New Studies in Social Epistemology

August 26, 2010

Here is a collection from OUP with a section devoted to SE (how times have changed) with some top-notch names anchored of course by Alvin Goldman.

Special Theme: Social Epistemology Guest Editor: Alvin Goldman

8: Alvin Goldman: Systems-Oriented Social Epistemology

9: Franz Dietrich & Christian List: The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory

10: Miranda Fricker: Can There Be Institutional Virtues?

11: Melissa Koenig: Selective Trust in Testimony: Children’s Evaluation of the Message, the Speaker and the Speech Act

12: Jennifer Lackey: What Should We Do When We Disagree?

13: Michael Strevens: Reconsidering Authority: Scientific Expertise, Bounded Rationality, and Epistemic Backtracking


EPISTEME 2010 photos

August 19, 2010

Here are some photos from EPISTEME ’10 held in Edinburgh this past June.


Cambridge Handbook of Computational Psychology

April 22, 2010

Here’s a review by Robert West of Ron Sun’s (Ed.) book that has been very useful to me (I mean that I have already been using the book): Rob West’s review will better articulate the book’s virtues. (Reference books are notoriously difficult to review – a job admirably well done by Rob West).

Abstract:

Computational psychology refers to the effort to create computational mechanisms that, in some way, mimic mechanisms within the brain. More specifically, the goal in creating these mechanisms is to show that they can systematically reproduce patterns of human behaviour elicited under specific conditions. From this it is inferred that these mechanisms bare some similarity to the brain mechanisms that produced the human behaviours. In most cases this involves mimicking the results of psychology experiments, although it is good to see in this book, two chapters discussing the application of this approach to non experimental areas (multi agent social interactions and cognitive engineering).


Social epistemology meets network theory

April 7, 2010

Here’s a paper written by Carlo Martini.


Extended Mind – Extended Time

March 28, 2010

Since we’ve been waiting for almost four years!!! for the publication of this collection of papers attached to The Extended Mind II conference held at The University of Hertfordshire in July of ’06, it’s arrival is going to be somewhat underwhelming on the grounds that: (a) most of the papers have been in circulation for quite a while, and (b) much good literature and more detailed statements by many of the participants have appeared, many addressing issues raised at the Hertfordshire conference. This kinda makes this book redundant. A shame really considering the calibre of the line-up.

Update: I’m told by someone in the know that some of the papers go back to 2003!


Mind in Life

March 5, 2010

I’ve just completed reading Evan Thompson’s Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, a work which I heartily endorse as the best statement yet of the enactivist theory of mind. I especially like his taking on the philosopher’s zombie and his chapter on Empathy and Enculturation. Last, but by no means least, Thompson has clarified ideas from his now classic collaboration with Varela and Rosch – The Embodied Mind. But never mind my view, check out Dorothée Legrand’s superb critical notice from The Journal of Mind and Behavior.

In Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, Evan Thompson defends the thesis of a “deep continuity of life and mind” according to which “life and mind share a set of basic organizational properties . . . . Mind is life-like and life is mind-like” (p. 128, also p. ix). On the one hand, Thompson uncovers mind in life, by considering life and explaining how living organisms are organized in a way that involves the biological implementation of properties that are usually attributed to mental states. On the other hand, he roots mind in life by considering the mind and explaining how mental states are anchored to (neuro)biological processes. Following the lead of Merleau–Ponty and his notion of “comportment” (1963, p. 4; see Mind in Life, p. 67), Thompson argues that the notion of autonomous dynamic system can integrate the orders of life and mind, and account for the originality of each order, allowing the understanding that “on the one hand, nature is not pure exteriority, but rather in the case of life has its own interiority and thus resembles mind. On the other hand, mind is not pure interiority, but rather a form of structure of engagement with the world and thus resembles life” (p. 78).

Requests for reprints should be sent to Dorothée Legrand, Centre de Recherche en Epistemologie Appliquee, 32, boulevard Victor, 75015 Paris, France.


Hayek: Cognitive scientist Avant la Lettre

March 2, 2010

My published article is now available from here. Check out the full table of contents for this volume.


The Social Science of Hayek’s The Sensory Order

February 8, 2010

Here are the publisher’s details for this soon-to-be released volume that includes my paper “Hayek: cognitive scientist avant la lettre


Embodied Economics

January 22, 2010

Here’s a freely available download of an article entitled “Embodied economics: how bodily information shapes the social coordination dynamics of decision-making” from the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. The article references many of the major embodiment theorists and refreshingly there is much on Hayek and of course The Sensory Order.


The Phenomenal Qualities Project

January 20, 2010

I want to bring your attention to The Phenomenal Qualities Project. With a Whose Who of theorists involved, it promises to offer a wonderful forum for ecumenical discussion:

Objectives:

There are four main objectives.

To investigate a set of fundamental questions concerning phenomenal qualities – such as the colours, sounds and so on, of which we are immediately aware in perceptual experience – and their place in the physical world. The research will focus upon issues connected with the role of phenomenal qualities in perceptual experiences, their relation to cognitive states of mind, their ontological status, and the way they fit in with the best current theories about the fundamental nature of physical things.

To encourage and co-ordinate research focused on the above questions by organising a series of seminars, workshops and an international conference on the nature of phenomenal qualities, and through publication of research material. An interactive website will be set up, facilitating the dissemination and discussion of research on the issues raised.

To stimulate dialogue between theorists of different philosophical persuasions, and with cognitive scientists working on perception and attention, on problems connected with the nature of experience and phenomenal qualities. This project will bring together philosophers and cognitive scientists of international standing from different traditions to advance our understanding of these problems.

To communicate to a wider non-academic audience, through public lectures and the internet, the nature and relevance of this project for existing work in Consciousness Studies, Cognitive Science and Physics.