombing as if she were physically moving back into a specific spatial location. The idea of being able to “bring” “something” “out of it” refers to Jo’s mental reconstructing the bombing in terms of movement from one physical location to another, but this time in the possession of an important object (i.e., a new understanding). We also see in lines 99–101 that Jo conceives this process of reconciliation, and sitting down to talk with Pat, as the endpoint of a physical journey along some path where the psychological goal is understood as a destination (i.e., endpoint) on the path.

Why do speakers, like Jo, talk in these metaphorical ways, and what motivates them to utter the particular words they do to achieve different communicative effects? Is the use of metaphoric words and phrases idiosyncratic or can it be explained in some principled manner? The vast interdisciplinary research on metaphor use and understanding suggests that there are multiple reasons for why people speak metaphorically. Quite roughly, the possible reasons for speaking metaphorically refer to bodily, cognitive, linguistic, social, and cultural variables. For instance, people may employ certain metaphoric words and phrases because they typically think about particular, usually abstract, domains in metaphoric terms (cognitive), because there is no way to express specific meanings in a language without using metaphor (linguistic), because they wish to impress or persuade another person by the words used (social), and/or because their cultural beliefs and norms are conventionally encoded in specific metaphorical themes (cultural). Much of the contemporary scholarship in metaphor studies debates these, and other, possible reasons for why people use metaphorical language and how they interpret metaphors in discourse. This has led to a vast complex of alternative methods, empirical findings, and theories of metaphor use, with individual metaphor scholars exhibiting the strong tendency to focus on certain aspects of metaphor and adopt one perspective on metaphor use (e.g., cognitive or linguistic) while downplaying or ignoring others (e.g., social or cultural).

We believe that all these varying perspectives on metaphor have the potential to offer important insights into the use and understanding of metaphor in discourse. But the vast number of possible factors involved in metaphor use, and their complex interactions, makes it difficult to adjudicate between competing theories. Our aim is in this article is to suggest a different way of looking at metaphor by embracing a dynamical systems approach that better captures the total ecology of human behavior, and more specifically metaphor performance. The key to this idea is the recognition that metaphor performance is shaped by discourse processes that operate in a continual dynamic interaction between individual cognition and the social and physical environment. Dynamical approaches to human action attempt to describe how the body’s continuous interactions with the world, including other people, provide for coordinated patterns of adaptive behavior. Simple and complex behaviors are higher-order products of self-organization processes that emerge from both intra and interpersonal interactions. We argue that the complexities of metaphoric language use (i.e., how people coordinate with each other through metaphor) emerge from self-organizational processes that operate along a range of different time-scales, from the millisecond to the evolutionary, and across a range of scales of social group size, from the individual and dyad to the speech community. The phenomena of metaphor performance are, we suggest, best studied in terms of continuously dynamic discourse processes. This framework for studying metaphor recasts some traditional questions about metaphor use and understanding and suggests the need for a closer link in characterizing social and cognitive processes in human behavior.


Dynamic empathy: A new formulation for the simulation theory of mind reading

The intro to Teed Rockwell’s paper:

There are currently two popular theories for explaining “mind reading” i.e. our ability to become aware of what other people are feeling and thinking, and to predict (and/or respond skillfully to) behavior on the basis of that awareness. The first, known as the theory-theory (TT), claims that we have a theory of mind, which we use to make sense out of both our own and other people’s behavior. The second, known as the simulation theory (ST), has taken on two importantly different meanings.

(1) The first meaning is “equated with… imaginatively ‘putting oneself in the other’s place”’ (Gordon, 2004). Because the words ‘imaginative” and “imagine” are different forms of the word “image”, this definition seems to imply something like “creating an image in the mind”, and could include all five sensory modalities, not just audio-visual. There are arguably problems with thinking of this diverse range of qualities in the pictorial terms implied by the word “image”. However, this is very much in line with the traditional British Empiricist view. The Empiricists usually used visual examples like triangles and patches of red as their prototypes for “ideas”, and then used that word to refer to all sorts of sensations and feelings, including more qualitatively complex feelings such as thirst, hunger, disgust, fear, etc.

(2) Gordon also points out that ST refers to simulations of mental states where the pictorial connotations of “image” are much more problematic. These interpretations rely on the association of the word “simulation” with pretense or hypothetical “acting out”.

One’s own behavior control system is employed as a manipulable model of other such systems… The system is first taken off-line, so that the output is not actual behavior but only predictions or anticipations of behavior (Gordon, 2004).

According to this view, any aspect of our mental life can be turned into a simulation by taking it off-line—not just images and feelings, but abstract thoughts such as beliefs, desires, and decisions. Abstract thoughts of this sort include what are called the propositional attitudes, because they are focused towards a claim expressible in a proposition. (I believe/desire/ have decided that Paris is the capital of France, the war in Iraq must end, etc.) Because theories are ordinarily thought of as being sets of propositions, many people argue that there is no important difference between “simulating” these kinds of verbalizable thoughts and thinking them yourself, and thus the Simulation Theory collapses into the Theory Theory. (This requires the plausible assumption that thinking about something requires having a theory about it.)

It would take at least another whole paper to paraphrase and respond to the detailed and ingenious replies made by ST theorists to this objection (see especially Goldman, 2006, pp. 30–40). Most of them involve accepting what Goldman calls a hybrid theory, which describes mind reading as requiring both theories and simulations. The debate then continues as each side either defends or attacks claims that all alleged simulations in such a hybrid system can actually be reduced to theories, which in turn requires arguing over exactly what a theory is. The problem has become so complex that some have argued that we ought to drop the term “simulation” altogether (Stich & Nichols, 1992).

I personally find the criticisms made by TT theorists to be reasonably convincing, and agree with Stich and Nichols that the current defense of ST has made it hard to tell the difference between a theory and a simulation. I do believe, however, that the Simulation Theory got something importantly right, which would be lost if we retreated to a pure Theory Theory. The goal of this paper is to preserve these essential insights with a redefined Simulation Theory, which returns to an idea inspired by the first of Gordon’s descriptions of simulation, i.e. as a kind of “movie” consisting of perceptual sensations. I think the hybrid TT/ST theory does explain much (perhaps most) of what can be called mind reading. But I also believe that there is a kind of mind reading which is in a certain sense purely “perceptual” and unaided by any verbal theoretical elements. I understand why Gordon, Goldman and the other defenders of the Simulation Theory have not taken this route. There are excellent reasons, with a distinguished lineage, for rejecting pure ST. In the following section, I am going to trace that lineage. I will then argue that something like a pure ST is possible, if we greatly expand our concepts of “simulation” and “perception” by using conceptual resources from connectionist neuroscience. However, once these concepts are taken out of the brain and put into the world, there is no longer a compelling reason to always refer to our awareness of other minds as being a simulation. In certain circumstances, it arguably makes more sense to say that I share the same emotion with another person, rather than make a simulation of their emotion in my own private mind.

1. The Kantian objection to the simulation theory

In many ways, the argument between the Theory-Theory and the Pure Simulation Theory is the same argument that Kant and Hume had about the true nature of ideas. Hume and the other British empiricists thought that an idea was a particular ‘image’ in one of the sensory modalities, such as a red triangle or the taste of chocolate. These images were also capable of being shaped in a variety of ways by the faculty of imagination once they were received by the mind. Hume apparently believed that imagination was all that was needed to give these particular images the powers rationalists attributed to generalized abstractions.

Kant, however, argued that no image could ever do the work of a concept. The concept of triangle applies to triangles of mutually exclusive shapes and sizes, and therefore such an image of a “Universal Triangle” would be self-contradictory. The later Wittgenstein raised a similar objection to his earlier picture theory of language by pointing out that a picture of a man walking down a hill could just as easily be a picture of a man walking up a hill backwards. It is only our interpretation of the picture that makes it one or the other, just as it is our interpretation that decides that an image of a red triangle is an example of a triangle, rather than an example of a red thing. Jerry Fodor labeled this Humean position the resemblance theory and raised this objection to it.

The difficulty with the resemblance theory is that any portrait showing John to be tall must also show him to be many other things: clothed or naked, lying standing or sitting, having a head or not having a head, and so on. A portrait of a tall man who is sitting resembles a man’s being seated, as much as it resembles a man being tall. On the resemblance theory, it is not clear what distinguishes thoughts about John’s height from thoughts about his posture (Fodor, 1981, pp. 127–128).

The resemblance theory is the genus of which the pure simulation theory is a species, and the latter is thus vulnerable to all of these objections. Kant claimed that the only way to deal with this problem was to see an idea not as an image, but as a verbalizable theoretical rule. To have a concept of a triangle or dog is to have some sort of criteria or set of definitions that identifies all the different triangles or dogs. Even though a picture of a particular dog may be similar to all other dogs, It is also similar to countless other things. The only way you can make a distinction between relevant and irrelevant similarities is with a rule that connects the image to other members (and only other members) of the same category. Similarly, being able to simulate someone else’s emotions or beliefs is not going to help you “read her mind” unless you have some sort of theory that enables you to classify the simulated emotions and beliefs into some kind of category, such as fear or pain.


Cosmos & Taxis: Launch

Today marks the start of the Cosmos & Taxis conference to launch the associated journal. In attendance will be philosophers, economists, political scientists, sociologists, English profs, complexity theorists, computer scientists, urban geographers and more besides from North America, the Far East, Australasia, and Europe. Please consider submitting a paper, a review or discussion piece to C&T – it is an open access but fully referred journal, and given the nature of the subject matter, is very ecumenical. To keep apprised of developments, see the C&T Facebook page.