My chum Byron Kaldis’ big project has been brought to fruition. Bravo! My contribution: Hayek and the “Use of Knowledge in Society”. As you will see there is a terrific lineup – this is an exciting area to be in these days what with CogSci meeting social science – another project of Byron’s in the works.
April 16, 2013
Short URL Friedrich Hayek, Hayek, Philosophy of mind, Austrian School, social epistemology, situated cognition, rationalism, distributed knowledge, Economics, Spontaneous order, Individualism, Social science, Externalism, Liberalism, philosophy of social science, distributed cognition, cognitive closure, Byron Kaldis hayek
Here is an advance listing of the forthcoming volume Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences masterly edited by my chum Byron Kaldis. My contribution: Hayek and the “Use of Knowledge in Society”
January 14, 2013
Short URL Austrian School, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, Epistemology, Friedrich Hayek, Hayek, Philosophy, Philosophy of science, Road to Serfdom, social epistemology, Social science philosophy of science, philosophy of social science
Volume 9 – Issue 03 – September 2012
HIGHER-ORDER EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY
Allan Hazlett
RELIABILISM: HOLISTIC OR SIMPLE?
Jeffrey Dunn
GROUP AGENCY AND EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCY
Aaron Dewitt
CONSTRUCTIVIST AND ECOLOGICAL MODELING OF GROUP RATIONALITY
Gerald Gaus
EPISTEMOLOGY IN GROUP AGENCY: SIX OBJECTIONS IN SEARCH OF THE TRUTH
Fabrizio Cariani
HOW TO BE A REDUNDANT REALIST
Kurt L. Sylvan
THE NORMATIVE STANDING OF GROUP AGENTS
Rachael Briggs
EPISTEME SYMPOSIUM ON GROUP AGENCY: REPLIES TO GAUS, CARIANI, SYLVAN, AND BRIGGS
Christian List and Philip Pettit
November 6, 2012
Short URL collective intentionality, EPISTEME, Epistemology, group rationality, Jeffrey Dunn, John Scalzi, Philip Pettit, Philosophy, Psychology, social epistemology, Social science epistemology
New issue now available featuring symposium on Christian List and Phillip Pettit.
HIGHER-ORDER EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY
Allan Hazlett
RELIABILISM: HOLISTIC OR SIMPLE?
Jeffrey Dunn
GROUP AGENCY AND EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCY Aaron Dewitt
CONSTRUCTIVIST AND ECOLOGICAL MODELING OF GROUP RATIONALITY
Gerald Gaus
EPISTEMOLOGY IN GROUP AGENCY: SIX OBJECTIONS IN SEARCH OF THE TRUTH
Fabrizio Carrion
HOW TO BE A REDUNDANT REALIST
Kurt L. Sylvan
THE NORMATIVE STANDING OF GROUP AGENTS
Rachael Briggs
SYMPOSIUM ON GROUP AGENCY: REPLIES TO GAUS, CARIANI, SYLVAN, AND BRIGGS
Christian List and Philip Pettit
October 5, 2012
Short URL collective intentionality, Deductive closure, EPISTEME, Epistemology, group agency, Jeffrey Dunn, Philip Pettit, Philosophy, Psychology, Reliabilism, social epistemology, Social science epistemology
Check out the freely available symposium on Pragmatic Encroachment. Also there is a critical notice of Sandy Goldberg’s Relying on Others (sadly not free) that:
focuses on the book’s central claim, the extendedness hypothesis, according to which the processes relevant for assessing the reliability of a hearer’s testimonial belief include the cognitive processes involved in the production of the testimony.
September 16, 2012
Short URL Cognition, EPISTEME, Epistemology, Extended Mind, Externalism, Philosophy of mind, social epistemology, Social science, testimony sandy goldberg
Here is the abstract and the introduction from the volume Experts and Epistemic Monopolies where our paper can be found.
Abstract
Purpose/problem statement – Two highly successful complex adaptive systems are the Market and Science, each with an inherent tendency toward epistemic imperialism. Of late, science, notably medical science, seems to have become functionally subservient to market imperatives. We offer a twofold Hayekian analysis: a justification of the multiplicity view of spontaneous orders and a critique of the libertarian justification of market prioricity.
Methodology/approach – This chapter brings to light Hayekian continuities between diverse literatures – philosophical, epistemological, cognitive, and scientific.
Findings – The very precondition of knowledge is the exploitation of the epistemic virtues accorded by society’s manifold of spontaneous forces, a manifold that gives context and definition to intimate, regulate, and inform action. The free-flow of information is the lifeblood of civil (liberal) society. The commoditization of medical knowledge promotes a dysfunctional free-flow of information that compromises notions of expertise and ultimately has implications for the greater good.
Research limitations/implications – While we accept that there are irresolvable tensions between these epistemic magisteria we are troubled by the overt tampering with the spontaneous order mechanism of medical science. The lessons of Hayek are not being assimilated by many who would go by the adjective Hayekian.
Originality/value of chapter – On offer is a Hayekian restatement (contra the libertarian view typically attributed to Hayek) cautioning that no one spontaneous order should dominate over another, neither should they be made conversable. Indeed, we argue that the healthy functioning of a market presupposes institutions that should not answer to market imperatives.
Introduction
It’s a common error to mistake the nature of liberalism. Of course ‘‘liberalism’’ is a term with many meanings, some unrelated and not all compatible. A common refrain from both self-avowed Hayekians and critics alike attributes to Hayek the view that the market is the root of social order. In this chapter we dispute this assertion. Hayek made it clear in no uncertain terms that the market exists as part of a manifold of spontaneous orders that constitute the fabric of civil (liberal) society. Hayek’s defence of common law against legislation, morality, and tradition against so-called ‘‘social justice,’’ and the market against the egalitarian impulse affirms the multiplicity view. What Hayek was recommending was the interdependence of independent equals. This provides the philosophical backdrop to the discussion. As grist to the Hayekian mill we draw upon an eclectic body of literature and examples. The discussion unfolds as follows: the second section examines Hayek’s supposed economism and libertarianism; the third section looks at the characteristics of science as a spontaneous order; the fourth section recasts the notion of a spontaneous order as an extended cognitive system afforded by technological developments. The fifth section examines some of the distortive market influences upon medical science and the sixth section discusses the philosophical motivations behind the open access movement. The penultimate section looks at a specific case study – The Knowledge Hub for Pathology (hereafter TKHP) – that instantiates the virtues of a spontaneous order discussed in the preceding four sections. We conclude with a few brief remarks.
September 12, 2012
Short URL Austrian School, Economics, Friedrich Hayek, Hayek, Liberalism, Market, Social science, Spontaneous order science
Here is a skeptical take on the insights supposedly offered by the rise of behavioral economics as represented by Daniel Kahneman and others. Since I’m in the process of reviewing Kahneman it will be interesting to see if Levine’s take on behavioral economics jibes with my take on Kahneman in particular and behavioral economics in general – I have a strong sense that is unlikely to be the case.
July 29, 2012
Short URL Behavioral economics, Daniel Kahneman, Economics, Game Theory, Kahneman, Social science behavioral economics, bounded rationality, cognition, cognitive systems, complexity, computational psychology, david levine, neuroeconomics, neuromania, neurophilosophy, neuroscience, philosophy of mind, philosophy of social science, rationality, situated cognition, social cognition, social connectionism, social epistemology, social ontology, social psychology
I see that the publisher now has a fully detailed page up for a volume that I’ve been privileged to be a part of. The Foreword is by a very nice chappie going by the name of V.Smith and includes luminaries such as McCloskey, Boettke, Gintis, Steel and others. My abstract:
Mindscapes and Landscapes: Hayek and Simon on Cognitive Extension
Hayek’s and Simon’s social externalism runs on a shared presupposition: mind is constrained in its computational capacity to detect, harvest, and assimilate “data” generated by the infinitely fine-grained and perpetually dynamic characteristic of experience in complex social environments. For Hayek, mind and sociality are co-evolved spontaneous orders, allowing little or no prospect of comprehensive explanation, trapped in a hermeneutically sealed, i.e. inescapably context bound, eco-system. For Simon, it is the simplicity of mind that is the bottleneck, overwhelmed by the ambient complexity of the environmental. Since on Simon’s account complexity is unidirectional, Simon is far more ebullient about the prospects of explanation. Hayek’s social externalism functions as a kind of distributed “extra-neural” memory store manifest as dynamic spontaneous orders. Simon’s organizational rule-governed externalism negotiates the “inner” world (the mind) with the “outer” world through a homeostatic interface that offloads the cognitive burden into the environment. Their respective externalisms may differ in detail but not in spirit in that it ameliorates their shared presupposition of cognitive constraint. Even though any “optimization talk” for Hayek and Simon is objectionable, knowledge acquisition can be represented by a contextualized stigmergic swarm optimization algorithm that gives due emphasis to both the individual and the environment. The key insight is that “perfect” knowledge is unnecessary, impracticable and indeed irrelevant if one understands the mechanism at work in complex sociality, a stigmergic sociality that in effect augments or scaffolds cognition.
July 11, 2012
Short URL Austrian School, Bounded Rationality, Cognition, Cognitive science, Colin McGinn, complexity, Economics, Extended Mind, Friedrich Hayek, Hayek, Herbert Simon, Philosophy of mind, social epistemology, Social science, Spontaneous order behavioral economics, bounded rationality, cognitive closure, Deirdre McCloskey, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, hayek, herb gintis, Pete Boettke, self organizing systems, self-referentiality, situated cognition, social cognition, social connectionism, social epistemology, social ontology, social psychology, spontaneous order, spontaneous orders, stigmergic, stigmergic cognition, stigmergy, vernon smith
Check out this new book I’ve just come across – Wiley’s lists, across disciplines, is certainly looking very strong these days. Also check out two colleagues’ excellent Wiley offerings – Ted Lewis’ Network Science and of course Ken Aizawa’s and Fred Adams’ The Bounds of Cognition.
June 5, 2012
Short URL Agent-based model, Cognition, Cognitive science, complexity, Computational Sociology, Extended Mind, Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa, Network Science, Simulation, social epistemology, Social science, Sociology, Spontaneous order, Ted Lewis cognitive modeling, cognitive science, cognitive systems, collective intentionality, collective knowledge, complex adaptive systems, complexity, computation, computational intelligence, computational psychology, computer science, computer simulations, Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa, network theory, networks, social connectionism, social epistemology, social networking, social ontology, stigmergy, systems, ted lewis
My chum David Livingstone Smith has this piece in Psychology Today.
May 16, 2012
Short URL David Livingstone, Human, Psychology Today, Social science david livingstone smith, essentialism, evolution, evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, less than human, natural kinds, naturalism