Here is a skeptical take on the insights supposedly offered by the rise of behavioral economics as represented by Daniel Kahneman and others. Since I’m in the process of reviewing Kahneman it will be interesting to see if Levine’s take on behavioral economics jibes with my take on Kahneman in particular and behavioral economics in general – I have a strong sense that is unlikely to be the case.
July 29, 2012
Short URL Daniel Kahneman, Economics, Social science, Behavioral economics, Kahneman, Game Theory behavioral economics, bounded rationality, cognition, cognitive systems, complexity, computational psychology, david levine, neuroeconomics, neuromania, neurophilosophy, neuroscience, philosophy of mind, philosophy of social science, rationality, situated cognition, social cognition, social connectionism, social epistemology, social ontology, social psychology
I see that the publisher now has a fully detailed page up for a volume that I’ve been privileged to be a part of. The Foreword is by a very nice chappie going by the name of V.Smith and includes luminaries such as McCloskey, Boettke, Gintis, Steel and others. My abstract:
Mindscapes and Landscapes: Hayek and Simon on Cognitive Extension
Hayek’s and Simon’s social externalism runs on a shared presupposition: mind is constrained in its computational capacity to detect, harvest, and assimilate “data” generated by the infinitely fine-grained and perpetually dynamic characteristic of experience in complex social environments. For Hayek, mind and sociality are co-evolved spontaneous orders, allowing little or no prospect of comprehensive explanation, trapped in a hermeneutically sealed, i.e. inescapably context bound, eco-system. For Simon, it is the simplicity of mind that is the bottleneck, overwhelmed by the ambient complexity of the environmental. Since on Simon’s account complexity is unidirectional, Simon is far more ebullient about the prospects of explanation. Hayek’s social externalism functions as a kind of distributed “extra-neural” memory store manifest as dynamic spontaneous orders. Simon’s organizational rule-governed externalism negotiates the “inner” world (the mind) with the “outer” world through a homeostatic interface that offloads the cognitive burden into the environment. Their respective externalisms may differ in detail but not in spirit in that it ameliorates their shared presupposition of cognitive constraint. Even though any “optimization talk” for Hayek and Simon is objectionable, knowledge acquisition can be represented by a contextualized stigmergic swarm optimization algorithm that gives due emphasis to both the individual and the environment. The key insight is that “perfect” knowledge is unnecessary, impracticable and indeed irrelevant if one understands the mechanism at work in complex sociality, a stigmergic sociality that in effect augments or scaffolds cognition.
July 11, 2012
Short URL complexity, Cognitive science, Cognition, Friedrich Hayek, Hayek, Philosophy of mind, Extended Mind, Austrian School, social epistemology, Herbert Simon, Economics, Colin McGinn, Spontaneous order, Social science, Bounded Rationality stigmergy, social epistemology, social ontology, extended mind, hayek, social cognition, self-referentiality, cognitive closure, stigmergic, situated cognition, spontaneous order, externalism, extended cognitive systems, social connectionism, stigmergic cognition, social psychology, spontaneous orders, herb gintis, behavioral economics, vernon smith, self organizing systems, Pete Boettke, bounded rationality, Deirdre McCloskey
The publisher has now put up a webpage for this volume.
June 14, 2012
Short URL Austrian School, Cognition, Deirdre McCloskey, Economics, Epistemology, Friedrich Hayek, Herbert Gintis, Herbert Simon, Peter Boettke behavioral economics, complexity, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, extended mind, externalism, social epistemology, spontaneous orders, stigmergic, stigmergic cognition, stigmergy
Daniel Kahneman’s recently released book Thinking, Fast and Slow aimed at a popular audience is certainly generating a great deal of press, so far as I can tell, most of it very positive. Here he is outlining his experimental work in a Ted Talk. As a behavioral economist much of what he says about rationality will have resonance for Hayek and Simon and other situated cognitive theorists. I think that much of what Kahneman says is consistent with Gunderman from the previous posting though they are of course very different thinkers.
November 23, 2011
Short URL Amos Tversky, behavioral economics, bounded rationality, brain science, cognition, cognitive science, complexity, Daniel Kahneman, experiencing self, happiness, hayek, Herbert Simon, memory, neurophilosophy, personal identity, rationality, reflective self, remembering self, self, self-deception, self-referentiality, thinking fast and slow, well-being