A few weeks ago I trailed the release of Georg Theiner’s Res Cogitans Extensa: A Philosophical Defense of the Extended Mind Thesis. Then there was no page devoted to Georg’s book by the publisher. Well now there is so check out the book’s page here. I have the book in hand – scanning it promises a good read. My only gripe is that there is no index. Hopefully, some close-grained reviews will appear over the course of the next year.
Check out this review (scroll down) by Michael Madary of Mark Rowlands’ The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology.
One of the latest labels to emerge for anti-classical (or non-Cartesian, or post-cognitivist) cognitive science is “4E.” The four Es here are the embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended approaches to cognition. Since there are a number of different, and likely incompatible, lines of thought within the 4E group, more work needs to be done to articulate how the Es can and should fit together. Mark Rowlands’ newest book, The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology, addresses this need in a valuable way. He argues, clearly and carefully, for the thesis of the amalgamated mind, which “subsumes both theses of the embodied and the extended mind” (p. 84). The thesis of the embedded mind is rejected as being merely a claim about cognition depending causally on the environment. As such, it is not strong enough to be interesting for Rowlands’ non-Cartesian project. The thesis of the enacted mind, in particular Alva Noë’s sensorimotor version of it, is also rejected as being either implausible or no stronger than the thesis of the embedded mind (pp. 81–82). First I will outline Rowlands’ defense of the thesis of the amalgamated mind; then I will raise some issues for further investigation.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Michael Madary, Ph.D., Johannes Gutenberg — Universität Mainz, FB05 Philosophie und Philologie, Jakob-Welder-Weg 18, 55099 Mainz, Germany. Email: madary@mainz-uni.de
Look out for Rob Rupert’s forthcoming survey for Philosophy Compass. (Thanks to Rob for the heads up).
Abstract
This entry addresses the question of group minds, by focusing specifically on empirical arguments for group cognition and group cognitive states. Two kinds of positive argument are presented and critically evaluated: the argument from individually unintended effects and the argument from functional similarity. A general argument against group cognition – which appeals to Occam’s razor – is also discussed. In the end, much turns on the identification of a mark of the cognitive; proposed marks are briefly (and inconclusively) surveyed in the final section.
Here are some fuzzy but nevertheless recognizable Polaroid photos taken at the now legendary conference convened by Walter Weimer. Weimer was so crucial to bringing Hayek’s The Sensory Order back to life after it had “fallen still-born from the press”. In attendance was also J.J. Gibson who, though was favorably disposed towards TSO in the early 50s, pretty much snubbed Hayek at this conference (put down to his [Gibson's] politics). Thanks to Bill Mace for this info and the conference link. Thanks to John Johnson for documenting and posting these snapshots.
Walt, by the way, was interviewed by Bernard Baars some 25 years ago in The Cognitive Revolution in Psychology but, so far as I can see, with no mention of TSO. I have been in touch with a few of Weimer’s students – in many ways his legacy is assured through their interests and respect for the man. Walt must have had the most amazing foresight to back a outsider such as Hayek.