New EM paper by Kourken Michaelian published in Consciousness and Cognition.
May 22, 2012
Short URL Cognition, Cognitive neuroscience, Cognitive science, Consciousness and Cognition, Consciousness Studies, Extended Mind, Memory, neuroscience, Philosophy of mind, University of Granada Andy Clark, david chalmers, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, kourken michaelian
The VERY excellent Rob Rupert on naturalistic theories of mental content and no surprise – extended mind. Also with Jonno Sutton and Richard Menary sandwiched in between Rob. H/T to Ken Aizawa for the alert. Here is a link to my collection of ”Rupertiana“.
May 4, 2012
Short URL Alan Saunders, Brain, Cognition, Cognitive neuroscience, Cognitive science, complexity, David Chalmers, Embodied cognition, Extended Mind, Philosophy of mind, Philosophy of science, Robert Rupert, Shaun Gallagher Andy Clark, Chalmers, extended mind, externalism, john sutton, robert rupert
A pre-print of Paul Smart’s paper.
April 17, 2012
Short URL Cognition, Cognitive science, Extended Mind, Mind, Paul Smart, philosophical psychology, Philosophy of mind, Shaun Gallagher, Social Sciences Andy Clark, cognitive science, cognitive systems, consciousness, david chalmers, extended mind, externalism, neurophilosophy, robert wilson
Anthony Crisafi and Shaun Gallagher in AI & Society (Volume 25, Number 1, 123-129):
We examine the theory of the extended mind, and especially the concept of the ‘‘parity principle’’ (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58.1:7–19, 1998), in light of Hegel’s notion of objective spirit. This unusual combination of theories raises the question of how far one can extend the notion of extended mind and whether cognitive processing can supervene on the operations of social practices and institutions. We raise some questions about putting this research to critical use.
March 14, 2012
Short URL Artificial intelligence, Clark, Cognition, Cognitive neuroscience, Embodied cognition, Extended Mind, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel, Philosophy, Philosophy of mind, Shaun Gallagher, social epistemology Andy Clark, david chalmers, extended mind, externalism, hegel, parity principle, Shaun Gallagher, situated cognition, social cognition
Richard Menary’s long time coming The Extended Mind is reviewed here by Joseph Ulatowski.
February 27, 2012
Short URL Cognition, Cognitive neuroscience, Cognitive science, Embodied cognition, Extended Mind, neuroscience, Philosophy of mind, qualia active externalism, active perception, Adams & Aizawa, Andy Clark, david chalmers, David Spurrett, extended mind, externalism, Joseph Ulatowski, mark rowlands, neurophilosophy, neuroscience, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, richard menary, robert rupert, robert wilson, situated cognition, Stephen Cowley, susan hurley
Chalmers’ and Clark’s extended mind thesis cited in this article from an architecture and design publication.
Turning to philosophy and robotics gives us a new insight into what might be going on. In 1998, A. Clark and D. Chalmers proposed the “extended mind” concept, where the workings of our mind actually extend beyond the brain and into our surroundings. An interplay takes place between our thoughts and internal memories, and knowledge and information stored outside yet within ready reach. Mobile robots do, in fact, use their environment as their memory — they have no stored internal memory, and thus save enormous computational overhead. Rodney Brooks’ Mars Explorer works in precisely this way. Its ability to navigate its environment comes from an “intelligence” that links internal processors with external information.
This implies that the environment is crucial to the development of our brain: our mind is an integral part of our environment, and if we wish it to engage our intelligence, the environment should embody the same degree of organized complexity as our neurological processes themselves. Two possible connective scenarios are thus strikingly contrasted. 1. In an information-sparse, minimalist environment, our mind stops at the skull’s interior. 2. In a coherently complex environment, our mind can extend into and interact with the visual information stored outside. In the latter case, we are situated in a vastly richer information field that drives our brain’s growth in order to process and interpret this information.
February 25, 2012
Short URL Brain, Clark, Cognition, Cognitive science, complexity, Embodied cognition, Extended Mind, Mind, Philosophy, Philosophy of mind, robotics, Rodney Brooks, Stigmergy Andy Clark, architecture, cognitive science, david chalmers, Embedded, embodied cognition, embodiment, extended mind, externalism, philosophy of mind
Check out two forthcoming papers from Rob Rupert, one of the sharpest minds around:
1. Against Group Cognitive States (forthcoming in S. Chant and G. Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality. No listing on OUP’s website yet).
English users are not fazed by such sentences as “Microsoft intends to develop a new operating system” and “England wants to retain the pound as its unit of currency.” We produce and consume such claims frequently and with ease. One might nevertheless wonder about their literal truth. Does Microsoft — the corporation itself — literally intend to develop a new operating system? Does England — as a single body — genuinely want to retain the pound as its unit of currency. More generally, it is a substantive philosophical and empirical question whether groups of individuals (who themselves instantiate mental states) instantiate mental states properly so called.
2. Keeping HEC in CHEC: On the Priority of Cognitive Systems
February 11, 2012
Short URL Cognition, Cognitive science, Microsoft, social epistemology Adams & Aizawa, Andy Clark, Bounds of Cognition, brain science, cognition, cognitive science, Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind, collective intentionality, david chalmers, distributed cognition, embodied cognition, enaction, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism, philosophy of mind, robert rupert, situated cognition, social epistemology, social ontology, sociocognition
An article from The Atlantic. Allen Buchanan interviewed about his recent book.
I think that any appeal to the notion of human nature, on either side of the enhancement debate, is tricky and problematic and has to be handled with care. Yes, in one sense we might say that it’s part of human nature to strive to improve our capacities. Humans have done this in the past by developing literacy and numeracy, and the institutions of science, and more recently we’ve done it with computers and the Internet. So, yes, if an alien were looking at humanity and asking “What is human nature?” one of the ingredients is going to be that these beings seem quite concerned with improving their capacities and they seem to have a knack for doing it.
On the other hand, sometimes people say that we shouldn’t engage with these technologies because we could somehow damage our nature or interfere with our nature, and in doing so they seem to have a kind of rosy pre-Darwinian view about human nature and about nature generally. They tend to think that an individual organism, a human being, is like the work of a master engineer—a delicately balanced, harmonious whole that’s the product of eons of exacting evolution.
February 9, 2012
Short URL Allen Buchanan, Cognition, Cognitive science, Embodied cognition, Evolutionary Psychology, Human, Human nature Andy Clark, cyborgs, extended cognitive systems, extended mind, externalism
I’ve just come across this article by Andy with a follow-up here.
Some recent work in computational and cognitive neuroscience suggests that it is indeed the frugal use of our native neural capacity (the inventive use of restricted “neural bandwidth,” if you will) that explains how brains like ours so elegantly make sense of noisy and ambiguous sensory input.
January 29, 2012
Short URL Artificial intelligence, Cognitive neuroscience, Cognitive science, Neural Networks Andy Clark, brain science, cognition, cognitive science, neurophilosophy, neuroscience, philosophy of mind
Here’s a draft of a forthcoming paper I chanced across.
December 19, 2011
Short URL Cognition, Cognitive science, Embodied cognition, philosophical psychology, Philosophy of mind Andy Clark, cognition, cognitive science, consciousness, david chalmers, distributed cognition, distributed knowledge, extended mind, externalism, Katalin Farkas, neurophilosophy, neuroscience, philosophy of mind, situated cognition