Check out two forthcoming papers from Rob Rupert, one of the sharpest minds around:
1. Against Group Cognitive States (forthcoming in S. Chant and G. Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality. No listing on OUP’s website yet).
English users are not fazed by such sentences as “Microsoft intends to develop a new operating system” and “England wants to retain the pound as its unit of currency.” We produce and consume such claims frequently and with ease. One might nevertheless wonder about their literal truth. Does Microsoft — the corporation itself — literally intend to develop a new operating system? Does England — as a single body — genuinely want to retain the pound as its unit of currency. More generally, it is a substantive philosophical and empirical question whether groups of individuals (who themselves instantiate mental states) instantiate mental states properly so called.
2. Keeping HEC in CHEC: On the Priority of Cognitive Systems
February 11, 2012
Short URL Cognition, Cognitive science, Microsoft, social epistemology Adams & Aizawa, Andy Clark, Bounds of Cognition, brain science, cognition, cognitive science, Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind, collective intentionality, david chalmers, distributed cognition, embodied cognition, enaction, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, philosophy of mind, robert rupert, situated cognition, social epistemology, social ontology, sociocognition
Simon died this day in 2001. Check out these two books – Models of a Man (as with most edited books this is uneven, but there is still much to recommend it) and Herbert A. Simon: The Bounds of Reason in Modern America, an excellent intellectual biography. Speaking of Simon, I have a paper coming out entitled “Mindscapes and Landscapes: Hayek and Simon on Cognitive Extension” to be found in a collection edited by Roger Frantz and Robert Leeson Hayek and Behavioural Economics” Vol 4 of Archival Insights into the Evolution of Economics with an introduction by non-other than Vernon Smith (whom I met in Tucson last May) and a host of other luminaries such as Herb Gintis, Deirdre McCloskey, Gerry Steele and others. Here is the abstract for my paper:
Hayek’s and Simon’s social externalism runs on a shared presupposition: mind is constrained in its computational capacity to detect, harvest, and assimilate “data” generated by the infinitely fine-grained and perpetually dynamic characteristic of experience in complex social environments. For Hayek, mind and sociality are co-evolved spontaneous orders, allowing little or no prospect of comprehensive explanation, trapped in a hermeneutically sealed, i.e. inescapably context bound, eco-system. For Simon, it is the simplicity of mind that is the bottleneck, overwhelmed by the ambient complexity of the environmental. Since on Simon’s account complexity is unidirectional, Simon is far more ebullient about the prospects of explanation. Hayek’s social externalism functions as a kind of distributed “extra-neural” memory store manifest as dynamic spontaneous orders. Simon’s organizational rule-governed externalism negotiates the “inner” world (the mind) with the “outer” world through a homeostatic interface that offloads the cognitive burden into the environment. Their respective externalisms may differ in detail but not in spirit in that it ameliorates their shared presupposition of cognitive constraint. Even though any “optimization talk” for Hayek and Simon is objectionable, knowledge acquisition can be represented by a contextualized stigmergic swarm optimization algorithm that gives due emphasis to both the individual and the environment. The key insight is that “perfect” knowledge is both unnecessary, impracticable and indeed irrelevant if one understands the mechanism at work in complex sociality, a stigmergic sociality that in effect augments or scaffolds cognition.

February 9, 2012
Short URL Austrian School, Deirdre McCloskey, Economics, Friedrich Hayek, Hayek, Herbert Simon, Simon, Social Sciences, Vernon Smith bounded rationality, cognitive closure, cognitive science, complex adaptive systems, complexity, computational intelligence, consciousness, Deirdre McCloskey, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, Embedded, embodied cognition, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, herb gintis, Herbert Simon, stigmergic, stigmergic cognition, stigmergy, swarm, swarm behavior, swarm intelligence
Here is a rather scathing review of David Weinberger’s Too Big To Know: Rethinking Knowledge Now that the Facts Aren’t the Facts, Experts Are Everywhere, and the Smartest Person in the Room Is the Room.
The renaissance of Marshall McLuhan in the era of the Web is disappointing for a number of reasons, not the least of which is its rather dull obviousness. There is little surprise that the quotable, evidence-free, technology-obsessed Canadian English professor would thrive in a technology-obsessed era where pithy quotes about the deep meaning of digital devices too often stands in for evidence. McLuhan, of course, was the master theorist of the medium; beyond the over-used “medium is the message,” McLuhan’s major insight was to argue that socio-technological systems — such as the media — operate on a grand scale, largely independent of the day-to-day interest us mere mortals might have in their actual content. McLuhan’s primary flaw, on the other hand, was to decouple this understanding of socio-technical system from any relationship to economics, politics, or society. As leading communications theorist James Carey put it, “McLuhan sees the principal effect [of communication technology] as impacting sensory organization and thought. McLuhan has much to say about perception and thought but little to say about institutions.”
German philosopher Martin Heidegger is less quoted in Silicon Valley than Marshall McLuhan, and not just because he was a Nazi. McLuhan and Heidegger are equally poor writers, but whereas McLuhan’s inscrutable prose has led to him being more read than he ought to be, unintelligibility has had the opposite outcome for Heidegger. A dazzlingly complex philosopher — probably the greatest of the 20th century — the most important aspect of Heidegger’s thought for our purposes is his understanding that human beings (or rather “Dasein,” “being-in-the-world”) are always thrown into a particular context, existing within already existing language structures and pre-determined meanings. In other words, the world is like the web, and we, Dasein, live inside the links.
February 3, 2012
Short URL David Weinberger, distributed knowledge, Epistemology, Facts, Knowledge, social epistemology constructing the world, constructivism, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, Heidegger, internet, Marshall McLuhan, network theory, networks, social cognition, social connectionism, social constructivism, social epistemology, social facts, social networking, social ontology, social reality
Here’s an article in The Economist that my colleague, Roger Koppl, who has done terrific work in the field of forensic evidence, alerted me to. The article mentions Itiel Dror who I’ve been in correspondence with though Roger. I know Itiel’s work through his co-edited Cognition Distributed. Here is his co-authored “extended mind” chapter.
January 20, 2012
Short URL Forensic science, Science in Society social epistemology, extended mind, distributed knowledge, testimony, Roger Koppl, forensics, forensic science, cognition, distributed cognition, externalism, Itiel Dror
Here’s a draft of a forthcoming paper I chanced across.
December 19, 2011
Short URL Cognition, Cognitive science, Embodied cognition, philosophical psychology, Philosophy of mind Andy Clark, cognition, cognitive science, consciousness, david chalmers, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, extended mind, externalism, Katalin Farkas, neurophilosophy, neuroscience, philosophy of mind, situated cognition
This article is really creating a buzz (sorry!!) The idea has some resonance to an aspect of Hayek’s social epistemology (see the article that I just today uploaded).
In much the same way that synapses are strengthened while unused linkages weaken and wither away, so too are paths to salient social knowledge strengthened or weakened – “social connectionism,” if you will.
December 8, 2011
Short URL Artificial intelligence, complexity, Friedrich Hayek, Hayek, Stigmergy, Swarm intelligence bees, collaboration, collective intentionality, collective knowledge, complexity, connectionism, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, social connectionism, social epistemology, stigmergic, stigmergic cognition, stigmergy, swarm, swarm behavior, swarm intelligence, Thomas D. Seeley
Here is a draft of my entry for the SAGE Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences.
December 8, 2011
Short URL Hayek, use of knowledge in society austrian economics, bounded rationality, cognition, cognitive closure, cognitive ecology, cognitive science, cognitive systems, Colin McGinn, collective intentionality, collective knowledge, complex adaptive systems, complexity, connectionism, cybernetics, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, Economics, Embedded, embodied cognition, embodiment, emergence, enactivism, epistemic systems, epistemology, evolutionary psychology, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, freedom, individualism, philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, self organizing systems, self-referentiality, self-synchronizing systems, situated cognition, social cognition, social connectionism, social epistemology, social networking, social ontology, social psychology, socialism, sociocognition, sociology, spontaneous order, spontaneous orders
Here’s an article in this month’s Atlantic.
Rejecting the views of classic political philosophers like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau that primitive humankind started out as a collection of scattered, unorganized individuals, Fukuyama writes: “Human sociability is not a historical or cultural acquisition, but something hardwired into human nature.” Nowhere is Wilson, who pioneered this view, even mentioned.

Wilson is of course famous for his work on stigmergy:
• Sematectonic stigmergy.
• Sign-, cue-, or marker-based stigmergy.
Sematectonic stigmergy denotes communication via modification of a physical environment, an elementary example being the carving out of trails. One needs only to cast an eye around any public space, a park or a college quadrangle for instance, to see the grass being worn away, revealing a dirt pathway that is a well-traveled, unplanned and thus indicates an ‘‘unofficial’’ intimation of a shortcut to some salient destination.
Marker-based stigmergy denotes communication via a signaling mechanism. A standard example is the phenomenon of pheromones laid by social insects. Pheromone imbued trails increase the likelihood of other ants following the aforementioned trails. Unlike sematectonic stigmergy which is a response to an environmental modification , marker-based stigmergy does not make any direct contribution to a given task.
Wilson, E. O. (1975/2000). Sociobiology: The new synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
November 13, 2011
Short URL E. O. Wilson, Stigmergy ants, collaboration, collective intentionality, collective knowledge, complexity, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, Fukuyama, hobbes, human nature, locke, rousseau, social cognition, sociobiology, sociocognition, spontaneous order, stigmergic, stigmergic cognition, stigmergy
Here is an uncorrected proof (do not cite) of my introduction to Hayek in Mind: Hayek’s Philosophical Psychology. Further details will be made available just as soon as the publisher has updated the webpage for this book (according to Amazon the book will be made available on December 13th). A dedicated website to the volume can be found here.
November 4, 2011
Short URL Friedrich Hayek, Hayek, philosophical psychology, Philosophy, Psychology, Social Sciences active externalism, adam smith, advances in austrian econmics, brain science, Chiara Chelini, Chor-Yung Cheung, cognition, cognitive closure, cognitive science, cognitive systems, collective intentionality, collective knowledge, complex adaptive systems, complexity, connectionism, consciousness, cybernetics, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, don ross, edward feser, Embedded, embodied cognition, embodiment, enaction, enactivism, erol basar, evolutionary psychology, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, friedrich hayek, Fuster, Giandomenica Becchio, Gloria Zúñiga y Postigo, hayek, James wible, Jan Willem Lindemans, joaquin fuster, joshua rust, neurophilosophy, phenomenology, philosophical psychology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, psychology, qualia, social epistemology, spontaneous orders, the "easy" problems, the "hard" problem, the sensory order, Thierry Aimar, Troy Camplin, walter weimer
Here’s a co-authored paper by one of the leading complexity theorists Vitorino Ramos.
October 27, 2011
Short URL collaboration, collaborative filtering, collective intentionality, collective knowledge, complex adaptive systems, complexity, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, network theory, networks, self organizing systems, spontaneous order, stigmergic, stigmergic cognition, stigmergy, Vitorino Ramos