Having just delivered an edited volume entitled Hayek in Mind: Hayek’s Philosophical Psychology to the publisher, this is an opportune time to make widely available, for the first time, some photographs so generously sent to me by Walt Weimer (contact made through the good offices of a few of his students, some featured in the photos below). But before that, the first shameless plug for the volume which amazingly includes a contribution from Weimer himself!
Hayek’s philosophical psychology as set out in his The Sensory Order (1952) has, for the most part, been neglected. Despite being lauded by computer scientist grandee Frank Rosenblatt and by Nobel prize-winning biologist Gerald Edelman, cognitive scientists — with a few exceptions — have yet to discover Hayek’s philosophical psychology. On the other hand, social theorists, Hayek’s traditional disciplinary constituency, have only recently begun to take note and examine the importance of psychology in the complete Hayek corpus.
This volume brings together for the first time state-of-the-art contributions from neuroscientists, philosophers of mind, economists, and social theorists to critically examine many aspects of Hayek’s philosophical psychology.
Weimer was the co-convenor along with the late David Palermo of The Second Penn State Conference on Cognition and the Symbolic Processes. Weimer was so instrumental in rehabilitating (or perhaps more accurately, resuscitating) Hayek’s philosophical psychology. Here are my two previous Weimer posts. The photographs below are annoted precisely as Walt did in the hardcopy he sent me. (I have held back a couple of photos of Hayek since there is a dearth of good shots and I would like to have first dibs at using them should the occasion arise.)
A few weeks ago I trailed the release of Georg Theiner’s Res Cogitans Extensa: A Philosophical Defense of the Extended Mind Thesis. Then there was no page devoted to Georg’s book by the publisher. Well now there is so check out the book’s page here. I have the book in hand – scanning it promises a good read. My only gripe is that there is no index. Hopefully, some close-grained reviews will appear over the course of the next year.
Here are two of the biggest names in analytical SE discussing the area on Philosophy TV. Another opportunity to plug the journal with which they are associated – EPISTEME.
Check out this review (scroll down) by Michael Madary of Mark Rowlands’ The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology.
One of the latest labels to emerge for anti-classical (or non-Cartesian, or post-cognitivist) cognitive science is “4E.” The four Es here are the embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended approaches to cognition. Since there are a number of different, and likely incompatible, lines of thought within the 4E group, more work needs to be done to articulate how the Es can and should fit together. Mark Rowlands’ newest book, The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology, addresses this need in a valuable way. He argues, clearly and carefully, for the thesis of the amalgamated mind, which “subsumes both theses of the embodied and the extended mind” (p. 84). The thesis of the embedded mind is rejected as being merely a claim about cognition depending causally on the environment. As such, it is not strong enough to be interesting for Rowlands’ non-Cartesian project. The thesis of the enacted mind, in particular Alva Noë’s sensorimotor version of it, is also rejected as being either implausible or no stronger than the thesis of the embedded mind (pp. 81–82). First I will outline Rowlands’ defense of the thesis of the amalgamated mind; then I will raise some issues for further investigation.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Michael Madary, Ph.D., Johannes Gutenberg — Universität Mainz, FB05 Philosophie und Philologie, Jakob-Welder-Weg 18, 55099 Mainz, Germany. Email: madary@mainz-uni.de
Look out for Georg Theiner’s book (publisher, Peter Lang) that is about to hit the shelves. I’m reproducing the cover blurb from the preprint he so kindly sent me. Georg has already done some good work for an Extended Mind project and I’m looking forward to his contribution to the stigmergy issue.
Abstract for Res cogitans extensa: For Descartes, minds were essentially immaterial, non-extended things. Contemporary cognitive science prides itself on having exorcised the Cartesian ghost from the biological machine. However, it remains committed to the Cartesian vision of the mental as something purely inner. Against the idea that the mind resides solely in the brain, advocates of the situated and embodied nature of cognition have long stressed the importance of dynamic brain-body-environment couplings, the opportunistic exploitation of bodily morphology, the strategic performance of epistemically potent actions, the generation and use of external representations, and the cognitive scaffolding provided by artifacts and social-cultural practices. According to the extended mind thesis, a significant portion of human cognition literally extends beyond the brain into the body and its environment. This book aims to clarify the nature and the scope of this thesis, and to defend its central insight that cognition is not confined to the boundaries of the biological individual.
About Georg: Georg Theiner, born in Vienna, received his Ph.D. in Philosophy, with a Joint Ph.D. in Cognitive Science and a Minor in History and Philosophy of Science, at Indiana University, Bloomington in 2008. His research interests are in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. During his tenure as a Killam Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Alberta, he worked on the extended mind thesis and socially distributed cognition.
Here is the recently published book by my chum Erol Başar who as it happens is also contributing to my forthcoming edited book entitled Hayek in Mind: Hayek’s Philosophical Psychology. Not surprisingly, there is much reference to Hayek’s The Sensory Order peppered throughout Erol’s book most notably in section 2.12 (pp. 39-41). Other distinguished neuroscientists who appreciate the virtues of Hayek’s prescient insights include of course Fuster and Edelman. Erol writes:
The writing of a monograph on brain-body-mind is extremely ambitious. This is because I think that Friedrich von Hayek was correct when he stated (1952), “The mind must remain forever in a realm of its own, which we shall never be able fully to explain.”
I unfashionably argue for this view in a forthcoming paper borrowing Colin McGinn’s phrase “Cognitive Closure.”
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Scienceshas published a bumper themed issue devoted to EM as well as other related theses, now collectively known as 4E. There is a “whose who” of contributors including the old firm Adams and Aizawa, Barnier, Sutton, Menary, Sterelny, Harris and others. This promises to be a super “must read” collection. Congrats to Richard Menary for pulling this together.
At the “social” in the cabin-in-the-woods.
