Spot on Shaun!!! This is exactly what I’ve been banging on about over the past six years – very nice validation from a top-notch theorist. The fruits of my labour will be available in its full form next year as a book entitled Stigmergic Cognition.
May 14, 2013 0 Comments Short URL Andy Clark, Cognitive science, complexity, consciousness, Critical theory, David Chalmers, enactivism, Epistemology, Extended Mind, Externalism, Institutions, Parity Principle, philosophical psychology, Philosophy of mind, Shaun Gallagher, Social affordances, Social Sciences, Spontaneous order extended mind
August 14, 2012 0 Comments Short URL NDPR, oxford handbook of the self, personal identity, philosophy of social science, Shaun Gallagher, situated cognition, social epistemology, social identity metaphysics
According to the author a new book can be expected. In this ever crowded genre I do like the title.
Apparently this major volume is to be released early next year.
May 5, 2012 0 Comments Short URL Cognition, Dan Zahavi, David Carr, Ed Casey, Embodied cognition, John Brough, Philosophy of mind, qualia, Renaud Barbaras, Shaun Gallagher, Steven Crowell, Subjectivity phenomenology, philosophy of mind, situated cognition
The VERY excellent Rob Rupert on naturalistic theories of mental content and no surprise – extended mind. Also with Jonno Sutton and Richard Menary sandwiched in between Rob. H/T to Ken Aizawa for the alert. Here is a link to my collection of ”Rupertiana“.
May 4, 2012 0 Comments Short URL Alan Saunders, Brain, Cognition, Cognitive neuroscience, Cognitive science, complexity, David Chalmers, Embodied cognition, Extended Mind, Philosophy of mind, Philosophy of science, Robert Rupert, Shaun Gallagher Andy Clark, Chalmers, extended mind, externalism, john sutton, robert rupert
A pre-print of Paul Smart’s paper.
April 17, 2012 0 Comments Short URL Cognition, Cognitive science, Extended Mind, Mind, Paul Smart, philosophical psychology, Philosophy of mind, Shaun Gallagher, Social Sciences Andy Clark, cognitive science, cognitive systems, consciousness, david chalmers, extended mind, externalism, neurophilosophy, robert wilson
I argue that the extended mind hypothesis requires an enactive, neo-pragmatic concept of intentionality if it is to develop proper responses to a variety of objections. This enactive concept of intentionality is based on the phenomenological concept of a bodily (or motor or operative) intentionality outlined by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. I explore the connections between this concept and recent embodied approaches to social cognition.
See also Evan Thompson on “Mind in life and life in mind” and Michael Wheeler on “Cognition at the crossroads: from embodied minds to thinking bodies“
March 29, 2012 0 Comments Short URL Cognitive neuroscience, Cognitive science, Edmund Husserl, Embodied cognition, enactivism, Evan Thompson, Extended Mind, Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, merleau-ponty, Michael Wheeler, Mind in Life: Biology Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind, qualia, Shaun Gallagher Adams & Aizawa, Descartes, embodied cognition, embodiment, Enacted, enaction, enactivism, Evan Thompson, extended mind, externalism, functionalism, intentionality, Michael Wheeler, neurophilosophy, phenomenology, Shaun Gallagher, situated cognition, social cognition
Here is a review of Shaun Gallagher’s door-stopper of a book - the publisher’s blurb and toc below. (I’ve just finished a paper for another collection that would have fitted in this collection since communitarian notions of identity seem to be missing).
Research on the topic of self has increased significantly in recent years across a number of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, psychopathology, and neuroscience. The Oxford Handbook of the Self is an interdisciplinary collection of essays that address questions in all of these areas. In philosophy and some areas of cognitive science, the emphasis on embodied cognition has fostered a renewed interest in rethinking personal identity, mind-body dualism, and overly Cartesian conceptions of self. Poststructuralist deconstructions of traditional metaphysical conceptions of subjectivity have led to debates about whether there are any grounds (moral if not metaphysical) for reconstructing the notion of self. Questions about whether selves actually exist or have an illusory status have been raised from perspectives as diverse as neuroscience, Buddhism, and narrative theory. With respect to self-agency, similar questions arise in experimental psychology. In addition, advances in developmental psychology have pushed to the forefront questions about the ontogenetic origin of self-experience, while studies of psychopathology suggest that concepts like self and agency are central to explaining important aspects of pathological experience. These and other issues motivate questions about how we understand, not only “the self”, but also how we understand ourselves in social and cultural contexts.
Table of Contents
Introduction: A Diversity of Selves, Shaun Gallagher
1. Self: Beginnings and Basics
1. History as Prologue: Western Theories of the Self, John Barresi and Raymond Martin
2. What is it Like to be a Newborn?, Philippe Rochat
3. Self-Recognition, Gordon G. Gallup, Jr., James R. Anderson, and Steven M. Platek
4. Self in the Brain, Kai Vogeley and Shaun Gallagher
2. Bodily Selves
5. The Embodied Self, Quassim Cassam
6. Body Awareness and Self-Consciousness, Jose Bermudez
7. The Sense of Body Ownership, Manos Tsakiris
8. Phenomenological Dimensions of Bodily Self-Consciousness, Dorothee Legrand
9. Witnessing from Here: Self-Awareness from a Bodily versus Embodied Perspective, Aaron Henry and Evan Thompson
3. Phenomenology and Metaphysics of self
10. The Minimal Subject, Galen Strawson
11. The No-Self Alternative, Thomas Metzinger
12. Buddhist Non-Self: The No-Owner’s Manual, Mark Siderits
13. Unity of Consciousness and the Problem of Self, Dan Zahavi
4. Personal Identity, Narrative Identity, and Self-Knowledge
14. Personal Identity, John Campbell
15. On What We Are, Sidney Shoemaker
16. On Knowing your Self, John Perry
17. The Narrative Self, Marya Schechtman
5. Action and the Moral Dimensions of Self
18. The Unimportance of Identity, Derek Parfit
19. Self-Agency, Elisabeth Pacherie
20. Self-Control in Action, Alfred Mele
21. Moral Responsibility and the Self , David Shoemaker
6. Self Pathologies
22. The Structure of Self-Consciousness in Schizophrenia, Josef Parnas and Louis Sass
23. Multiple Selves, Jennifer Radden
24. Autism and the Self, Peter Hobson
25. The Self: Growth, Integrity, and Coming Apart, Marcia Cavell
7. The Self in Diverse Contexts
26. Our Glassy Essence: the Fallible Self in Pragmatist Thought, Richard Menary
27. The Social Construction of Self, Kenneth Gergen
28. The Dialogical Self: A Process of Positioning in Space and Time, Hubert Hermans
29. Glass Selves: Emotions, Subjectivity, and the Research Process, Elspeth Probyn
30. The Postmodern Self: An Essay on Anachronism and Powerlessness, Leonard Lawlor
31. Self, Subjectivity, and the Instituted Social Imaginary, Lorraine Code
March 22, 2012 0 Comments Short URL Artificial intelligence, Cognition, Cognitive neuroscience, Cognitive science, consciousness, Dan Zahavi, Derek Parfit, Elspeth Probyn, Embodied cognition, Extended Mind, Gordon G. Gallup, Personal identity (philosophy), Philosophy of mind, Quassim Cassam, Shaun Gallagher, social epistemology, Thomas Metzinger metaphysics, personal identity, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, situated cognition
Anthony Crisafi and Shaun Gallagher in AI & Society (Volume 25, Number 1, 123-129):
We examine the theory of the extended mind, and especially the concept of the ‘‘parity principle’’ (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58.1:7–19, 1998), in light of Hegel’s notion of objective spirit. This unusual combination of theories raises the question of how far one can extend the notion of extended mind and whether cognitive processing can supervene on the operations of social practices and institutions. We raise some questions about putting this research to critical use.
March 14, 2012 0 Comments Short URL Artificial intelligence, Clark, Cognition, Cognitive neuroscience, Embodied cognition, Extended Mind, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel, Philosophy, Philosophy of mind, Shaun Gallagher, social epistemology Andy Clark, david chalmers, extended mind, externalism, hegel, parity principle, Shaun Gallagher, situated cognition, social cognition
- Geza Vermes: Death of a Great Scholar May 22, 2013
- Kermit Ruffins: We Partyin’ Traditional Style! May 22, 2013
- A Confederacy of Dunces – quotes and extracts – 13 May 22, 2013
- Mark Rowlands on the Extended Mind May 21, 2013
- Kripke resigns as report alleges he faked results of thought experiments May 20, 2013
- Social relationships and groups: New insights on embodied and distributed cognition May 19, 2013
- Oakeshott on Science as a Mode of Experience May 17, 2013
- A Confederacy of Dunces – quotes and extracts – 12 May 16, 2013
- Stigmergy and emergent behaviour May 15, 2013
- The socially extended mind May 14, 2013
- Consciousness and the social mind May 13, 2013
- Science of Swarms May 12, 2013
- Jazz as conversation May 11, 2013
- Oakeshott on the Character of Religious Experience: Need There be a Conflict Between Science and Religion? May 11, 2013
- The Dynamically Extended Mind – A Minimal Modeling Case Study May 10, 2013