The VERY excellent Rob Rupert on naturalistic theories of mental content and no surprise – extended mind. Also with Jonno Sutton and Richard Menary sandwiched in between Rob. H/T to Ken Aizawa for the alert. Here is a link to my collection of ”Rupertiana“.
May 4, 2012 0 Comments Short URL Alan Saunders, Brain, Cognition, Cognitive neuroscience, Cognitive science, complexity, David Chalmers, Embodied cognition, Extended Mind, Philosophy of mind, Philosophy of science, Robert Rupert, Shaun Gallagher Andy Clark, Chalmers, extended mind, externalism, john sutton, robert rupert
Look out for Georg Theiner’s book (publisher, Peter Lang) that is about to hit the shelves. I’m reproducing the cover blurb from the preprint he so kindly sent me. Georg has already done some good work for an Extended Mind project and I’m looking forward to his contribution to the stigmergy issue.
Abstract for Res cogitans extensa: For Descartes, minds were essentially immaterial, non-extended things. Contemporary cognitive science prides itself on having exorcised the Cartesian ghost from the biological machine. However, it remains committed to the Cartesian vision of the mental as something purely inner. Against the idea that the mind resides solely in the brain, advocates of the situated and embodied nature of cognition have long stressed the importance of dynamic brain-body-environment couplings, the opportunistic exploitation of bodily morphology, the strategic performance of epistemically potent actions, the generation and use of external representations, and the cognitive scaffolding provided by artifacts and social-cultural practices. According to the extended mind thesis, a significant portion of human cognition literally extends beyond the brain into the body and its environment. This book aims to clarify the nature and the scope of this thesis, and to defend its central insight that cognition is not confined to the boundaries of the biological individual.
About Georg: Georg Theiner, born in Vienna, received his Ph.D. in Philosophy, with a Joint Ph.D. in Cognitive Science and a Minor in History and Philosophy of Science, at Indiana University, Bloomington in 2008. His research interests are in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. During his tenure as a Killam Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Alberta, he worked on the extended mind thesis and socially distributed cognition.
May 29, 2011 0 Comments Short URL active externalism, active perception, Adams & Aizawa, Andy Clark, Boundaries of the Mind, Bounds of Cognition, brain, brain science, Chalmers, consciousness, cyborgs, Descartes, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, Embedded, embodied cognition, embodiment, enactivism, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, Georg Theiner, ghost in the machine, philosophy of mind, situated cognition, social cognition, sociocognition, stigmergy
Here’s the penultimate draft of the aforementioned paper by Julian Kiverstein and Mirko Farina:
Abstract: Like many other studies, this paper focuses on the ways in which the functional isomorphism between neural and extra-neural features can provide the means to meet the criteria for cognitive extension. However, unlike these other studies, this paper acknowledges the stalemate into which the debate over Extended and Embedded has fallen. While surveying the literature directed at the functionalist version of Extended Mind, we investigate the feasibility of the complementarity approach. By exploring the offshoots of recent studies encompassing developmental niche construction, neural development and nurtured cognitive structures, we attempt to validate this complementarity alternative and in bringing it back to fore thereby escape the apparent impasse.
January 27, 2011 Comments Off Short URL Andy Clark, Chalmers, Embedded, embodied cognition, embodiment, enactivism, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, functionalism, Julian Kiverstein, Mirko Farina
Here is an interview conducted by Howard Rheingold, as he says motivated by Andy’s Natural-Born Cyborgs. Note Andy’s reference to stigmergic (swarm) behavior though he doesn’t actually use the term. (Via David Livingstone Smith and Mirko Farina).
November 7, 2010 Comments Off Short URL cognitive science, stigmergy, consciousness, philosophy of mind, swarm intelligence, extended mind, Chalmers, distributed knowledge, Bounds of Cognition, Andy Clark, cyborgs, artificial intelligence, distributed cognition, stigmergic, cognitive systems, brain science, swarm, swarm behavior, evolutionary psychology, externalism, extended cognitive systems, cybernetics, stigmergic cognition, natural-born cyborgs, Boundaries of the Mind, philosophy of psychology, Howard Rheingold, global brain, world wide web
Check out the ms of Colin Klein’s critical notice (forthcoming in Journal of Mind and Behavior) of Rob Rupert, something I’ve been trailing for some time.
November 6, 2010 Comments Off Short URL Andy Clark, Chalmers, cognition, cognitive closure, cognitive ecology, cognitive science, cognitive systems, Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind, colin klein, consciousness, cybernetics, cyborgs, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa, philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, robert rupert
March 11, 2010 Comments Off Short URL Andy Clark, Bounds of Cognition, brain, Chalmers, cognition, cognitive science, complexity, consciousness, david chalmers, Dennett, emergence, epistemology, extended mind, folk psychology, frank Jackson, functionalism, mind body, neuron, neurophilosophy, neuroscience, phenomenology, philosophy, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, psychology, qualia, representationalism, Supersizing the Mind, the "hard" problem, tim bayne
I’ve just completed reading Evan Thompson’s Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, a work which I heartily endorse as the best statement yet of the enactivist theory of mind. I especially like his taking on the philosopher’s zombie and his chapter on Empathy and Enculturation. Last, but by no means least, Thompson has clarified ideas from his now classic collaboration with Varela and Rosch – The Embodied Mind. But never mind my view, check out Dorothée Legrand’s superb critical notice from The Journal of Mind and Behavior.
In Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, Evan Thompson defends the thesis of a “deep continuity of life and mind” according to which “life and mind share a set of basic organizational properties . . . . Mind is life-like and life is mind-like” (p. 128, also p. ix). On the one hand, Thompson uncovers mind in life, by considering life and explaining how living organisms are organized in a way that involves the biological implementation of properties that are usually attributed to mental states. On the other hand, he roots mind in life by considering the mind and explaining how mental states are anchored to (neuro)biological processes. Following the lead of Merleau–Ponty and his notion of “comportment” (1963, p. 4; see Mind in Life, p. 67), Thompson argues that the notion of autonomous dynamic system can integrate the orders of life and mind, and account for the originality of each order, allowing the understanding that “on the one hand, nature is not pure exteriority, but rather in the case of life has its own interiority and thus resembles mind. On the other hand, mind is not pure interiority, but rather a form of structure of engagement with the world and thus resembles life” (p. 78).
Requests for reprints should be sent to Dorothée Legrand, Centre de Recherche en Epistemologie Appliquee, 32, boulevard Victor, 75015 Paris, France.
March 5, 2010 Comments Off Short URL active perception, Alva Noë, Andy Clark, artificial intelligence, autonomy, brain scans, brain science, Chalmers, cognition, cognitive closure, cognitive modeling, cognitive science, collective intentionality, complexity, concept of mind, consciousness, cybernetics, cyborgs, Daniel Dennett, david chalmers, Dennett, Descartes, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, Dorothée Legrand, Eliminative Materialism, Embedded, embodiment, emergence, Enacted, enactivism, Evan Thompson, evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, functionalism, ghost in the machine, Gilbert Ryle, intropection, journal of mind and behavior, knowing how knowing that, mark rowlands, memory, metaphysics, mind body, Mind in Life, mirror neurons, nature-nurture, neurophilosophy, neuroscience, phenomenology, philosophy of biology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of social science, psychology, qualia, representationalism, Searle, sensation, situated cognition, social cognition, social constructivism, social epistemology, sociocognition, sociology, spontaneous order, susan hurley, the "hard" problem, turing test, varela
Here is the uncorrected proof of my essay – do not cite.
January 9, 2010 Comments Off Short URL Andy Clark, ants, austrian economics, behaviorism, Bounds of Cognition, brain, brain science, bruce caldwell, Chalmers, cognition, cognitive closure, cognitive ecology, cognitive modeling, cognitive science, cognitive systems, Colin McGinn, complexity, computational intelligence, concept of mind, consciousness, david chalmers, Dennett, Descartes, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, dualism, Economics, Edelman, Embedded, embodiment, emergence, enactivism, evolutionary psychology, explanation, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, frame problem, frank rosenblatt, functionalism, Fuster, gerald edelman, Gilbert Ryle, hayek, Inevitability Thesis, intentionality, joaquin fuster, knowing how knowing that, leslie marsh, liberty, memetics, metaphysics, michael oakeshott, mind body, networks, neurobiology, neuroeconomics, neuron, neurophilosophy, neuroscience, particle swarm optimization, philosophy of economics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of social science, plasticity, political philosophy, psychology, rationality, representationalism, science, self-referentiality, situated cognition, social cognition, social connectionism, social constructivism, social epistemology, socialism, sociocognition, sociology, spontaneous order, stigmergic, stigmergy, swarm, swarm behavior, swarm intelligence, the "hard" problem, The Road to Serfdom, the sensory order
I’m pleased to have discovered a superb website that accompanies the PBS series Closer to Truth.
The definitive series on the latest advances in brain, mind, free will, personal identity, alien intelligence, parapsychology, afterlife, and brain-mind critical thinking.
Interviewer Robert Lawrence Kuhn does a super job of guiding the discussion for a lay audience and pretty much picks up where Brian Magee left off some 20 years ago in a series of programes for the BBC (and, I think, Channel 4). The interest here is on the selection of programs devoted to consciousness:
Why is Consciousness so Mysterious?
Why is Consciousness Baffling?
Is Consciousness an Illusion?
What’s the Essence of Consciousness?
What’s the Meaning of Consciousness?
Is Consciousness Fundamental?
Is Consciousness Irreducible?
Is Consciousness an Ultimate Fact?
What is the Mind-Body Problem?
Why a Mind-Body Problem?
Solutions to the Mind-Body Problem?
What are Brains?
How are Brains Structured?
What do Brains Do?
How do Brains Function?
How do Human Brains Work?
How Do Human Brains Think and Feel?
Can Brain Explain Mind?
How are Brains Conscious?
What Makes Brains Conscious?
How Brain Scientists Think about Consciousness
Among the luminaries interviewed include David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, Hubert Dreyfus, Kristof Koch, Colin McGinn, Alva Noë, Roger Penrose, and John Searle and others besides. Here is the link to the video archive.
December 10, 2009 Comments Off Short URL Alva Noë, artificial intelligence, brain, brain science, brian magee, Chalmers, cognition, cognitive closure, cognitive science, cognitive systems, Colin McGinn, complexity, computational intelligence, concept of mind, connectionism, consciousness, Daniel Dennett, david chalmers, Dennett, Descartes, distributed cognition, Embedded, embodiment, enactivism, evolutionary psychology, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, hubert dreyfus, intentionality, John Searle, Kristof Koch, mirror neurons, neurobiology, neuron, neurophilosophy, Neurophysics, neuroscience, phenomenology, philosophy of mind, psychology, qualia, Robert Lawrence Kuh, roger penrose, the "hard" problem
July 1, 2009 Comments Off Short URL Adams & Aizawa, Andy Clark, Bounds of Cognition, Chalmers, cognition, cognitive science, cognitive systems, consciousness, david chalmers, distributed cognition, embodiment, extended mind, Joel Krueger, Leonard Angel, leslie marsh, Lynne Rudder Baker, mark rowlands, Matthew Day, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, psychology, religion, robert rupert, robert wilson, social constructivism, Supersizing the Mind, susan hurley, teed rockwell
- Kripke resigns as report alleges he faked results of thought experiments May 20, 2013
- Social relationships and groups: New insights on embodied and distributed cognition May 19, 2013
- Oakeshott on Science as a Mode of Experience May 17, 2013
- A Confederacy of Dunces – quotes and extracts – 12 May 16, 2013
- Stigmergy and emergent behaviour May 15, 2013
- The socially extended mind May 14, 2013
- Consciousness and the social mind May 13, 2013
- Science of Swarms May 12, 2013
- Jazz as conversation May 11, 2013
- Oakeshott on the Character of Religious Experience: Need There be a Conflict Between Science and Religion? May 11, 2013
- The Dynamically Extended Mind – A Minimal Modeling Case Study May 10, 2013
- A Confederacy of Dunces – quotes and extracts – 11 May 9, 2013
- Hayek May 8, 2013
- Preservation Hall: New Album May 7, 2013
- Kingdom Come May 7, 2013