Tag Archives: Adam Smith

Getting to the Hayekian Network

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Extracts from Troy’s paper:

In many ways this paper is necessarily an introduction. I want to introduce away to understand F. A. Hayek’s ideas on both spontaneous orders and the brain by understanding network structures. More, I want to distinguish between networks that emerge top-down in organizations and cellular regulatory networks and those that emerge bottom-up in self-organizing systems and spontaneous orders, whose relations to each other follow similar patterns.

Socialists argue, contrary to Adam Smith’s thesis that the economy self-organizes from the bottom-up (1776), that the economy should be consciously designed and given goals. Hayek modernized Smith with spontaneous order theory. At the same time, self-organization theory emerged in physics and chemistry, complex adaptive systems (CAS) theory emerged in biology, and network theory emerged in several disciplines; these are all in the same conceptual family as spontaneous order theory. Hayek was part of the 20th century revolution of bottom-up self-organization theorizing that sees the universe emerging on its own through natural processes.

If everything in the universe is self-organized, where do we get this idea, resurrected by socialists, that conscious design is the norm? Humans, like most animals, evolved to immediately, instinctively recognize the signs of others of their species. With wolves, lions, and other strongly territorial species, scent signs mark territory to warn off others. But humans are more visual, so we leave visual evidence of order. As a consequence, we associate the presence of order with an orderer or designer, and the development of  creationist theories to explain nature, soul theories to explain the mind, and governments to order society. Darwinism and self-organization theories replaced creationist theories (for most people); top-down soul theories, including Descartes’ homunculus theory, evolved into CAS theories of the brain’s network structures, out of which the mind emerges; top-down social theories (where the hierarchical structure of the Catholic church was reproduced in other Western social structures, for example) gave way to Adam Smith’s bottom-up self-organizing ‘‘invisible-hand’’ theory. While life and mind have continued to evolve toward theories of self-organization, our social theories took a u-turn when socialism emerged as a respectable theory of economic ordering. The designer fallacy, increasingly abandoned in theories of life and mind, was readopted in our social theories.

When humans evolved in the African savannahs, there was little question about whether or not we designed the environment in which we built our social hierarchies. We did, however, tend to attribute the order of nature to nature spirits, gods, and goddesses, and, later, a creator God. We attributed top-down ordering of the world to external forces. Since it was the natural world, there was no question as to our having had a hand in designing it: if there was a designer, it wasn’t us. But then our numbers and density grew to give rise to new kinds of social ecosystems: spontaneous orders. As a tribal species, we assumed social structures were man-made; yet here was a social order not of anyone’s making, but emergent from our interactions. While language was a spontaneous order, its ancientness prevented us from considering it ‘‘man-made.’’ The same cannot be said of the catallaxy. While each order has roots in our evolved human behaviors, it seems the more recently a particular order emerged, the more likely we are to try to control it. Few try to control language (notable exceptions being constructivist efforts by the French and political correctness); the arts face fewer attempts at control (notable exceptions being constructivist Communist countries and conservative theocracies); religion and government both decentralized and became more heterogeneous in many places – though these typically required revolutions to precipitate the changes. The internet is the most recent spontaneous order to emerge, and we are only now facing people trying to control it.

Hayek developed his theory of spontaneous order to counter the designer fallacy. He argues, with Kauffman (1993), that the evolution of complex systems is essentially ‘‘lawless’’ (Hayek, 1991, p. 261), meaning one cannot predict future states. These lawless systems arise naturally, from the bottom-up, the interacting elements creating a network. They do not need a designer. Yet, this goes against our instincts. As humans evolved more social behaviors, our ability to detect intentions in others improved, becoming almost instantaneous. One result is ‘‘Our ancestral sociality endowed us with a hair-trigger when it comes to detecting intentions, even where there are none. When confronted with impersonal processes, we prefer to see design, purpose and agency’’ (Tonaka, 2010, p. 8). For Hayek ‘‘the sensory order is an imperfect representation of the physical order, and there are limits to what the human mind can know, as knowledge is acquired from experience’’ (Wenzel, 2010, p. 63). The presence of such built-in modes of thought/world maps such as the belief that order requires an orderer (the source of all top-down theories of cosmic and social order) also contribute to ‘‘an imperfect representation of the physical order’’ that can be overcome with sufficient experience. Since each person is born with this cognitive bias, each person must learn the natural world is not ordered top-down. This bias results in errors in understanding the economy, society, culture, and even the brain. It is perhaps ironic that the tendency to see intentionality everywhere, an evolved behavioral trait that can be traced to the brain’s structures, has been one of the primary barriers to understanding the brain’s structures, or similar networks. It is overcome only through understanding complex networks. This is what Hayek’s spontaneous order theory gives us. It may seem odd we are biased against understanding how the real world actually works, but if we understand the environment in which we evolved, it makes sense. Someone who thought a village could emerge naturally would end up killed by the villagers; those who believed if there is order, there is an orderer, would expect dangerous humans about. Unfortunately, that same bias is no longer adaptive.

Our hypersensitivity to intention may make it difficult to persuade belief in spontaneous orders. We want to believe in creationism or intelligent design, whether in cosmology, biology, government, or economy. Yet, science helps us understand the world beyond how we are programmed to see it (Hayek, 1952, p. 5.42). It is important we have the right science for the right system to create the right model. Without the right model, we make mistakes understanding the world. Widespread use of the wrong model will result in the same mistakes because ‘‘similar Hayekian maps (mental models) will lead to similar descriptions of the world among individuals with similar backgrounds and will thus never have exactly identical minds (Hayek, 1952, p. 5.28)’’ (Wenzel, 2010, p. 64). This is built on the speciesspecific structures that also unify us. It is thus possible to pile error upon error. And the more complex the data – such as economic data – the more open it is to interpretation and to confirmation bias.

Nevertheless, it seems that if spontaneous orders are human social environments, with parallels in the natural environment, then in a real sense human beings are preadapted to living in spontaneous orders. This hardly means there won’t be people trying to control those social environments any more than people have tried to control their natural environments – as ancient dams, irrigation, and rain dances prove. These controls are not without consequence, though. When you irrigate, you accidentally salt the earth, eventually decreasing soil fertility. Some, like rain dances, are simply ineffectual. Economic equivalents would be the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing in response to the Great Recession (where they ‘‘irrigated’’ the economy with money, with the likelihood that it will soon ‘‘salt the earth’’) and the stimulus packages (the economic equivalent to ‘‘rain dances,’’ since they are based on a belief that the economy is controlled by ‘‘spirits’’). Interfering with the natural evolution of spontaneous orders has negative consequences when one does not understand the processes involved. And even if you do, you won’t be able to predict when a transformation will take place in a TCAS. Such processes are inherently unpredictable and uncontrollable.

Our evolved general intelligence allows us to adapt to any physical environment, but it is our other mental orders that restrict the kinds of social environments we can thrive in. This is why understanding the human brain is vital to the work of social scientists. To understand the neurological basis of the various elements of our various cultures and societies, ‘‘a series of bridging laws must ultimately anchor cultural constructions to their relevant brain networks. These bridging laws must integrate, rather than eliminate, the laws of human psychology. They must also include the historical, political, and economic forces that shaped human society’’ (Dehaene, 2010, p. 304). Indeed, in writing The Sensory Order, is this not Hayek’s challenge to all of the social sciences?

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Propriety and Prosperity: New Studies on the Philosophy of Adam Smith

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It is unlikely that the Adam Smith “problem” in all its manifestations could be definitively resolved and this is certainly not the line this book is promoting. What’s on offer here is a fresh critical take on the two works looked at from recent developments within philosophy – philosophy of social science, philosophy of mind, social epistemology, moral philosophy – with a view to bringing Smith to a mainstream philosophy audience while simultaneously informing Smith’s traditional constituency (political economy) with philosophically finessed interpretations. The title of the book (due 2014, Palgrave MacMillan) is significant in that “Propriety” connotes Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments and “Prosperity” connotes The Wealth of Nations.

The line-up for the volume as follows:

Geoffrey Thomas (Philosophy, Birkbeck College, London)

Joshua Rust (Philosophy, Stetson University)

Gloria Zúñiga y Postigo (Philosophy, University of Texas, Arlington)

Brian Glenney (Philosophy, Gordon College, Wenham)

Byron Kaldis (Philosophy, Hellenic Open University)

Gordon Graham (Philosophy, Princeton Theological Seminary)

Gavin Kennedy (Edinburgh Business School, Heriot-Watt University)

Eugene Heath (Philosophy, State University of New York, New Paltz)

Jonathan Wight (Robins School of Business, University of Richmond)

David Hardwick (Medicine, University of British Columbia)

Leslie Marsh (Medicine, University of British Columbia)

Lauren Hall (Political Science, Rochester Institute of Technology)

Noel Parker (Political Science, University of Copenhagen)

Laurent Dobuzinskis (Political Science, Simon Fraser University)

Spiros Tegos (Philosophy, University of Crete)

Jack Weinstein (Philosophy, University of North Dakota)

Thomas Wells (Philosophy and Economics, Erasmus University)

Roger Frantz (Economics, San Diego State University)

Craig Smith (Social and Political Sciences, Glasgow University)

David Brat (Economics & Business, Randolph Macon College)

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Minds, Models and Milieux

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Minds, Models and Milieux: Commemorating the Centenary of Herbert Simon’s Birth

Edited by Roger Frantz (San Diego State University) and Leslie Marsh (University of British Columbia)

Call for Papers

Herbert Simon (June 15, 1916 – February 9, 2001) was a polymath of the highest order, making significant contributions to sociology, political science, behavioral economics, epistemology, cognitive science, public administration, economics, organization theory and complexity studies. With ever narrowing specialization we may never (at least in our lifetime) see another intellect as genuinely polymathic as Simon. We take the view that Simon’s lifelong project is analogous to Adam Smith in the sense that just as Smith wrote about both Man’s inner life (Theory of Moral Sentiments) and his outer life (Wealth of Nations) so too did Simon in many of his publications. Our book will include chapters on Simon’s theory of mind, theory of rationality and his work on organizations and markets (the latter connoted by milieux of our tripartite title). We welcome proposals on all aspects of Simon’s work, be it his contribution to a single topic, a single field, or his interdisciplinary influence. Papers should include some – as long or as short as best befits your paper – historical perspective on Simon’s writings. What was the conventional wisdom on your paper’s topic when Simon undertook his research; what was Simon’s contribution to the topic and how did the change the conventional wisdom, if at all, and; how has his work influenced research in the field. Chapters dealing with some neglected aspect of Simon’s legacy would be welcome as well. The deadline for sending a proposal is May 1, 2013. We anticipate having the book published in 2016, the centenary of Simon’s birth.

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Hayek in Today’s Cognitive Neuroscience

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My chum, the extraordinarily distinguished and generous neuroscientist Joaquín Fuster, has this excerpt from his essay:

In bold characters I mark the concepts advanced by Hayek in his The Sensory Order. In parentheses, under each conclusion, the text passages are noted in which he makes reference to those concepts:

1. The cognitive code is a relational code; memories are self-organized networks of associative connections formed in the cortex by the temporal coincident activation of dispersed neuronal assemblies.

(The Sensory Order 2.1-2.5, 3.51-3.78)

2. The networks or cognits of perceptual memory self-organize hierarchically in posterior cortex; those of executive memory do it in frontal cortex.

(The Sensory Order 4.1-4.26, 5.17-5.32)                                                                              

3. The prefrontal cortex, at the top of the perception/action (PA) cycle, integrates behavior, language and/or reasoning by, among other operations, working memory.

(The Sensory Order 4.45-4.55, 5.33-5.49)

4. Working memory is maintained by recurrent activity within the PA cycle between perceptual and executive cognits.

(The Sensory Order 5.63-5.91)

Thus far I have summarized the contributions of modern neuroscience that support Hayek’s thinking in The Sensory Order. There, in accord with the latest data at the time he theorized, that perceived knowledge was distributed in the cerebral cortex in the form of associative networks (“maps”) that bound together the sensory elements of every perceptual experience. He also theorized that the cortical perceptual system thus constituted a classificatory apparatus that was embedded in memory and would serve to classify future percepts by association or similarity. He proposed that that perceptual-knowledge apparatus of the brain was a hierarchically self-organized system that, in its ensemble, constituted what we now call a complex adaptive system. Clearly he was using a methodology very similar to the one he had been using with respect to socio-economic systems. This is most apparent on reading his earlier 1937 paper, Economics and Knowledge, of which he always spoke very fondly.

What Hayek did not say in The Sensory Order, because it was not yet known when he wrote it, is that his hypothetical “maps,” which we now call cognitive networks or cognits, interconnect profusely with one another through nodes of common linkage. In other words, that all the items of memory and knowledge in our brain constitute a massive system of relational encoding and communication. Most importantly, that knowledge is dispersed and distributed in the cerebral cortex much as it is in the marketplace among individuals. Further, that it makes sense, metaphorically, to speak of a cerebral marketplace of knowledge. This would be the cognitive counterpart of the sub-cortical marketplace of values and rewards that Ainslie et al. (2004) hypothesize.

In both “marketplaces” the unit of exchange would be synaptic strength. Thus, with more empirical knowledge, Hayek could have extended to the brain concepts very similar to those he used to explain the relationships between marketplace participants and between price and cost. He could have applied those concepts more explicitly than he did in his book to the cybernetic relation between perception and action, as encapsulated in the PA cycle. My presumptions are the more plausible if we view his stance on the role of subjective factors in the behavior of complex economic systems.

Thus current cognitive neuroscience not only confirms Hayek’s hypotheses on the brain/mind relation, but also incorporates gradually into the cerebral cortex some of the same principles of operation that he and other liberal economists tell us govern the behavior of individuals in an economic system as complex as the human brain. Indeed, there is in the cortex an endless competition between cognits for action. Cognits are, after all, self-organized units of information that is incomplete by definition — insofar as it is subjective. Out of that competition emerge, spontaneously, not only the sensory but also the action order. And the PA cycle engages the self with the environment in a dynamic cybernetic interplay much as the one that governs market transactions. In neither of the two is a “central executive” necessary.

Thus the brain dynamics between perception and action is more than a metaphor of market dynamics, not only because the former underlies the latter, but also because both serve the continuous regulation toward adaptive equilibrium that characterizes the dynamics of all open adaptive systems in biology as well as human society. Feedback and self-correction are essential components of adaptive systems. Central design and planning are generally blind to both, and therein is the cause for failure of many self-sustained bureaucracies and multi-annual plans.

For proper operation, a cybernetic cycle needs built-in feed-forward as well as feedback. Here is where Hayek’s “foresight” in an economic system appears essential to deal with what he called “imperfect competition,” in the brain as in the market. Much as in the latter, the cortical cognitive system, where cognits compete with estimates of risk and success in the PA cycle, contains within it a substrate of executive cognits or “enablers.” They reside in the prefrontal cortex on top of the cycle, which collects the information available to it in preparation of action and expectation of outcome. For this reason we can rightfully envision the prefrontal cortex as the organ of pre-adaptation of the cognitive system, which through its PA cycle ever strives for maximal future success with minimal risk.

Finally, our cortex serves our individual goals with more knowledge than we are aware of. Unconsciously, we can intuit probabilities of risk and benefit a great deal better than any conscious “central planner” inside our brain could ever do. Much of our decision-making is laden with the imponderable yet beneficial force of intuition. Inasmuch as we may derive individual benefit from intuitive knowledge, and inasmuch as our intuitive knowledge may serve our fellow humans, it is entirely possible that there is in our brain an “invisible hand” sustaining that larger one that Adam Smith (1976) proposed for society at large.

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New Translation of Lichtenberg

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Here is a new translation of Lichtenberg’s work. As some will know I’m a great admirer of Lichtenberg and his equally endearing contemporary Adam Smith. I had the great privilege of meeting Reg Hollingdale who was a translator of Lichtenberg. If you are looking for a great commuting read, something that is accessible (i.e. aphoristic), provocative and amusing, few come better than Lichtenberg.

Despite having lived over two hundred years ago (July 1, 1742 – February 24, 1799) Georg Christoph Lichtenberg even from our current perspective, is temperamentally speaking, a thoroughly modern man. Were he alive today Lichtenberg might well have filled the role of public intellectual (or free-thinker) in his threefold capacity of scientist, atheist, and satirist. Whether or not Lichtenberg could be considered a philosopher in a conventional sense, i.e. professionally, he was certainly philosophical. Lichtenberg was well-known to some of the greatest minds of the Western world. He personally knew Kant and Goethe, Nietzsche, admired him, as did Wittgenstein who introduced Russell to Lichtenberg’s writing, Despite his Anglophilia and the high-esteem in which he has been held, Lichtenberg is still relatively unknown in the English speaking world: while much of his writings have been translated into English, there exists only one book-length treatment. The secondary literature is, for the most part, in German.

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What Drives Continuing Evolution of Careers in Medicine and Healthcare?

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This by my colleague and regular co-author from the UBCMJ | SEPTEMBER 2012 4(1). As you will see, Dave has a rather unusual quality of mind in that he has a philosophical sensibility and so many reference points that typically few with his training would have.

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Two major phenomena have driven dramatic changes in medicine and healthcare careers over the past century. One critical factor has been the almost logarithmic increase in knowledge, a general phenomenon forcefully evident in medicine over the past decades. The other significant phenomenon relates to social and cultural changes with gradual development of more accepting attitudes in a diverse medical and healthcare workforce. Each of these is paralleled by consequential, organizational, family, and institutional changes.

Knowledge has expanded at about 2% per annum, compound, over the past 200 years, according to economic studies using translation of knowledge into productivity increases as a surrogate measure.1 Creation of new knowledge has also led to innovative translation with huge changes in medicine. Whereas 100 years ago a single brain, that of Sir William Osler, could be the primary repository of what was known then in medicine and write the comprehensive textbook “Principles and Practice of Medicine”,2 today, one single mind cannot contain all that is known in medicine. Accrediting bodies such as the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada and the American Boards of Medical Specialities in the USA now recognize over two dozen specialities, each of which requires a whole career focus and is in itself a brain full of knowledge. This profound increment in medical specialities continues with new subspecialties proposed each year. Similar proliferation of roles have led to an expanded number of new professional careers in nursing, pharmacy, physiotherapy and occupational therapy, and other healthcare activities — unlike years ago where each was a single profession.

Nowadays, this requires collaboration facilitated by electronic communications with practitioners cooperating as inter–professional “communities of practice” in the best interests of patients. Additionally the patients and practitioners are now exposed to web based knowledge that accentuates the requirement for caregivers to also have immediate access to detailed current knowledge. It also emphasizes the need for all practitioners to use continuing education programs to maintain an up to date knowledge base! This, together with patient-rights initiatives, is gradually leading to a balance with physicians being seen as having expertise and authority over medical therapy and patients exercising more control over which options for care are implemented according to their preferences.3 This is, however, a very complex set of interdependent professional relationships and will continue to evolve long into the future.

Fifty to one hundred years ago, single, apparently omniscient physicians, nurses, or others with comprehensive knowledge in their specialty or practice often presented themselves as authoritative, occasionally irascible bosses with structural authority.4 Such prescriptive behaviours often occurred in operating rooms or emergency rooms where definitive verbal orders were given with instantaneous action and compliance expected of subordinate nurses and others. Nowadays, there are numerous knowledgeable practitioners, each more accustomed to assuming the role of helpful expert to assist their teams, who display their own extensive knowledge as “sapiential” or “personal”4 authority, a much more benign professional presentation.

From a social and cultural perspective over the past century, major cultural shifts in Western-oriented civil societies have occurred: perhaps as a result of two World Wars and post-recession episodic changes. Changes in traditional family roles has been one of these shifts, with more women in the workforce at senior level workforce positions. If one reviews the pictures of UBC Medical graduates over the past 60 years in the Webber MSAC Alumni room, the number of female graduates in the 1950’s was 5-10% each year whereas in current classes 50-60% of graduates are female. Also, the racial makeup of classes has changed to more closely reflect population numbers. To a degree, these shifts seem to reflect a more balanced perspective towards a civil society with a move away from authoritarianism, thus encouraging a more egalitarian professional situation.

All of these social, cultural, and epistemic changes have impacted the overall orientation of healthcare and medical practice. While always required, added emphasis is now placed on empathy, dependability, and integrity as attributes required of our graduates and coworkers in addition to an ongoing need for critical analysis and reasoning skills leading to measurable clinical competence. This is not to imply that a focus on social issues never existed. I can personally recall having a medical school course on social and cultural values in the 1950’s and still remember and utilize the concepts today of a required essay5 where I proposed a balanced civil society that valued individual freedoms. Condemned was the authoritarianism of the “soul–less”, and absolutist anarchic or regimented states!

A further cultural shift has been towards an increasing emphasis on the need for economic efficiencies. Indeed, in medical research, the requirement for effective “bench to bedside” translation is emphasized today with increasing calls for “ROI” or return on investment. This has led to the need for effective ethics review committees to protect patients’ interests6 and reduce pressures on medical researchers from undue market involvement of commercial entities such as pharmaceutical companies.7 A further problem arises with the increasing clash of professional and corporate interests. A professional by definition practices medicine to the standards of their profession in their community—not as an “occupational” working to the imposed standards of a boss!8 Pressure is exerted by some healthcare administrators for doctors to practice according to administrative budgetary requirements, thus being more efficient and perhaps less effective in care of their patients. A number of years ago at the Canadian Red Cross Blood Services, the physician in charge appeared to have rejected blood testing for donor blood infections due to testing costs on the orders of his funding agency bosses—in that case provincial government bureaucrats. His unprofessional behaviour was ultimately outlined in the Krever Commission Report.9 This led to him being professionally discredited, the Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service being terminated, and the Canadian Blood Services Agency being created.

In medicine, a major initiative that has had a profound impact is prevention of infectious diseases by immunization. This and other preventive measures have led to the survival of many who might otherwise have died. Now we are faced with an aging demographic, many of whom through excess nutrition and salt intake,10 suffer from obesity,11 hypertension, diabetes, and major cardiovascular issues. These will require additional attention in the decades to come!

So, what is the ultimate answer to the question posed at the beginning of this polemic? The enormous increase in medical knowledge, adapted to improve the quality of care of patients has led to an essential, major proliferation in types of healthcare providers. This in turn has led to significant shifts in professional relationships, not only of patients and doctors but also among healthcare providers. It is interesting to observe that such interdisciplinary activity is effected, based on a principle outlined by Adam Smith in the 1770’s as a significant concept of the Scottish Enlightenment—the Division of Labour.12 In that description, workers provided a defined activity based on their personal expertise and skill that built upon the different expertise and skill of other providers towards an ideal cooperative outcome. In Smith’s description, that outcome was the efficient manufacture of pins; in our current description for healthcare providers it is towards the optimum outcome of care for our patients in an increasingly complex healthcare environment. Cooperative inter–professional care will require greater provider empathy for all to understand and enable each other’s role in these complex, beneficent patient care related undertakings.

REFERENCES

  1. Taylor T. Thinking about a “New Economy.” The Public Interest. 2001;143: 3-19.
  2. Osler W. Principles and practice of medicine. New York: Appelton;1892.
  3. Truog RD. Patients and doctors—evolution of a relationship. N Engl J Med. 2012 Feb 16;366:581-585.
  4. Paterson TT. Pay for making decisions. Vancouver, Canada: Tantalus Publications; 1981.
  5. Hardwick, D.F. Aldous Huxley and George Orwell: An assessment of their interpretation of their age and prognostications. Social and Cultural values course, unpublished term paper, Faculty of Medicine, The University of British Columbia, 1955.
  6. Millum J. Canada’s new ethical guidelines for research with humans. CMAJ. 2012 Apr 3; 184:657-661.
  7. Hardwick DF, Marsh L. Clash of the titans: when the market and science collide. Advances in Austrian Economics, Vol. 17. Bingley: Emerald;2012.
  8. Friedson E. Professional powers: a study of the institutionalization of formal knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press;1988.
  9. Krever, Mr. Justice Horace. Commission of inquiry on the blood system in Canada (Government of Canada); 1997.
  10. Flegel K, Magner P. Get excess salt out of our diet. CMAJ. 2009 Feb 3.180(3);263.
  11. Eisenberg MJ, Atallah R, Grandi SM, Windle SB, Berry EM. Legislative approaches to tackling the obesity epidemic, CMAJ. 2011 Sep 20. 183(13);1496-1500.
  12. Smith A. An enquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations – edited with introduction and notes by Edwin Cannan.New York:Modern Library;1994.p.1-13.
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The Morphology of Liberalism

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Here’s a book review in The Economist looking at the morphology in meaning attached to (neo)liberalism. Here is the publisher’s blurb.

But the line between Smith and Friedman is not a straight one, as Mr Stedman Jones points out. Smith thought one of the state’s jobs should be to build public works and forge institutions that would otherwise fail under market pressure. Here he sounds more like Franklin Roosevelt. Smith believed the state should fund schools, bridges and roads. Friedman said that was the job of the private sector.

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Smith on the death of Hume

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Letter from Adam Smith, LL.D. to William Strachan, Esq.

Kirkaldy, Fifeshire, Nov. 9, 1776.

DEAR SIR,— It is with a real, though a very melancholy pleasure, that I sit down to give some account of the behavior of our late excellent friend, Mr. Hume, during his last illness.

Though, in his own judgment, his disease was mortal and incurable, yet he allowed himself to be prevailed upon, by the entreaty of his friends, to try what might be the effects of a long journey. A few days before he set out, he wrote that account of his own life, which, together with his other papers, he has left to your care. My account, therefore, shall begin where his ends.

He set out for London towards the end of April, and at Morpeth met with Mr. John Home and myself, who had both come down from London on purpose to see him, expecting to have found him at Edinburgh. Mr. Home returned with him, and attended him during the whole of his stay in England, with that care and attention which might be expected from a temper so perfectly friendly and affectionate. As I had written to my mother that she might expect me in Scotland, I was under the necessity of continuing my journey. His disease seemed to yield to exercise and change of air, and when he arrived in London, he was apparently in much better health than when he left Edinburgh. He was advised to go to Bath to drink the waters, which appeared for some time to have so good an effect upon him, that even he himself began to entertain, what he was not apt to do, a better opinion of his own health. His symptoms, however, soon returned with their usual violence, and from that moment he gave up all thoughts of recovery, but submitted with the utmost cheerfulness, and the most perfect complacency and resignation.

Upon his return to Edinburgh, though he found himself much weaker, yet his cheerfulness never abated, and he continued to divert himself, as usual, with correcting his own works for a new edition, with reading books of amusement, with the conversation of his friends; and, sometimes in the evening, with a party at his favorite game of whist. His cheerfulness was so great, and his conversation and amusements run so much in their usual strain, that, notwithstanding all bad symptoms, many people could not believe he was dying. “I shall tell your friend, Colonel Edmondstone,” said Doctor Dundas to him one day, “that I left you much better, and in a fair way of recovery.” “Doctor,” said he, “as I believe you would not choose to tell any thing but the truth, you had better tell him, that I am dying as fast as my enemies, if I have any, could wish, and as easily and cheerfully as my best friends could desire.” Colonel Edmondstone soon afterwards came to see him, and take leave of him; and on his way home, he could not forbear writing him a letter bidding him once more an eternal adieu, and applying to him, as to a dying man, the beautiful French verses in which the Abbé Chaulieu, in expectation of his own death, laments his approaching separation from his friend, the Marquis de la Fare.

Mr. Hume’s magnanimity and firmness were such, that his most affectionate friends knew that they hazarded nothing in talking or writing to him as to a dying man, and that so far from being hurt by this frankness, he was rather pleased and flattered by it. I happened to come into his room while he was reading this letter, which he had just received, and which he immediately showed me. I told him, that though I was sensible how very much he was weakened, and that, appearances were in many respects very bad, yet his cheerfulness was still so great, the spirit of life seemed still to be so very strong in him, that I could not help entertaining some faint hopes. He answered, “Your hopes are groundless. An habitual diarrhoea of more than a year’s standing, would be a very bad disease at any age: at my age it is a mortal one. When I lie down in the evening, I feel myself weaker than when I rose in the morning; and when I rise in the morning, weaker than when I lay down in the evening. I am sensible, besides, that some of my vital parts are affected, so that I must soon die.” “Well,” said I, “if it must be so, you have at least the satisfaction of leaving all your friends, your brother’s family in particular, in great prosperity.” He said that he felt that satisfaction so sensibly, that when he was reading, a few days before, Lucian’s Dialogues of the Dead, among all the excuses which are alleged to Charon for not entering readily into his boat, he could not find one that fitted him; he had no house to finish, he had no daughter to provide for, he had no enemies upon whom he wished to revenge himself. “I could not well imagine,” said he, “what excuse I could make to Charon in order to obtain a little delay. I have done every thing of consequence which I ever meant to do; and I could at no time expect to leave my relations and friends in a better situation than that in which I am now likely to leave them. I therefore have all reason to die contented.” He then diverted himself with inventing several jocular excuses, which he supposed he might make to Charon, and with imagining the very surly answers which it might suit the character of Charon to return to them. ” Upon further consideration,” said he, “I thought I might say to him, Good Charon, I have been correcting my works for a new edition. Allow me a little time, that I may see how the public receives the alterations.” But Charon would answer, “When you have seen the effect of these, you will be for making other alterations. There will be no end of such excuses; so, honest friend, please step into the boat.” But I might still urge, “Have a little patience, good Charon; I have been endeavoring to open the eyes of the public. If I live a few years longer, I may have the satisfaction of seeing the downfall of some of the prevailing systems of superstition.” But Charon would then lose all temper and decency. “You loitering rogue, that will not happen these many hundred years. Do you fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a term? Get into the boat this instant, you lazy loitering rogue.”

But, though Mr. Hume always talked of his approaching dissolution with great cheerfulness, he never affected to make any parade of his magnanimity. He never mentioned the subject but when the conversation naturally led to it, and never dwelt longer upon it than the course of the conversation happened to require: it was a subject, indeed, which occurred pretty frequently, in consequence of the inquiries which his friends, who came to see him, naturally made concerning the state of his health. The conversation which I mentioned above, and which passed on Thursday the 8th of August, was the last, except one, that I ever had with him.

He had now become so very weak, that the company of his most intimate friends fatigued him; for his cheerfulness was still so great, his complaisance and social disposition were still so entire, that when any friend was with him, he could not help talking more, and with greater exertion, than suited the weakness of his body. At his own desire, therefore, I agreed to leave Edinburgh, where I was staying partly upon his account, and returned to my mother’s house here, at Kirkaldy, upon condition that he would send for me whenever he wished to see me; the physician who saw him most frequently, Dr. Black, undertaking, in the mean time, to write me occasionally an account of the state of his health.

On the 22d of August, the Doctor wrote me the following letter:

“Since my last, Mr. Hume has passed his time pretty easily, but is much weaker. He sits up, goes down stairs once a day, and amuses himself with reading, but seldom sees anybody. He finds that even the conversation of his most intimate friends fatigues and oppresses him; and it is happy that he does not need it, for he is quite free from anxiety, impatience, or low spirits, and passes his time very well with the assistance of amusing books.”

I received the day after a letter from Mr. Hume himself, of which the following is an extract.

Edinburgh, 23d August, 1776.

MY DEAREST FRIEND,—I am obliged to make use of my nephew’s hand in writing to you, as I do not rise today.

“I go very fast to decline, and last night had a small fever, which I hoped might put a quicker period to this tedious illness, but unluckily it has, in a great measure, gone off. I cannot submit to your coming over here on my account, as it is possible for me to see you so small a part of the day, but Doctor Black can better inform you concerning the degree of strength which may from time to time remain with me. Adieus” etc.

Three days after I received the following letter from Doctor Black.

Edinburgh, Monday, 26th August, 1776.

“DEAR SIR,—Yesterday, about four o’clock, afternoon, Mr. Hume expired. The near approach of his death became evident in the night between Thursday and Friday, when his disease became excessive, and soon weakened him so much that he could no longer rise out of his bed. He continued to the last perfectly sensible, and free from much pain or feelings of distress. He never dropped the smallest expression of impatience; but when he had occasion to speak to the people about him, always did it with affection and tenderness. I thought it improper to write to bring you over, especially as I heard that he had dictated a letter to you desiring you not to come. When he became very weak, it cost him an effort to speak, and he died in such a happy composure of mind, that nothing could exceed it.”

Thus died our most excellent and never to be forgotten friend; concerning whose philosophical opinions men will, no doubt, judge variously, every one approving or condemning them, according as they happen to coincide or disagree with his own; but concerning whose character and conduct there can scarce be a difference of opinion. His temper, indeed, seemed to be more happily balanced, if I may be allowed such an expression, than that perhaps of any other man I have ever known. Even in the lowest state of his fortune, his great and necessary frugality never hindered him from exercising, upon proper occasions, acts both of charity and generosity. It was a frugality founded, not upon avarice, but upon the love of independency. The extreme gentleness of his nature never weakened either the firmness of his mind or he steadiness of his resolutions. His constant pleasantry was the genuine effusion of good nature and good humour, tempered with delicacy and modesty, and without even the slightest tincture of malignity, so frequently the disagreeable source of what is called wit in other men. It never was the meaning of his raillery to mortify; and, therefore, far from offending, it seldom failed to please and delight, even those who were the objects of it. To his friends, who were frequently the objects of it, there was not perhaps any one of all his great and amiable qualities, which contributed more to endear his conversation. And that gaiety of temper, so agreeable in society, but which is so often accompanied with frivolous and superficial qualities, was in him certainly attended with the most severe application, the most extensive learning, the greatest depth of thought, and a capacity in every respect the most comprehensive. Upon the whole, I have always considered him, both in his lifetime and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit.

I ever am, dear Sir,
Most affectionately yours,
ADAM SMITH

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Of the External Senses

adam-smith

This essay is well worth a read. H/T to Brian Glenney for bringing it to my attention (I hang my head in shame for not having read it before).

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Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl

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This is a highly unusual collection worth checking out, co-edited by the very excellent Dagfinn Føllesdal - for the first time here is a work that seriously brings Adam Smith into the orbit of cogsci:

Contents

Preface

Introduction

Contributors

Can we have objective knowledge of the world? Can we understand what is morally right or wrong? Yes, to some extent. This is the answer given by Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl. Both rejected David Hume’s skeptical account of what we can hope to understand. But they held his empirical method in high regard, inquiring into the way we perceive and emotionally experience the world, into the nature and function of human empathy and sympathy and the role of the imagination in processes of intersubjective understanding. The challenge is to overcome the natural constraints of perceptual and emotional experience and reach an agreement that is informed by the facts in the world and the nature of morality. This collection of philosophical essays addresses an audience of Smith- and Husserl scholars as well as everybody interested in theories of objective knowledge and proper morality which are informed by the way we perceive and think and communicate.

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