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Shapiro’s Embodied Cognition

Larry Shapiro’s book Embodied Cognition has just been published. Anything by Larry is well worth a read. This book comes with dust jacket recommendations from no less than heavy hitters such as Fred Adams, Arthur Glenberg, Rob Wilson, Elliott Sober and Ken Aizawa. If you haven’t already done so, check out his excellent The Mind Incarnate.

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Robert Haskell

(1938-2010)

My friend and colleague Robert Haskell passed away today. Rob was a very gentle, kind and generous man, a man with simple tastes but a man with immense philosophical sophistication. An example of his philosophical breadth and depth is his last published paper “The Access Paradox in Analogical Reasoning and Transfer: Whither Invariance?” Journal of Mind and Behavior (Vol.30 Nos. 1 and 2 Winter and Spring 2009). He will be sadly missed.

Below is a photo of Rob (far right, the usual scowl belying his gentle nature) at a reception for Ruth Millikan at NEI in April of 2008 – David Livingstone Smith, Rob’s longtime colleague and friend is on the far left. As and when more details are available from others on Rob’s work and life, and I have had a chance to reflect on his work, I will update this post.

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Psychology Of Violence

My chum David Livingstone Smith’s contribution to Forbes25 Ideas To Change The World.

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Embodiment, Stigmergy, and Swarm Intelligence

Here is a chapter from a book by Michael Dawson, Brian Dupuis, and Michael Wilson (all of the Biological Computation Project, University of Alberta) that has just come my way and is entitled From Bricks to Brains: The Embodied Cognitive Science of LEGO Robots. In fact, all the chapters in draft are freely available to be downloaded from the book’s dedicated webpage. This offer will cease on publication of the book – which will be VERY soon. There is also a nicely produced 15 minute mini-documentary on the publisher’s site featuring Dawson and Depuis (click the video tab).

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André Kukla

Here’s an interview with André Kukla plugging his book (see above) from 2006 (which I’ve only just come across). I know Kukla through his technical philosophical work: two titles remain vivid to me. Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science and Studies in Scientific Realism. The former was a well-needed tough-minded antidote to the vulgar relativism that was characteristic of the day (no doubt, still is in some quarters). The latter, I recall having to get printed-on-demand. In many ways Kukla reminds me of Colin McGinn (the subject of my last post). Both had psychology and philosophy as a joint interest; both also have a no-nonsense clarity in their approach. I felt honoured to meet Kukla in person in 2006 at the EPISTEME conference at the University of Toronto. Speaking of EPISTEME, Kukla and a talented then-student of his, Joel Walmsley, produced a lovely paper for the issue I was editing entitled “Mysticism and Social Epistemology.”

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Cambridge Handbook of Computational Psychology

Here’s a review by Robert West of Ron Sun’s (Ed.) book that has been very useful to me (I mean that I have already been using the book): Rob West’s review will better articulate the book’s virtues. (Reference books are notoriously difficult to review – a job admirably well done by Rob West).

Abstract:

Computational psychology refers to the effort to create computational mechanisms that, in some way, mimic mechanisms within the brain. More specifically, the goal in creating these mechanisms is to show that they can systematically reproduce patterns of human behaviour elicited under specific conditions. From this it is inferred that these mechanisms bare some similarity to the brain mechanisms that produced the human behaviours. In most cases this involves mimicking the results of psychology experiments, although it is good to see in this book, two chapters discussing the application of this approach to non experimental areas (multi agent social interactions and cognitive engineering).

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Guidance, Selection, and Representation/Affordances and Intentionality

Here is a two-fer from The Journal of Mind and Behavior:

1. Guidance, Selection, and Representation: Response to Anderson and Rosenberg

Tom Roberts

2. Affordances and Intentionality: Reply to Roberts

Michael L. Anderson and Anthony Chemero

Abstracts

Roberts:

Anderson and Rosenberg’s (2008) guidance theory of representation offers an analysis of mental content that strongly emphasises the influence that intentional states have upon the production and modulation of bodily behavior. On this view, a mental state gains both its status as a representation, and its content, in virtue of occupying a particular role in the guidance of action. I present three related challenges for the guidance theory, before defending an alternative model that is grounded not in action-guidance, but in action-selection. Firstly, I argue that the guidance theory fails to explain an important category of perceptual misrepresentation. Secondly, I propose that the content ascriptions predicted by the theory are not sufficiently determinate. Thirdly, I propose that the contents implicated by the guidance view do not match those that are naturally ascribed in the explanation of intentionally-directed behavior. The modified account that I develop responds to these concerns, and suggests that representational states depict affordance properties: the opportunities and obstacles that the subject’s environment offers for the pursuit of goals and plans.

Anderson and Anthony Chemero:

In this essay we respond to some criticisms of the guidance theory of representation offered by Tom Roberts. We argue that although Roberts’ criticisms miss their mark, he raises the important issue of the relationship between affordances and the action oriented representations proposed by the guidance theory. Affordances play a prominent role in the anti-representationalist accounts offered by theorists of embodied cognition and ecological psychology, and the guidance theory is motivated in part by a desire to respond to the critiques of representationalism offered in such accounts, without giving up entirely on the idea that representations are an important part of the cognitive economy of many animals. Thus, explorations of whether and how such accounts can in fact be related and reconciled potentially offer to shed some light on this ongoing controversy. Although the current essay hardly settles the larger debate, it does suggest that there may be more possibility for agreement than is often supposed.

P.S. Stay tuned for a critical notice of Tony Chemero’s Radical Embodied Cognitive Science to be reviewed in JMB by Rick Dale.


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A Dialogue on Consciousness/Amazon’s Recommendation Algorithm

Thanks to Amazon’s Recommendation Algorithm I chanced upon this book. I haven’t read it yet but it promises that it would provide a light (though hardly condescending) interlude between other drier and more technical works and the more stilted fictional attempts on which to hang the issues. And any work that makes philosophical approaches to consciousness more accessible, is a good thing. Of course it helps that it has as its authors are the top-notch Torin Alter and Robert Howell. The two discussants are Tollens and Ponens – unemployed graduate students who secretly live in a university library (tee hee, chortle, chortle).

Recommendation algorithms generally come in two varieties – collaborative filtering (CF) and cluster models (CM). CF attempts to mimic the process of ‘‘word-of-mouth’’ by which people recommend products or services to one another. CF runs on the notion that people who agreed in the past will agree in the future. CF aggregates ratings of items to recognize similarities between users, and generates a new recommendation of an item by weighting the ratings of similar users for the same item. But this technique is computationally expensive because ‘‘the average customer vector is extremely sparse’’ (Linden, Smith, & York, 2003, p. 77). By contrast CM divides the agent base into segments, treating the task as a classificatory problem. An agent is assigned a category comprised of similar agent profiles. Only then are recommendations generated. CM is computationally efficient since it only searches segments, rather than the complete database. Amazon.com’s recommendation algorithm is a derivative form of CF and CM. Consider an example. A search on Amazon for ‘‘stigmergy’’ returns 176 items, the default sort being by relevance (as opposed to price, reviews, publication date). Also given some prominence is a category ‘‘Customers who bought items in your Recent History also bought x, y, z . . ..’’ supplemented by Listmania, lists of salient material compiled by agents (all-comers as in Wikipedia) who ostensibly have some intimacy with the topic. There are also so-called ‘‘reviews’’ of a given title. All this over and above a record of my recent purchases which included stigmergy related material, assuming one hasn’t expunged Amazon’s cookies from one’s browser. Even on offer is the opportunity, for many titles, to peruse the contents page, read an excerpt and even be enticed by the dustjacket hyperbole. Furthermore, one can be alerted by email when a new title or new edition of a book matching one’s previous trails of interest, will become available: a preorder entitling the buyer to a discount. This all adds up to a highly bespoke experience that is better tailored than being in a bookstore, because it is unlikely the bookstore even stocks a title you have yet to discover as one scans the shelves – there is no ‘‘pheromone’’ trail. The Amazon algorithm rather than matching user-to-user finds items that customers tend to purchase together. It is computationally efficient (and easily scalable) because much of the computation has already been done off-line. The stigmergic interest of Amazon’s algorithm is patently clear: an item-to-item search generates a trail that gives rise to novel patterns of behavior. CF’s great virtue is that suppliers can be finely attuned to consumer behavior. The downside is that there runs the risk of ‘‘a kind of dysfunctional communal narrowing of attention’’ that can be self-fulfilling (Clark, 2003, p. 158; Gureckis & Goldstone, 2006, p. 296). Excerpt from Stigmergic epistemology, stigmergic cognition.

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Extended Mind – Extended Time

Since we’ve been waiting for almost four years!!! for the publication of this collection of papers attached to The Extended Mind II conference held at The University of Hertfordshire in July of ’06, it’s arrival is going to be somewhat underwhelming on the grounds that: (a) most of the papers have been in circulation for quite a while, and (b) much good literature and more detailed statements by many of the participants have appeared, many addressing issues raised at the Hertfordshire conference. This kinda makes this book redundant. A shame really considering the calibre of the line-up.

Update: I’m told by someone in the know that some of the papers go back to 2003!

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Extended X: Recarving the Biological and Cognitive Joints of Nature

Mike Wheeler has put online some draft chapters dealing with extended mind from his forthcoming work. If you enjoyed Mike’s last book Reconstructing the Cognitive World: the Next Step as I did, then this new work promises much.

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