Here’s a just published paper by Duncan Pritchard in Synthese. It’s reassuring to see epistemologists picking up on the extended mind thesis – the other notable epistemologist pursuing this line is Sandy Goldberg. This is the way things are going – I for one am working on a project that will be a major push in this direction. As I’ve recently said, “ it is clear that the notion of extended mind has made inroads into other domains . . epistemologists who view mind and epistemology as two sides to the same coin and are engaged in the project to “cognitivize epistemology” and “socialize the mind” (Goldberg, 2007; Marsh & Onof, 2008b; Prichard, in press).”
Duncan’s Abstract
This paper explores the ramifications of the extended cognition thesis in the philosophy of mind for contemporary epistemology. In particular, it argues that all theories of knowledge need to accommodate the ability intuition that knowledge involves cognitive ability, but that once this requirement is understood correctly there is no reason why one could not have a conception of cognitive ability that was consistent with the extended cognition thesis. There is thus, surprisingly, a straightforward way of developing our current thinking about knowledge such that it incorporates the extended cognition thesis.
Constraining imagination by knowledge does not make it redundant. We rarely know an explicit formula that tells us what to do in a complex situation. We have to work out what to do by thinking through the possibilities in ways that are simultaneously imaginative and realistic, and not less imaginative when more realistic. Knowledge, far from limiting imagination, enables it to serve its central function.
The articles comprising the themed issue of Cognitive Systems Research are now available from the publisher’s Articles in Press page.
Note from Elsevier:
The section “Articles in Press” contains peer reviewed accepted articles to be published in this journal. When the final article is assigned to an issue of the journal, the “Article in Press” version will be removed from this section and will appear in the associated published journal issue. The date it was first made available online will be carried over. Please be aware that although “Articles in Press” do not have all bibliographic details available yet, they can already be cited using the year of online availability and the DOI as follows: Author(s), Article Title, Journal (Year), DOI.
Please consult the journal’s reference style for the exact appearance of these elements, abbreviation of journal names and the use of punctuation.
There are three types of “Articles in Press”:
Accepted manuscripts: these are articles that have been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by the Editorial Board. The articles have not yet been copy edited and/or formatted in the journal house style.
Uncorrected proofs: these are copy edited and formatted articles that are not yet finalized and that will be corrected by the authors. Therefore the text could change before final publication.
Corrected proofs: these are articles containing the authors’ corrections and may, or may not yet have specific issue and page numbers assigned.
Keep an eye out for this soon to be published anthology of papers. To my knowledge, this is the first such collection of analytically orientated papers on social epistemology. Some of the stellar line-up has previously appeared in EPISTEME.
We love stories as much as we need them, but a funny thing has happened to departments of literature. The study of literature as an art form, of its techniques for delighting and instructing, has been replaced by an amalgam of bad epistemology and worse prose that goes by many names but can be summed up as Theory. The situation seems to call for a story, and one written in the style of Jorge Luis Borges, the grand chronicler of the tragicomic struggle between humans and logic.
Check out this piece in The New York Times by Rebecca Newberger Goldstein (Mrs. Pinker). She of course has in mind departments that where a lack of philosophical culture licences uncritical and obscure thinking.
Theo alone insisted that Theory was no hoax but was intended as the most imperialist of cognitive campaigns, having designs on all the disciplines. Culture owns knowledge, and departments of literature own Culture. It follows (at least if logic can be said to hold constant in the face of frenetic Culture) that departments of literature can legitimately claim dominion over us all.
Here’s an interview with André Kukla plugging his book (see above) from 2006 (which I’ve only just come across). I know Kukla through his technical philosophical work: two titles remain vivid to me. Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science and Studies in Scientific Realism. The former was a well-needed tough-minded antidote to the vulgar relativism that was characteristic of the day (no doubt, still is in some quarters). The latter, I recall having to get printed-on-demand. In many ways Kukla reminds me of Colin McGinn (the subject of my last post). Both had psychology and philosophy as a joint interest; both also have a no-nonsense clarity in their approach. I felt honoured to meet Kukla in person in 2006 at the EPISTEME conference at the University of Toronto. Speaking of EPISTEME, Kukla and a talented then-student of his, Joel Walmsley, produced a lovely paper for the issue I was editing entitled “Mysticism and Social Epistemology.”
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