Here is a pre-published version of Francis Heylighen’s paper from JCS
Abstract:
The present paper criticizes Chalmers’s discussion of the Singularity, viewed as the emergence of a superhuman intelligence via the self-amplifying development of artificial intelligence. The situated and embodied view of cognition rejects the notion that intelligence could arise in a closed ‘brain-in-a-vat’ system, because intelligence is rooted in a high-bandwidth, sensory-motor interaction with the outside world. Instead, it is proposed that superhuman intelligence can emerge only in a distributed fashion, in the form of a self-organizing network of humans, computers, and other technologies: the ‘Global Brain’.
November 9, 2012
Short URL Artificial intelligence, Brain in a vat, David Chalmers, Embodied cognition, Emergence, Extended Mind, Francis Heylighen, global brain, Philosophy, Singularity, situated cognition, Technological singularity, Transhumanism embodied cognition, embodiment, extended cognitive systems, extended mind
Check out this essay forthcoming from the power team of Clark, Kilverstein and Farina.
Sensory substitution devices are a type of sensory prosthesis that (typically) convert visual stimuli transduced by a camera into tactile or auditory stimulation. They are designed to be used by people with impaired vision so that they can recover some of the functions normally subserved by vision. In this chapter we will consider what philosophers might learn about the nature of the senses from the neuroscience of sensory substitution. We will show how sensory substitution devices work by exploiting the cross-modal plasticity of sensory cortex: the ability of sensory cortex to pick up some types of information about the external environment irrespective of the nature of the sensory inputs it is processing. We explore the implications of cross-modal plasticity for theories of the senses that attempt to make distinctions between the senses on the basis of neurobiology.
September 20, 2012
Short URL Andy Clark, Cognitive science, julian kilverstein, mirko farina, neuroscience, Philosophy of mind, Sensory cortex, Sensory substitution distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, embodied cognition, embodiment, enactivism, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism
Dave Chalmers featured in Monolith Magazine.
August 29, 2012
Short URL Chalmers, consciousness, David Chalmers, dualism, Extended Mind, Externalism, Mind, Philosophy of mind, Physicalism extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism
This from PCS
July 23, 2012
Short URL Clark, Cognition, Cognitive neuroscience, Cognitive science, complexity, consciousness, Consciousness Studies, David Chalmers, Extended Mind, Functional magnetic resonance imaging, Philosophy, Philosophy of mind distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism
I see that the publisher now has a fully detailed page up for a volume that I’ve been privileged to be a part of. The Foreword is by a very nice chappie going by the name of V.Smith and includes luminaries such as McCloskey, Boettke, Gintis, Steel and others. My abstract:
Mindscapes and Landscapes: Hayek and Simon on Cognitive Extension
Hayek’s and Simon’s social externalism runs on a shared presupposition: mind is constrained in its computational capacity to detect, harvest, and assimilate “data” generated by the infinitely fine-grained and perpetually dynamic characteristic of experience in complex social environments. For Hayek, mind and sociality are co-evolved spontaneous orders, allowing little or no prospect of comprehensive explanation, trapped in a hermeneutically sealed, i.e. inescapably context bound, eco-system. For Simon, it is the simplicity of mind that is the bottleneck, overwhelmed by the ambient complexity of the environmental. Since on Simon’s account complexity is unidirectional, Simon is far more ebullient about the prospects of explanation. Hayek’s social externalism functions as a kind of distributed “extra-neural” memory store manifest as dynamic spontaneous orders. Simon’s organizational rule-governed externalism negotiates the “inner” world (the mind) with the “outer” world through a homeostatic interface that offloads the cognitive burden into the environment. Their respective externalisms may differ in detail but not in spirit in that it ameliorates their shared presupposition of cognitive constraint. Even though any “optimization talk” for Hayek and Simon is objectionable, knowledge acquisition can be represented by a contextualized stigmergic swarm optimization algorithm that gives due emphasis to both the individual and the environment. The key insight is that “perfect” knowledge is unnecessary, impracticable and indeed irrelevant if one understands the mechanism at work in complex sociality, a stigmergic sociality that in effect augments or scaffolds cognition.
July 11, 2012
Short URL Austrian School, Bounded Rationality, Cognition, Cognitive science, Colin McGinn, complexity, Economics, Extended Mind, Friedrich Hayek, Hayek, Herbert Simon, Philosophy of mind, social epistemology, Social science, Spontaneous order behavioral economics, bounded rationality, cognitive closure, Deirdre McCloskey, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, hayek, herb gintis, Pete Boettke, self organizing systems, self-referentiality, situated cognition, social cognition, social connectionism, social epistemology, social ontology, social psychology, spontaneous order, spontaneous orders, stigmergic, stigmergic cognition, stigmergy, vernon smith
July 3, 2012
Short URL Andy Clark, Clark, Cognition, Embodied cognition, Extended Mind, Social Sciences Andy Clark, david chalmers, Embedded, embodied cognition, embodiment, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, situated cognition
Marge and my intro now available as an uncorrected proof. Stay tuned for the rest of the papers comprising this special issue.
According to Andy Clark “[M]uch of what goes on in the complex world of humans, may thus, somewhat surprisingly, be understood in terms of so-called stigmergic algorithms” (Clark, 1996, p. 279; 1997, p. 186). Pierre-Paul Grassé, the brilliant mind who first conceptualized the notion probably wouldn’t disagree (Grassé, 1959). Grassé was as much a zoologist as he was an entomologist. Under his editorship the monumental (17-volume) Traité de Zoologie, Anatomie, Systématique, Biologie was guided.
June 24, 2012
Short URL Andy Clark, Ant, Cognitive science, complexity, Grassé, Philosophy of mind, Pierre-Paul Grassé, social epistemology, Social Sciences, Spontaneous order, Stigmergy, Traité de Zoologie adam smith, complexity, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, Don Lavoie, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, hayek, Herbert Simon, Margery Doyle, stigmergic, stigmergic cognition, stigmergy
Rob’s contribution to the Extended Mind special issue of CSR:
This essay begins by addressing the role of the so-called Parity Principle in arguments for extended cognition. It is concluded that the Parity Principle does not, by itself, demarcate cognition and that another mark of the cognitive must be sought. The second section of the paper advances two arguments against the extended view of cognition, one of which – the conservatism-or-simplicity argument – appeals to principles of theory selection, and the other of which – the argument from demarcation – draws on a systems-based theory of cognition. The final section contests the claim, made by Andy Clark, that empirical work done by Wayne Gray and colleagues supports the extended view.
June 7, 2012
Short URL Andy Clark, Cognition, Cognitive neuroscience, Cognitive science, consciousness, Embodied cognition, Extended Mind, Parity Principle, philosophical psychology, Philosophy of mind, Philosophy of science, Psychology extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, robert rupert
Here is Fred’s contribution to the Extended Mind CSR special issue:
What makes a process a cognitive process? I’m not just asking for a list of cognitive processes, but for what makes an item on that list a cognitive process. Why should it be on the list? This is a question that has been ignored far too long in the domain of research calling itself cognitive science. It is time to give an answer and that is what I propose in this paper. I contrast my answer with others that have been given and defend the need against some claims in the literature that a mark of the cognitive is not needed.
May 28, 2012
Short URL Cognition, Cognitive neuroscience, Cognitive science, Embodied cognition, Extended Mind, Philosophy of mind extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, Fred Adams
Since I’m about to submit another themed issue of Cognitive Systems Research I thought I’d give a plug to the papers from the last CSR “Extended Mind” issue I edited some two months ago. First up is Dan Weiskopf’s paper:
According to the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC), parts of the extrabodily world can constitute cognitive operations. I argue that the debate over HEC should be framed as a debate over the location and bounds of cognitive systems. The “Goldilocks problem” is how to demarcate these systems in a way that is neither too restrictive nor too permissive. I lay out a view of systems demarcation on which cognitive systems are sets of mechanisms for producing cognitive processes that are bounded by transducers and effectors: structures that turn physical stimuli into representations, and representations into physical effects. I show how the transducer–effector view can stop the problem of uncontrolled cognitive spreading that faces HEC, and illustrate its advantages relative to other views of system individuation. Finally, I argue that demarcating systems by transducers and effectors is not question-begging in the context of a debate over HEC.
May 23, 2012
Short URL Artificial intelligence, Cognition, Cognitive neuroscience, Cognitive science, Embodied cognition, Extended Mind, Philosophy of mind, qualia dan weiskopf, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism